China’s Peripheral Environment and Its Future Strategies

A country requires a peaceful external environment to develop and thrive. China is no exception. Creating such an environment calls for commitment from not only China itself， but also countries in the region and in the wider international community.

The geopolitical situation in the Asia-Pacific region is becoming more complex by the day. One reason for this is the U.S.’s “return to Asia.” The United States has taken steps to sure up its allegiances with a host of local players， calling its movements benign and insisting it doesn’t regard China as a threat.

Where China is concerned， the effects of these renewed alliances come in the form of emboldened national governments. Knowing the U.S. “has their back，” ruling parties in countries such as Japan and the Philippines routinely provoke China into wars of words. Consequently cool heads are called for in China’s handling of neighborly relations.

Two Systematic Threats

The U.S. embarked on a planned and staged global geopolitical expansion after the conclusion of the Cold War. It focused on Eastern Europe for the first decade， resulting in an eastward expansion of NATO and the EU. It shifted to the Middle East and Central Asia in the following decade， waging wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the third， current decade， the U.S. has set its eye on East Asia， and primarily on China. These moves display the U.S. geopolitical strategic roadmap to exercising control over all Eurasia.

As China’s economic and political power continues to grow， the U.S. feels a pressing need to contain its top strategic antagonist. It has proved difficult for policymakers there to assert their influence in regions to China’s north， west and south. The east is a different story. There， China’s coastal provinces drive the engine of the national economy， and East Asia and the Western Pacific are critical to the country’s energy and resource supply. Understandably these two areas have become the key battleground in the U.S.’s containing of China.

China now faces two systematic threats. The first arises from the U.S.’s new Cold War pattern.

The main constituents are as follows. Firstly， the U.S. is consolidating its military alliances that date back to the Cold War era. While beefing up bilateral alliances， the U.S. is also streamlining its alliances with Japan and South Korea to form a trilateral coalition， and encouraging its allies to build extensive military relationships among themselves as well as with non-ally countries.

Second， the U.S. is mending relations with old foes in Asia including Vietnam， Myanmar and Laos， playing down ideological disparities and historical enmity in a bid to build a united front against China. Of these maneuvers， military ties with Vietnam are emphasized， as the U.S. expects the country to become a new pivot in its Asia-Pacific strategy.

Third is the U.S.’s ratcheting up of military deployment across the board in the Asia-Pacific region. While increasing its military presence in regional countries like Japan， South Korea， the Philippines and Singapore， it has pushed its military outreach by enhancing the strategic position of Guam， Hawaii and Australia. What’s more， it has reinstated military bases on Pacific islands such as Saipan， Palau and Wake Island. These moves are making the Pacific Ocean the equivalent of the At-lantic during the Cold War era.

Fourth is the U.S.’s attempt to reshape economic relations among countries in the Asia-Pacific region. By drumming up support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement （TPP）， it intends to check the economic clout of China， sabotage the process of economic integration among East Asian countries， and consequently foster a U.S.-centric network for economic cooperation in the area.

The other systematic threat China faces comes from Japan’s attempts to upset the post-WWII order. In recent years the worrying trend whereby the country denies its wartime aggression and whitewashes its history has grown stronger. Evidence includes the Japanese government’s approval of textbooks that distort historical facts， visits by Japanese leaders to the Yasukuni Shrine， blunt denial of the Nanjing Massacre and the sexual abuse of women by Japanese military during WWII， the upgrading of the Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense， and a proposed constitutional amendment that turns the Self-Defense Forces （SDF） into an offensive military force. Japan has also significantly enhanced the scope of its military， attempted to breach the defense-only principle by seeking preemptive strike capacity， relaxed restrictions on weapons exports， beefed up its arms industry and established military bases abroad. These moves are all motivated by the goal to become a military power. The right wing is getting stronger in Japan， advocating revision of the pacifist Constitution among other endeavors in order to break the post-war global and regional order.

The situation grew tenser in July with the election of LDP President Shinzo Abe as Japan’s prime minister. He has long sought to rewrite the Japanese Constitution and legitimize militarism. The month after the election the country unveiled Izumo， its largest warship since WWII and aircraft carrier in disguise. The unveiling， at a time of heightened tensions with China over territorial disputes， provoked fresh alarm across the Sea of Japan at the prospect of an arms race.

What’s more disturbing is that the U.S. tacitly approves the right-wing trend developing in the island country， hence encouraging it to gloss over defeat in the anti-Fascist war of the 1930s and 1940s and reverse the post-war order. By doing so the U.S. actually guides Japan on a path to militarism and external expansion – all with the purpose of containing China. Japan buys into the idea as it hopes to suppress China with American help and so gain dominancy in East Asia. Fostering an aggressive rival to deter China is part of the U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific.

East Asian Integration

The geopolitical pattern in East Asia is changing dramatically， breeding sharp tensions. The U.S. strives to consolidate and expand its influence in the region. China， meanwhile， is regaining its traditional clout， a tendency the U.S. tries to check but has little chance of suppressing given China’s geographical advantage. As a matter of fact， the loss of China’s leading role in East Asia， its foreign invasion and occupation were a brief historical interlude. Fierce contentions in the region over the past decades have resulted in the forging of a new pattern in East Asia. China must take the initiative in this transition by prioritizing diplomatic relationships with East Asian neighbors and actively seeking to build a security and strategic alliance. The Sino-U.S. relationship should be a part of the overall arrangement of China’s geopolitical strategy. It is a dangerous misconception that a good relationship with the U.S. will automatically bring about amity within East Asia. China should be careful not to let its relationship with the U.S. dominate its regional diplomacy.

Proper handling of relations with East Asian countries can in fact facilitate the healthy development of Sino-U.S. ties. In its diplomacy in the region China should firmly oppose the sur- rogates of external forces and saboteurs of world peace， earnestly win over fence sitters and establish security and strategic alliances. It must be understood that the maritime territorial disputes between China and some of its neighbors are of varied natures. Very few are in essence about hegemony vs. anti-hegemony and world peace. The overwhelming majority are merely border demarcation disputes between nations.

The crux of China’s East Asia strategy is promoting integration of the region， broadly including Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. China must play a pivotal role in this mission by dispelling external distractions and obstructions with deftness and wisdom. It must ward off U.S. attempts to replace East Asian cooperation with Asia-Pacific cooperation. China should be wary of the different geopolitical traits of its diverse array of neighbors， and promote solidarity in East Asia through integration of infrastructure facilities， economic systems and security cooperation among the continental countries.

To sum up， China’s security and development strategy is to ensure stability to its north， south and west and seek progress in the east. The country should concentrate its attention and resources on the most pressing threats. It needs to strive for the earliest possible solution to the Taiwan issue in order to open up the biggest possible stage of its security and development in East Asia and the West Pacific.

China-India Conflicts Are Controllable

There are long-standing territorial disputes between China and India， and tensions seem to have escalated recently with the repetition of the so-called “Tents Confrontation” standoff. India is obviously paying greater attention to East Asia， with intensified collaboration， particularly in military matters， with Japan and Southeastern countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines. Its ties with the U.S. were also strengthened following a July visit to the country by U.S. Vice President Biden. The U.S. reiterated that it welcomes a bigger strategic role for India in Asia， and supports its extension eastward – obviously to contain China. These moves destabilize the situation south of China.

Territorial disputes once led to conflict between China and India. However the border issue is not the defining feature of bilateral ties. The fundamental obstacle to healthy development of the Sino-Indian relationship is that India is loath to see China rise above it in international geopolitical stature. It therefore takes the opportunity to use the U.S. to “rebalance”the Asia-Pacific by increasing its presence in East Asia. But India aims at nothing more than restricting China， as it lacks the intention and strength to confront China head on in the way the U.S. and Japan do. What’s more， its economic and security lifeline is not East Asia and the West Pacific but rather the Indian Ocean， where the leading potential threat is the U.S.， not China. India hence has to watch out for the U.S. when trying to check the rise of China， as the former is of fundamental and long-term significance to its security.

Based on the above reasons， we can conclude that territorial disputes and even clashes may arise to the south of China， but they will be of controllable scope and shouldn’t impose a critical strategic threat to China.

In-depth Development of Sino-Russian Relations

The strategic partnership between China and Russia is making progress. The two countries staged their largest ever joint naval drill “Joint Sea-2013” in July and a joint anti-terrorism military exercise “Peace mission 2013” in August， taking political trust and military cooperation to new heights.

The U.S. has increased its military presence in the AsiaPacific region following the introduction of its “rebalance”policy. The situation is further complicated by the rallying of right-wingers and remilitarization in Japan. Enhanced military cooperation with Russia is hence a strong countermeasure to these worrying trends in the region. It contributes to a balanced strategy in East Asia – where the U.S. is bolstering a military coalition – and across the whole Asia-Pacific. Greater military cooperation between China and Russia could also be a strong deterrent to the resurrection of militarism in Japan and the Diaoyu Islands issue.

The U.S. is not the target of Sino-Russian cooperation. Nevertheless， the pressure the U.S. puts on Russia in Europe and the strategic barricade it is laying out against China in the Asia-Pacific region are necessarily external conditions affecting such cooperation. Mongolia is committed to strengthening ties with the U.S. and Japan under its “third neighbor” policy. But the geopolitical realities mean it cannot afford to sour its relationship with China or Russia. As Sino-Russian ties grow stronger， Mongolia is unlikely to take on a hostile policy toward China. China can therefore expect a general atmosphere of security and stability to its north.

Over the past few months the U.S. has been readying for a withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan. The decade-long war that has cost more than 4，000 American lives and trillions of dollars， now coming to an end， is reminiscent of the Vietnam war. Though a U.S. military contingent will remain in the restive country after the 2014 withdrawal， the U.S. is and will not be in the position to put Afghanistan under its control.

Another neighbor of China， Kyrgyzstan， has required the U.S. to shut its Manas Air Force Base before July 11， 2014. It will allow Russia to expand its military bases there， signaling yet another setback for the U.S. in its attempt to enlarge its military presence in Central Asia via the Afghanistan war.

China feels no angst about stability in Central Asia after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. As noted， in August this year China and Russia successfully conducted the Peace Mission-2013 joint anti-terrorism drill. Held within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization， it demonstrated their capacity to combat the “three evil forces” – terrorism， secessionism and extremism. In fact， the U.S.’s wedging into the region creates favorable conditions for the rallying of these evil forces that ferments a so-called color revolution. Staving off external interference is therefore a critical precondition for regional stability. The SCO not only thwarts the infiltration of the U.S. military forces into five Central Asian countries， but also plays a greater role in safeguarding regional stability.