國企經(jīng)營者薪酬兌現(xiàn)與企業(yè)績效的實證研究

楊水利 姚瑤

摘 要：企業(yè)經(jīng)營者薪酬兌現(xiàn)制度是激勵與約束機(jī)制的重要內(nèi)容，其即時性可以實現(xiàn)對企業(yè)經(jīng)營者的短期激勵，滯后性有利于經(jīng)營者的長期激勵和約束。本文選取我國部分國有控股制造業(yè)上市公司的經(jīng)營者為研究對象，以經(jīng)營者行為作為中介變量研究薪酬兌現(xiàn)方式與企業(yè)績效之間的關(guān)系，研究表明：當(dāng)期兌現(xiàn)對經(jīng)營者短期導(dǎo)向行為有顯著影響，對企業(yè)運(yùn)營績效有正向影響；延期兌現(xiàn)對經(jīng)營者長期導(dǎo)向行為有顯著影響，對企業(yè)成長績效有正向影響。研究結(jié)論對于選擇適合的經(jīng)營者薪酬兌現(xiàn)時機(jī)及兌現(xiàn)方式提供了理論依據(jù)。

關(guān)鍵詞：國有企業(yè)；薪酬兌現(xiàn)；經(jīng)營者行為；企業(yè)績效

中圖分類號：F244.3 文獻(xiàn)標(biāo)識碼：A 文章編號：1003-5192(2012)01-0027-07

A Positive Study of State-owned Enterprise Managers Salary

Cash and Enterprise Performances

YANG Shui-li, YAO Yao

（Faculty of Economics and Management, Xian University of Technology, Xian 710054, China）

Abstract:The salary cash system enterprise of manager is an important item in the incentive and constraint mechanism. Its real instant can achieve the short-term effective incentive for the enterprise manager, and its delay can realize the long-term incentive and constraint for the enterprise manager. This paper selects many enterprise managers of part of state-owned enterprises and the state-owned holding manufacturing listed company in our country as the research objects. The managers behavior is as the intermediate variables for studying the function relationship between the salary cash means and the enterprise performances. The results show that the current pay encasement makes marked effect to the manager short-term guiding behaviors. It makes positive effect to the enterprise operating performance. The deferred pay encasement makes marked effect to the manager long-term guiding behaviors. It makes positive effect to the enterprise growing performance. The results from the positive study can provide the theoretical basis for the company. It shows that how to select the suitable cash opportunities and salary cash means.

Key words:state-owned enterprise; salary cash; manager behaviors; enterprise performances

1 引言

隨著我國市場經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展，國有企業(yè)經(jīng)營者薪酬制度的缺陷日漸突出，表現(xiàn)在：一方面企業(yè)經(jīng)營者薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)不合理、長短期激勵失衡、不同行業(yè)之間經(jīng)營者薪酬差距懸殊等；另一方面經(jīng)營者薪酬與企業(yè)經(jīng)營績效背離，部分國有企業(yè)無論盈虧與否，經(jīng)營者的薪酬水平仍然呈現(xiàn)上升趨勢，這種現(xiàn)象越來越引起政府主管部門、學(xué)者及社會公眾的質(zhì)疑和關(guān)注。經(jīng)營者薪酬兌現(xiàn)作為薪酬制度中最后也是至關(guān)重要的一個環(huán)節(jié)，逐漸暴露出存在的問題，表現(xiàn)為經(jīng)營者重現(xiàn)金支付，輕股權(quán)期權(quán)支付。由于經(jīng)營者受聘經(jīng)營管理企業(yè)，存在任職期限，雖然這種“瓷飯碗”具有一定程度的壓力及動力，但是經(jīng)營……