在實現人民幣國際化的過程中可能面臨的挑戰

摘要：中國的官方貨幣（人民幣）已經開始成為國際性的貨幣，但是在此過程中人民幣的境外市場的發展可能對中國的金融市場提出挑戰。銀行和保險公司正在使用這些境外人民幣創建境外外匯、貨幣和債券市場，因此銀行間的資金流入也可能會提出新的政策挑戰。最終，境外的銀行將繞開國內銀行而直接對中國的公司提供人民幣信貸，這就可能使中國當局的政策性杠桿處于危險境地。

關鍵詞：人民幣 國際化 挑戰

1. Introduce

A currency is internationalised when market participants – residents and non-residents alike – conveniently use it to trade， to invest， to borrow and to invoice in it outside the currency’s home country (“offshore”). The Chinese Renminbi has just begun the process of becoming an international currency.

As long as capital controls remain effective， Renminbi internationalization leaves the levers intact. Relaxed capital controls would put at risk bond market rationing， regulated deposit and lending rates， and quantitative credit guidance. Reserve requirements can be extended to inflows from offshore， but at a price.

The development of the Renminbi’s offshore market can be expected to pose challenges to China’s financial development. One of the consequences of this model is that hardly any credit is extended to Chinese borrowers across the mainland border.

Chinese firms are selling Renminbi bonds offshore and ready access to such funding could undermine the domestic rationing of bond market access and accelerate large Chinese firms’ exit from the banking system. Eventually， banks will forge strong links between the offshore Renminbi interbank market and its domestic counterpart， challenging monetary and credit control. In the longer term， firms in China will borrow from non-Chinese banks located outside the mainland， challenging not only monetary and credit control but also the predominance of Chinese-owned banks.

Non-Chinese and Chinese obligors selling Renminbi bonds offshore， the forging of strong interbank links between the Renminbi market on the mainland and off shore， and direct borrowing by Chinese firms from banks located outside the mainland.

2. Offshore bond market development

If it follows the precedent of offshore markets in other major currencies， the Renminbi offshore bond market will diversify away from Chinese nationals asissuers. So far， the overwhelming majority of issuers of Renminbi bonds in Hong Kong have plans to use the proceeds on the mainland. Since offshore bonds yield less than onshore bonds， which themselves are generally cheaper than bank loans， there is much latent supply of offshore bonds. The constraint is notthe bond issuance in Hong Kong per se， but rather the remittance of the Renminbi proceeds to the mainland – for which safe approval is required， just as it is for the inward remittance of dollars.

This dominance of the offshore market by borrowers of domestic origin is a very unusual trait (Graph 1). Whereas 80% of Renminbi issuers are of Chinese nationality， only 30–60% of issuers in other offshore markets are nationals of the curency’s country of issue. For non-financial issuers， however， the offshore Renminbi bond market is less out of line with the international experience.

The dearth of non-Chinese Renminbi bond issuers allows unusually weak credits to issue offshore bonds. While the median rating of Renminbi bonds sold in Hong Kong is A， some 7% by number and 17% by value carried sub-investment grade ratings at the time of issue. In contrast to the high quality of issuers in other offshore markets (McCauley (2010))， the unsatisfied demand for offshore Renminbi bonds lets weak credits issue bonds.

A major deterrent to the borrowing of Renminbi by firms and governments outside China， even at low interest rates， is the potential exposure to a currency that is widely anticipated to appreciate. If they perceived a two-way risk in the exchange rate， obligors outside China might be more willing to take on Renminbi liabilities and to hold them without hedging them.

One of the payoffs to China of Renminbi internationalisation would be the sharing of exchange risk – the short Renminbi， long foreign currency risk – that is currently held by Chinese investors in general， and the government in particular. This ultimately requires that firms and governments in the rest of the world take on Renminbi obligations and leave them unhedged (except through trade flows). For the international use of the Renminbi to succeed as a tool for international risk diversification， offshore issuance of Renminbi bonds needs more non-Chinese issuers.

Returning to Chinese issuance of offshore Renminbi bonds， a future regime allowing easy repatriation of Renminbi to China would pose a challenge to domestic credit control. Required approval for the repatriation of the proceeds of Renminbi offshore bonds keeps offshore issuance small in relation to the domestic bond market in China， which itself is small in relation to bank debt (Graph 2).

Moreover， assuming more cross-border capital mobility in the future ，offshore bond issuance could spur an accelerated liberalisation of the domestic bond market that could cost banks their best corporate borrowers in a few short years. In Japan， the liberalisation of the foreign exchange market in 1980 and 1984 and of the euroyen market in 1984 prompted heavy use of the offshore market from the mid-1980s. This， in turn， spurred domestic bond market liberalization . Losing their big corporate borrowers， the big Japanese banks reinvented themselves as lenders to small and medium-sized firms that had real estate collateral， with disastrous results.

All this highlights how the development of the offshore Renminbi market leaves the domestic rationing of bond market access vulnerable to easier cross-border flows of Renminbi. Of course， a similar statement can be made about cross-border flows of dollars into China. Easy cross-border flows of dollars would lead to an explosion of dollar bond issuance. The development of the offshore Renminbi bond market implies that an easing of cross-border flows would give Chinese firms a choice between dollar and Renminbi borrowing.

3. Interbank inflows

Offshore banking in the renminbi can be expected ultimately to be less isolated from banking markets on the mainland， and the eventual interactions may pose policy challenges. At present， renminbi in Hong Kong banks can flow back to the mainland only via limited channels. They can flow back through trade or through capital account channels.The existing， relatively small claims of offshore banks on Chinese banks and non-banks are denominated in dollars and other foreign currencies.

At some stage， one would expect cross-border markets to link banks outside the mainland to mainland banks and firms. The records of the global banking markets in dollar， euro， yen and sterling all make clear that offshore banks end up holding substantial exposures to the banks and non-banks of the currency’s home country. And the growth and fluctuations of these stakes have posed policy challenges elsewhere to authorities used to working with regulated deposit rates， reserve requirements and domestic banks.

Experience elsewhere suggests that eventually banks outside the mainland will lend in Renminbi directly to banks in China. For example， dollar claims on banks in the United States booked by banks located outside the United States have risen from less than a fifth to more than a third of overall dollar interbank claims booked outside the United States (Graph 3， red line).

Eurodollar inflows into the United States in 1969 are instructive. With inflation rising towards 5–6%， the Federal Reserve was in the process of raising interest rates to 10%. As Treasury bill and other money market yields approached the (Regulation Q) ceilings on deposit rates， banks suffered a run-off of interest-sensitive certificates of deposit – so-called disintermediation. Previously， banks would have been forced to cut back on their lending. But the eurodollar market had advanced so much in a dozen years that big US banks could attract deposits there and thereby replace the lost funding at home.

At the time， Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members were surprised at how elastic a source of funds the offshore dollar market had become. President Hayes of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York worried in February about the consequences of a “drying up of the supply of Euro-dollars”(FOMC， 4 February 1969， p 44). However， at the 9 September meeting， FOMC members learned that New York banks had drawn on the eurodollar market since December for an amount equivalent to 6–7% of their assets. An inflow in eight months of a like share of the assets of the large Chinese commercial banks would be quite a sum.

4. Direct borrowing by Chinese firms from banks abroad

Eventually， banks offshore will extend Renminbi credit directly to firms in China， bypassing domestic banks altogether and putting at risk some of the policy levers of the authorities. In particular， the offshore markets in dollar， euro， yen and sterling direct 20–40% of their credit to borrowers in the currency’s home country. Dollar claims on US residents that are booked by banks outside the United States started out as a small proportion of overall dollar claims booked offshore but rose over a generation to approach a half (Graph 4， red line).Precisely when the Bank of Japan sought to restrict domestic yen lending (Fukumoto et al (2010))， the proportion of offshore yen claims on Japanese residents jumped in the late 1980s from around 20% to 60% (Graph 4， green line). Eventually， a good part of the Renminbi offshore assets can be expected to be claims on Chinese residents.

Such Renminbi credit would pose manifold policy challenges. Offshore loans can be priced below minimum regulated loan rates， especially if they are funded with deposits that are not subject to reserve requirements. The authorities may encounter difficulties in measuring such credit， even with authorisation or registration requirements. If， as can be expected， non-Chinese banks do most of this direct cross-border lending， especially if they can evade reserve requirements or other regulation， the foreign bank share of bank credit to Chinese residents (currently 2%) can be expected to rise. By allowing foreign banks to raise their market share in China， direct cross-border lending will also weaken window guidance as a tool for influencing credit growth.

5. Conclusions

The growing use of the Renminbi beyond the Chinese mainland has a complex relationship with the country’s capital controls. Cross-border flows themselves represent an exception to capital controls， and the build-up of Renminbi deposits has further raised China’s official foreign exchange reserves. Yet capital controls remain effective， and this allows the Chinese authorities to enforce ceilings on deposit rates and to guide bank lending quantities as well as to ration access to the bond market.

This feature argues that established offshore markets provide significant credit to borrowers in the currency’s home country. This is already the direction in which the offshore Renminbi bond market is moving. At this stage， border controls on Renminbi inflows limit the impact of the offshore Renminbi bond market on domestic bond market rationing and， more generally， on the balance between bank credit and securities market credit.

For its part， offshore Renminbi banking can be expected to evolve beyond the use of deposits outside the mainland to fund non-Chinese borrowers. Renminbi credit will at some stage flow into China through the interbank and direct cross-border lending channels， complicating monetary and credit control. Reserve requirements may well be extended to Renminbi interbank inflows， but these may give an edge to foreign banks in lending directly to Chinese firms from offshore.

In all， the internationalisation of the Renminbi can provide a third track of pricing for currency， money and bond markets. This track will help to diminish the importance of regulated financial prices and， alongside its domestic counterpart， to inform their setting where flexibility is permitted. The more that offshore Renminbi are given a passport to enter the mainland freely， the more prices in the offshore market will matter. In the process of easing capital controls， a preferential passport for Renminbi to enter the domestic economy could usefully lessen the risk of foreign currency borrowing.

Graph used in the paper:

Graph 1

Graph 2

Graph 3

Graph 4

References：

[1]Aliber， R (1980): “The integration of the offshore and domestic banking system”， Journal of Monetary Economics， vol 6， no 4， October， pp 509-26

[2]Borio， C， R McCauley and P McGuire (2011): “Global credit and domestic credit booms”， BIS Quarterly Review， September， pp 43-57

[3]Cheung， Y-W， G Ma and R McCauley (2011): “Why does China attempt to internationalise the renminbi?”， in J Golley and L Song (eds)， China rising:global challenges and opportunities， Australian National University Press andSocial Sciences Research Press (China)， pp 45-68

[4]Eichengreen， B and M Flandreau (2010): “The Federal Reserve， the Bank of England and the rise of the dollar as an international currency， 1914-39”， BIS Working Papers， no 328， November

[5] Frankel， J (2011):“Historical precedents for internationalization of the RMB” ，paper presented to a Council on Foreign Relations/China Development Research Foundation symposium， The future of the international monetary system and the role of the renminbi， Beijing， 1 November 2011