摘 要:企業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)所產(chǎn)生的污染是我國(guó)環(huán)境污染的主要來(lái)源,我國(guó)的環(huán)境政策大多局限于控制政策本身和實(shí)施政策所需的措施,并假設(shè)這些措施均能完全執(zhí)行。而企業(yè)作為一個(gè)由利害關(guān)系基本一致的成員組成的群體,必然形成堅(jiān)強(qiáng)的“利益剛性”,其對(duì)政府的環(huán)境管制會(huì)采取各種規(guī)避措施。本文通過構(gòu)建一個(gè)政府先行的博弈模型分析在管制不完全執(zhí)行的情況下政府與企業(yè)之間的互動(dòng)關(guān)系。
關(guān)鍵詞:不完全執(zhí)行管制;規(guī)避;博弈
中圖分類號(hào):F224.2 文獻(xiàn)標(biāo)識(shí)碼:A 文章編號(hào):100-5192(2008)01-0067-05
Game between the Government and Enterprise under IncompletelyImplemented Regulations of Pollution
DENG Feng
chool of Economy and Management, Xinjiang University, Urumq 80046, China)
Abstract:he pollution from economic activities of enterprise is the main source ofenvironmental pollution in China, Chinese environmental policies mainly focus on the controlling regulations and the relative implementing measures, and these measures are supposed to be implemented completely. But as a set of members with coherent interest, the firms will generate strong rigidity of benefits, and will take many kinds of elusions to these regulations. In this paper, a game model with governmental precession is put forward to analyze the relationship between government and enterprises under incompletely implemented regulations of pollution.
Key words:incompletely implemented regulation; elusion; game model
1 引言
根據(jù)我國(guó)環(huán)境污染構(gòu)成的現(xiàn)狀,可將我國(guó)的環(huán)境污染主要限定在“產(chǎn)業(yè)公害”范圍內(nèi)。企業(yè)(尤其是工業(yè)企業(yè))經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)中所伴隨產(chǎn)生的污染是環(huán)境污染的主要來(lái)源,因此企業(yè)是污染控制政策的調(diào)節(jié)對(duì)象。
然而在我國(guó)的環(huán)境政策研究中,大多僅局限于控制政策本身和實(shí)施政策所需的措施等方面,且都是以企業(yè)具有合理的預(yù)期反應(yīng)方式為假設(shè)前提的。如,生產(chǎn)不同產(chǎn)品的企業(yè),在面對(duì)高于污染治理費(fèi)用的排污費(fèi)時(shí),應(yīng)該都是采取治理或防止污染的積極態(tài)度;具有不同財(cái)產(chǎn)約束條件的企業(yè),在同一的政策調(diào)節(jié)面前,都應(yīng)該按照最佳的技術(shù)經(jīng)濟(jì)路線選擇防治污染的方案,等等。這種假設(shè)前提具有兩個(gè)特點(diǎn):(1)企業(yè)具有可調(diào)節(jié)性;(2)企業(yè)對(duì)于政策調(diào)節(jié)具有同一的、確定的反應(yīng)函數(shù)。如果在實(shí)際經(jīng)濟(jì)運(yùn)行中企業(yè)行為滿足這些前提條件,污染控制政策的實(shí)施將會(huì)達(dá)到預(yù)期的目標(biāo)。……