The Prospects of ASEAN’s Major Power Balancing Strategy Under the Impact of Trump 2.0

ASEAN’s major power balancing strategy refers to the balancing strategy adopted by ASEAN and its member states to seek national and regional security and development by maintaining multi-faceted friendship and impartiality with surrounding major powers. The evolution of this strategy is a process of dynamic adjustment， with ASEAN and its members being the implementing subjects， major powers the objects. There is close interaction and mutual influence between the subjects and the objects， forming a complex systematic strategic field. As the once-in-a-century changes take place on the world stage， major power competition and rivalry unfold in Southeast Asia in its fullness. In particular， with Donald Trump taking office again in the U.S.， ASEAN’s major power balancing strategy is set to undergo new developments.

ASEAN's Major Power Balancing Strategy Has Basically Formed

Although ASEAN was established as early as in 1967， its major power balancing strategy was put forward and came into maturity after the end of the Cold War in 1991. It has now grown into a full-fledged strategy.

I. The Evolution of ASEAN’s Major Power Balancing Strategy

ASEAN started as a loose regional organization. Back then its foreign policy mainly aimed to address the bipolar Cold War situation， “communist infiltration” and issues such as the Vietnam War and Cambodian War. Generally， it adopted a pro-U.S.， anti-Soviet and anti-China position， focusing on ensuring peace and survival in Southeast Asia against the Cold War background.

In the post-Cold War era， two key factors enabled the evolution of the major power balancing strategy： first， eased major power relations provided more space for ASEAN to carry forward the strategy; second， the East Asian cooperation mechanism established after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis initiated an institutional platform unseen before for implementing the strategy. After over 30 years of post-Cold War efforts， the strategy has gradually taken shape， enabling ASEAN to maintain good cooperative relations with major powers， promote regional prosperity and stability， and yield strategic dividends for itself.

II. The Holistic Nature of ASEAN’s Major Power Balancing Strategy

The defining feature of the strategy is its holism which consists of three meanings. For one， as a regional organization facing the world， ASEAN has a unified stance on conducting the major power balancing strategy. In the post-Cold War era， ASEAN underwent expansion， with membership growing from six original countries （with Brunei joining in 1984） to the Greater ASEAN encompassing all Southeast Asian nations before entering the 21st century after the accession of Vietnam （in 1995）， Laos and Myanmar （in 1997）， and Cambodia （in 1999）. East Timor， now an observer state， is seeking full membership. All new members are on board with the major power balancing strategy. For two， all ten ASEAN members have pursued major power balancing strategy after the Cold War. Since China and the U.S. established diplomatic ties in 1979， “old” ASEAN members decided to improve their relations with China， and countries like Indonesia， Vietnam and Singapore followed suit after the end of the Cold War. At present， most member states adopt a non-aligned strategy between China and the U.S. For three， ASEAN adopts a systematic approach to its major power balancing. While advancing regional integration， ASEAN has built an “ASEAN+” structure by which it sets up an institutionalized strategic partnership network with major Asia-Pacific countries and has spread it to the EU， the UK， France， Germany， the Middle East， Africa and Latin America. A so-called “ASEAN World” comes into being with ASEAN countries at its core. The “ASEAN+” structure glues together the development of ASEAN members， the process of ASEAN integration， the cooperation in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region， and the evolution of the Asia-Pacific order.

III. “ASEAN Centrality” Is the Defining Feature of ASEAN’s Major Power Balancing Strategy

In developing its balancing strategy， ASEAN has shaped the core concept of “ASEAN Centrality”， which becomes the defining feature of the strategy. Proposed in 2008 and endorsed by major powers， this concept emphasizes ASEAN as the “driver” of East Asian cooperation， calling on major powers to respect and support the central role of ASEAN in “ASEAN+” structure， and working for the institutionalization of such role. To answer its appeal， major powers have endorsed this concept， even though it fluctuates from time to time with the changing relations among the major powers. In some way， the ups and downs of the “ASEAN Centrality” becomes the barometer of the global situation， as well as the gains and losses of the major power balancing strategy. In recent years， ASEAN has felt its centrality challenged in the turbulent world， in particular， amid the major changes in China-U.S. relations. While the U.S. claims to respect “ASEAN Centrality”， its Indo-Pacific Strategy has undermined it in effect. In response， ASEAN introduced the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific （AOIP）” in 2019， aiming to maintain its centrality by building a non-exclusive regional order and acting as a super bridge builder between China and the U.S. So far， the “ASEAN Centrality” remains quite stable as no major power has voiced for their abandonment， indicating no fundamental shift in ASEAN’s major power balancing strategy.

The Impact Of Trump 2.0 On ASEAN’s Major Power Balancing Strategy

Like other nations， ASEAN countries believe Trump 2.0 will significantly impact their development， security， internal affairs and diplomacy， and even trigger new crises.

I. Impact on ASEAN Member States

As the main force for enacting the major power balancing strategy， ASEAN countries perceive more risks than opportunities from Trump 2.0. According to the Trump Risk Index， U.S. allies such as Thailand and the Philippines will be subject to higher risk of retaliatory measures. ASEAN countries may face challenges at the following fronts： One， disrespect. Trump’s first term records of diplomatic incivility， interference in others’ internal affairs and trade bullying are still there， and in the second term， his unilateral and isolationist policy may marginalize ASEAN’s political voices. Two， transactionalism in U.S. diplomacy. As Trump pursues first and foremost American interests in international affairs， he tends to resort to transactionalism in foreign policy in order to better serve domestic purposes. This leaves ASEAN countries， who lack negotiation leverages， in fear and anxiety as they are in an unfavorable position when dealing with the U.S. Three，"rise of populism. Trump’s protectionist policies may trigger populist sentiments in ASEAN countries and thus exacerbate economic inequalities and social tensions. Four， interference in their"domestic affairs. Countries like Vietnam， Laos， Myanmar， and Cambodia particularly worry about that given the history of U.S. dictating over the Rohingya issue in Myanmar， or the prospect of U.S. interfering in Vietnam’s internal affairs under the pretext of human rights and democracy. Five， tariff imposition. Vietnam and other ASEAN countries with large trade surpluses with the U.S. （around $200 billion annually） are facing threats of tariff hikes or tariff increase on transit trade from Trump administration， which will squeeze the space for ASEAN countries to undertake industrial transfer and strain their economic resilience.

II. Impact on ASEAN Community Building

While international attention is limited， the anticipated impacts of Trump 2.0 upon the building of ASEAN Community matter a lot to ASEAN countries. One of the main tasks of the balancing strategy is to win support and investment from major powers in building the ASEAN Community via major power competing mechanism. 2025 marks the 10th anniversary of the ASEAN Community， and its achievements need to be recognized and endorsed by the major powers. However， Trump 1.0 showed little interest in ASEAN summits and declined presence of the U.S. in East Asia summits and ASEAN meetings. It is safe to say that Trump 2.0 is unlikely to maintain the U.S.-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership established by the Biden administration. U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has demonstrated ignorance towards ASEAN， focusing instead on anti-China alliances like U.S.-Japan and U.S-South Korea military alliance and the Australia， U.K. and U.S. trilateral security agreement （AUKUS）. What’s more， Trump’s disinterest in ASEAN Community building， the ASEAN Way， “ASEAN Centrality” and ASEAN’s structure is as much as that in specific issues like climate change， green energy and bio security.

III. Impact on the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific （AOIP）

Trump 1.0 formulated and implemented the Indo-Pacific Strategy， and Biden inherited and developed it. At present， the Indo-Pacific Strategy has basically taken shape， and ASEAN countries have gradually adapted to it. The strategic concept of the AOIP put forward by ASEAN follows suit with the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy， on the one hand， by expanding the Asia-Pacific region covered by the “ASEAN+” structure to the broader Indo-Pacific region. On the other hand， it incorporates the essence of the ASEAN major power balancing strategy by advocating a regional order that is non-exclusive to all， especially China. Up to now， the AOIP has been relatively effective. It has not only received the support of major powers including China， but also further expanded cooperation with them in the fields of digital economy， green transformation and connectivity. Currently， ASEAN countries worry that the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy under Trump 2.0 will pose challenges to the ASEAN’s major power balancing strategy. As the mastermind of the Indo-Pacific Strategy， Trump will inevitably remould relevant policies of the Biden administration according to his own logic， which will increase the opportunity cost of ASEAN’s balancing strategy. Trump may withdraw from the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework （IPEF） promoted by Biden， which will increase the burden for ASEAN to go on with its balancing efforts. He may also threaten with “giving up on ASEAN Centrality”， which will make the balancing strategy more complicated， vulnerable and unfeasible. Moreover， alliance networks， including QUAD， the Five Eyes Alliance， the AUKUS， the newly launched SQUAD and others， may be upgraded and expanded under Trump 2.0， potentially replacing ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit， hence further weakening the central position of ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific region.

IV. Impact on the China-U.S.-ASEAN Relationship Framework

Trump 2.0 is expected by many to bring no tangible improvement to China-U.S. relations， and may deepen the strategic rivalry between China and the U.S.， increasing the risk and difficulty of ASEAN’s rope walking between the two. ASEAN has actively developed strategic relations with China after the Cold War to balance U.S. dominance in the South East Asian region， yet when China’s regional influence grows， some countries come out stressing the importance of U.S. presence in the region in checking China. However， as the power shifts in China’s favor， the weight of China-U.S. relations in ASEAN’s major power balancing strategy increases. As China-U.S. competition is restricted to a rational range， ASEAN can benefit more from its balancing strategy. For example， countries like Vietnam， Indonesia， Malaysia and Thailand witnessed increased trade volume with both China and the U.S. after China-U.S. trade frictions occurred in 2017. Besides， they elevated relations with both China and the U.S. to comprehensive strategic partnership. However， ASEAN is well aware that， when the rivalry between the two comes near a tipping point， it will shrink the space of its hedging strategy and force hard choices. Trump’s decoupling agenda this time could disrupt the traditional “economic reliance on China， and security reliance on the U.S.” paradigm， challenging regional cooperation logic.

Basic Experience And Trajectory of ASEAN’s Major Power Balancing Strategy

The impact of Trump 2.0 will be broad and profound， affecting all ASEAN countries， ASEAN Community building， China-U.S.-ASEAN relations and the Asia-Pacific order. In the next four years， the shock will be swift and loud， with more disruptions than achievements. ASEAN will draw on past experience， especially lessons from Trump 1.0， to refine its strategy.

I. ASEAN’s Experiences in Dealing With Impacts of Trump 1.0

By bypassing “ASEAN Centrality”， dividing Southeast Asia through alliances and triggering regional tensions， Trump 1.0 succeeded in disrupting ASEAN’s major power balancing strategy， which can be concluded in the following three aspects： The first is security disruption. Under the framework of “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy， Trump administration increased military engagement with ASEAN countries， expanded military aid， implicitly supported claimant countries to confront China on South China Sea issue， intensified regional tensions， and made ASEAN’s efforts to balance between China and the U.S. even more difficult. The second is development blockade. The U.S. practiced trade protectionism， labeling Malaysia， Vietnam， and Singapore as “currency manipulators”. It also carried out the Clean Network， forcing ASEAN countries to take sides between China and the U.S. The third is disregard to “ASEAN Centrality”. Trump prioritized its alliance with Japan and South Korea in its attempts against China， neglecting the crucial role of ASEAN in regional security and development. He only sent vice president and some low-ranking representatives to attend ASEAN summits on his behalf， which deeply frustrated ASEAN countries.

In response， ASEAN countries have made the following efforts： Firstly， they tried to turn the crisis into opportunity. Through supply chain transfer， ASEAN countries have become new production bases for multinational corporations. With this， they have pushed for industrial upgrading and enhanced their international influence. Secondly， they are united for mutual support. Through mechanisms such as ASEAN Regional Forum， they have strengthened cooperation， established a collective security structure， and promoted the adoption of the framework of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea to maintain regional stability. Thirdly， they have pursued balanced development. ASEAN has implemented diversified and independent diplomacy and strengthened connectivity. In 2018， ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership Vision 2030 was released， marking that its relationship with China has entered a mature stage with upgraded and quality development. It has promoted “ASEAN+3” multilateral cooperation to boost regional integration. During Trump’s first term， ASEAN countries obtained more trade and investment from China， while maintaining their security relations with the U.S. They could even be regarded as the winners in the rising geopolitical competition in the Asia-Pacific region.

II. ASEAN’s Experience of Implementing Its Major Power Balancing Strategy

Over the more than 30 years of post-Cold War era， ASEAN has developed key insights and resilience in dealing with the U.S. and balancing China-U.S. relations. Firstly， Southeast Asia is a core arena for US strategic competition against China. ASEAN is fully aware of the truth that “it is the grass that takes the brunt when elephants fight”. Its internal and external conditions determine that they must adhere to the balancing strategy towards major powers. Secondly， US strategic competition against China is long-term and systemic. It may further intensify during Trump 2.0. ASEAN also adopts long-termism and will not easily give up its central position in the “ASEAN+” structure. By binding its cooperation with China and other countries and then leveraging major power competition mechanism， ASEAN prevents the U.S. from disengaging from or abandoning regional cooperation led by ASEAN. Thirdly， ASEAN still has room to enact its balancing strategy as the China-U.S. competition has not yet escalated into a military conflict despite rising intensity. Moreover， when China and the U.S. are close in terms of their power， the weight of ASEAN will grow， making it a crucial regional third party in determining the situation in the end. Fourthly，"U.S. Democrats generally value ASEAN more than the Republicans， and the result is often to push ASEAN further towards China. Fifthly， the strength and influence of ASEAN itself has changed remarkably， allowing it to act as a connective buffer zone between China and the U.S.， which is conducive to the building of an inclusive regional order and to the positive， stable and orderly evolution of the international landscape.

III. The Future Trajectory of ASEAN’s Balancing Strategy

Given the certainty and consistency of China’s cooperation strategy towards ASEAN， the latter’s balancing strategy will mainly depend on Trump’s Southeast Asia policy. Generally speaking， ASEAN aims for the following strategic goals ranking from low to high within the framework of major power strategic competition. Firstly， adhere to the bottom line thinking to prevent the worst case scenario， such as military conflicts triggered by issues like the Taiwan question and the South China Sea issue. Secondly， seek and expand the space for co-existence or even cooperation with both China and the U.S.， such as in the area of regional economic cooperation. Thirdly， build an inclusive regional order among China， the U.S. and ASEAN， such as convening a China-U.S. summit within the framework of the ASEAN summit or a summit between ASEAN， China， and the U.S.

While adopting long-termism， ASEAN will pay more attention to the mixed use of various tactics， including： Firstly， rapid response. ASEAN will promptly adjust its balancing strategy to Trump’s intensive moves， as seen in ASEAN leaders’ visits to both China and the U.S. recently. Secondly， cautious openness. It will enhance internal coordination and risk warning while maintaining cooperation with China and the U.S. Thirdly， morality above all. In the face of the “unethical policies” in some countries today， ASEAN seeks to take moral leadership by advocating open and free regionalism. Fourthly， selective alignment. ASEAN will have discriminative alignment with policy options put forward by countries like China and the U.S.， especially when facing policy pressure from Trump.

IV. The Sustainability of ASEAN’s Balancing Strategy Carries Great Global Strategic Significance

Facing the changes unseen in a century， ASEAN’s strategy of balancing towards major powers is of great significance for optimizing changes in the international landscape， shaping the Asia-Pacific regional order and improving China’s external environment. Firstly， even as many major geopolitical regions in the world today are experiencing wars and turmoil， Southeast Asia has maintained peace for more than 30 years amid major power rivalry， thanks to ASEAN’s balancing strategy. Secondly， despite the fact that it is usually major powers that dominate international landscape， by implementing the strategy of balancing， ASEAN has managed to establish and consolidate a regional structure that is ASEAN-centered and features the “ASEAN+” structure. It has become a “connective” force that cannot be ignored in shaping the international landscape， which in a way challenged the traditional “center-periphery” binary pattern. Thirdly， steering away from the common path of Global South countries being controlled by dominant powers， ASEAN succeeded in simultaneously achieving such goals as national development， the building of ASEAN Community， and the shaping of Asia-Pacific regional structure through its balancing strategy which served as a model for the rising of the Global South. Fourthly， China has made the correct choice by committing to “ASEAN Centrality”， and supporting its balancing strategy. It is conducive to the building of a community with a shared future for humankind at all levels under the principles of extensive consultation， joint contribution and shared benefits.

——————————————

Zhai Kun is Deputy Dean of the Institute of Area Studies and Professor at the School of International Relations， Peking University