Changes in the International Power Landscape and the Sino-U.S. relations

Changes in the International Power Landscape and the Sino-U.S. relations

Fu Mengzi,

Vice President and Researcher of China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations

The change of international power landscape, especially that of major powers, involves a complex combination of index system measurement. I’d like to take this opportunity to share some personal views from some linear aspects. We are going through some profound changes unseen in a century, the rampage of the novel coronavirus pandemic, a rare new disease in the world, is accelerating the existing changes and giving birth to some new changes. As the pandemic still continues currently, it cannot be termed the post-pandemic period yet. Therefore, how its global impact is remains to be further observed.

I. A turning-point change for the international power landscape is difficult in a short term

Even though among the domestic academia there are different views or even opposite views on the declining America theory, however, the U.S. hard power has not reached the sunset yet, and whether the COVID-19 pandemic is the watershed for ending the debate on the decline of the United States needs to be observed. In the short term, the architecture of international power composed of major powers is unlikely to see a turning-point change.

After the end of the Cold War, the world power landscape has changed from "two super powers and multi-major powers" to "one super power and multi-major powers", which, so far, has not undergone any significant turning-point change, or it cannot be concluded if there is such a change. Only China has become the biggest variable influencing the change of world architecture. It is too early to term it "two super powers and multi-major ones", since on the whole, the West is still strong and the East weak, the North is strong and the South weak; the strength of developed countries is still dominant, the catching-up pace of emerging market economy groups is slowing down, and the development of developing countries has their own difficulties. In terms of purchasing power parity, the gross domestic product (GDP) of developing countries exceeds that of developed countries, and many people think that developing countries and developed countries halve the global GDP. But this is not the case at market exchange rates. According to the data of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 2018, developing countries account for 39.7% of world GDP, while developed countries account for 57.6%.

In the year 2014, China's GDP exceeded US$10 trillion (the same below). In the past five years, i.e., from 2015 to 2019, China's GDP rose from $11 trillion to $14 trillion, an increase of $3 trillion; the United States increased from $18.2 trillion to $22 trillion, an increase of nearly $4 trillion; the European Union increased from $11 trillion to $13.6 trillion, an increase of $2.5 trillion; Russia shrank from $2 trillion in 2014 to $1.66 trillion. From these figures in the past five years, the growth of the economic scale of the United States is at least equal to that of China. In the year 2019, the economic scale gap between China and the United States was narrowed by$470 billion, but the gap between other major countries and the United States is still widening.

One must sustain the efforts when a task is nearing completion. We need to be soberly aware of the difficulties and challenges for China to catch up with and surpass the United States. Previously, as the Soviet Union and Japan accounted for more than 60% of the U.S. GDP, but they then turned downward. It is originally estimated that China would surpass the United States in 2025, 2030 or 2035, now we need to soberly assess the challenges facing China.

After having achieved the COVID-19 pandemic prevention and control, China first resumed work and production, and in 2020 may become the only major country with positive economic growth. According to the latest forecast of the World Economic Outlook issued by the International Monetary Fund, in the year 2020, the economic growth of the United States will be -5.9%, that of the Euro zone will be -7.5% (with Germany and France at -7.0% and -7.2% respectively), that of the United Kingdom will be -6.5%, that of Japan will be -5.2%, and that of Russia will be -5.5%. The growth rate of China's economic scale will expand, and the gap with the United States will be further narrowed. However, the future course will be more formidable, and is facing new challenges and uncertainties. Is the external environment of China relatively sound as it was in the past 40 years, will the global pandemic crepeat or prolong and compress the world economic growth space, is there a strategic opportunity to accelerate development under the globalization? Relying on the conditions of super large scale economy and population size, China will definitely become the world's largest economy, and strive to narrow the gap with other major countries in per capita GDP. Some countries and international institutions are sure that China will become the world's largest economy, but the timing may be after the year 2035, and the overall surpassing of economic, technological and military strength may be after the year 2050.

II. The traditional international politics of realism has returned with distinct characteristics of the times

The main manifestations of the return of traditional international politics include: disorder, selfishness and the state introversion, moral supremacy, and the aggravation of mutual strife; the confrontation between major powers is mainly the confrontation between China and the United States, and the confrontation between the United States and Russia is put on the table already. Robert Kagan points out in the Jungle Grows Back that our time has always been paradise. He said that from the years 1500 to 1945, as the most powerful group of countries in the world -- the great powers of Europe were fighting almost consecutively. However, after 1945, there was no war between the great powers, and the Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union ended peacefully, which is rare in history. The world enjoyed a boom of 3.5% annual growth in global GDP. Four billion people in the world are lifted out of poverty. We have lived in the illusion of free order for too long to imagine any other kind of world. He concluded that the current liberal order has become riddled with holes, and the role of the United States in the world has become blurred". The jungle is growing again, history is returning itself, countries are returning to their old habits and traditions, territorial aggression has returned to Europe and to Asia as well". The National Security Strategy Report and other documents of the United States emphasize that the U.S. main strategic tasks should return to responding to the challenges of major powers.

Compared with history, today's realistic international politics has distinct characteristics of the times. This prominent feature is that the world power landscape, without any significant symbolic sign, has witnessed the times pulsation of de-structuring international order and the complication of the relations among major powers, i.e. there is no milestone of a war or a major crisis to shape the world order, which is rare in history, and is also the essence of the wording "unseen" in the great change unseen in a century.

The existing trend of the profound changes in a century is overlaid by novel coronavirus pandemic, with the international order weakening, the dispersion becoming stronger, the hierarchical levels or multicentre feature also highlighted. Organizations such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Group 20, the European Union and others are still vigorously advocating multilateralism, but the effectiveness of these mechanisms is on the decline, the issues are diverse, the differences increase, and it is more difficult to reach a consensus. Trump's "withdrawals" and abrogation accelerated the de-structuring process of the existing international order. The United States is a major country in the construction of international order, but there are some people who always believe that the weakening of liberal international order does not strengthen the national interests of the United States, while China has rapidly realized its strength growth by using the existing order. In some ways, the United States may have the impulse to make a new start.

The polycentricity here mainly refers to the world that may go halves. The United States established an international system based on values as a link to exclude China; China has expanded its development space in depth and breadth by independent innovation and the Belt and Road Initiative. If the United States abandons the generally unified international order, including technology and economic system, it has established, it is bound to promote the actual development of "decoupling". Like or not, the emergence of a plural system world will become an inevitable reality. In the future, there will be a Western technology system dominated by the United States and formation of a technology system led by China, including a dual economic system in a sense. In August 2020, U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo announced the "clean net" program, proposing to move China's digital products (telecommunications, information, digital economy, various software sectors) out of the United States. The "decoupling" between China and the United States in the high-tech area has already occurred. This will force China to make efforts to adopt a more independent science and technology development policy and avoid bottlenecks in key areas. Of course, technology "decoupling" is not necessarily incompatible, for example, Android and Apple belong to two different systems, which does not mean complete independence of each other in use.

In the world landscape, if there is an overwhelming dominant issue, it is competition among major powers. Because the competition among major powers, especially the confrontation between China and the United States is on the table, the world may face an international architecture dominated by a dual power structure with each as its own pole, but this is different from the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Presently, the forefront of major powers competition is not clear, military confrontation does not constitute the main thread, but the competition is all-round, and there are also areas of common interests between China and the United States that need cooperation. In such a world, a grand universality may no longer be the goal pursued by any major country or enterprise, "winner-take-all" is difficult to be accepted by various countries in the world, so the demand for fairness will get stronger. Even in the same camp, various countries will no longer follow the leadership of the leading countries, and are no longer willing to be "followers" to follow up casually. Between Germany and the United States, between Britain after Brexit and the European Union, and between small and medium-sized members and the major powers of the European Union, power and interests face redistribution; Japan does not want South Korea to attend the G-7 summit; Russia does not choose side, which is most in line with its own interests, and is more willing to be a strategic balancer between China and the United States; the European Union has consensus with the United States on some issues, but emphasizes strategic autonomy, and meantime regards China as a systematic or institutional challenger.

III. China's strategic response

China will face an international environment different from that in the past 40 years. It is difficult for the international power architecture to change fundamentally in a short period of time. It is still "one superpower and multi-major powers", but the speed of orienting to the two poles represented by China and the United States will be accelerated. China will still face a more complex international environment in which Western strength (including economic, military, technological and cultural influence, etc.) will dominate in a rather long period or its inertia will continue for a longer period of time. Particularly, it is necessary to face up to the bilateral relations that China and the United States may be getting further and further away from each other rather than getting closer, to adhere to the bottom line thinking, prepare for the worst, but not give up the best expectations and efforts.