The Situation of International Arms Control and Non-proliferation in 2003

By Hou Hongyu

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The Situation of International Arms Control and Non-proliferation in 2003

By Hou Hongyu

Director of General Affairs Division Chinese People’s Association for Peace and Disarmament

In 2013, the United States and Russia continued to implement the new START, the United States proposed to engage Russia to start a new round of nuclear disarmament from the purpose of cutting military spending and consolidating strategic superiority. However, the U.S. proposal was turned down by Russia. Russia maintains that U.S. development of missile defense systems and advanced conventional strategic strike systems will damage the global strategic stability. In order to make up for the inadequacy of conventional military forces and upgrade nuclear forces, Russia continuously and comprehensively develops its triad of strategic forces. The international non-proliferation efforts have achieved some positive results. The Iran nuclear issue has taken the first step towards solution; the abolition of Syrian chemical weapon is going ahead according the plan and the UN has adopted the Arms Trade Treaty. However, the DPRK nuclear issue has made no progress yet at the moment.

Ⅰ. The New Development of the International Arms Control

First, the U.S. arms control and disarmament policy. The United States maintains that the international security environment has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War: the threat of global nuclear war has become remote, but the risk of nuclear attacks has increased. The traditional concept of nuclear deterrence — the idea that a country would not initiate a nuclear war for fear of nuclear retaliation — does not apply to terrorists. While the U.S. nuclear arsenal has little relevance in deterring this threat, concerted actions by all states to uphold their NPT obligations – including those related to disarmament – are important for building a sense of common purpose that helps maintain support from partners around the world to uphold and strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Securing sensitive nuclear materials worldwide will also make it harder for terrorists to acquire those materials. The United States actively raises the awareness of the international community about its achievements in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. For example, the downblending of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU) by Russia that was required by the 1993 U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement is now completed. Upon the successful completion of the Agreement, 500 metric tons of HEU from dismantled Russian weapons will be converted into LEU and delivered to the United States to fuel U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The HEU that was converted by downblending was enough to produce approximately 20,000 nuclear warheads. In the United States, 374 metric tons of U.S. HEU is declared excess to nuclear weapons; most of which will be downblended or used as fuel in naval or research reactors. In 2011, the United States and Russia brought into force the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement and its 2006 and 2010 protocols, which require each side to dispose of 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium – enough in total for about 17,000 nuclear weapons – and thus permanently removing this material from military programs. Russia has also been an essential partner in the U.S. Global Threat Reduction Initiative efforts to convert research reactors worldwide from HEU to LEU and repatriate those reactors’ HEU to the country of origin. These efforts have now converted or verified over 88 shutdown research and test reactors and isotope production facilities, and removed over 5,017 kg of HEU for secure storage, downblending and disposition.

The United States has proposed a new disarmament initiative. President Obama expressed in the State of the Union on February 12 that the United States would like to negotiate with Russia to further reduce their nuclear arsenals. The U.S. Government internal review concludes that it can reduce the number of its deployed strategic or long-range nuclear warheads to 1100 or 1000 in the future. According to the data of the Depart of State, currently the number of the U.S. deployed strategic warheads is about 1700 and that of Russia is about 1500. When the new START is fully implemented in 2018, the United States and the Russia will have no more than 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads each – the lowest levels since the 1950s. The U.S. overall nuclear stockpile is 85% below the Cold War levels. In June 2013, in conjunction with his Berlin speech, President Obama issued new guidance that aligns U.S. nuclear policies to the 21st century security environment. President Obama has tried to take a new step to advance his Prague agenda and the long-term goal of achieving peace and security of a nuclear weapons free world. After a comprehensive review, the President determines that the United States can ensure its national and allies security and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a one-third reduction in deployed strategic nuclear weapons from the level established in the new START. According to the data of a U.S. think-tank, by the beginning of 2013, there are 8500 Russian nuclear warheads and 7700 U.S. nuclear warheads. They still possess more than 90% of all the nuclear weapons in the world and have a shared responsibility to continue the process of reducing their nuclear arms.

The U.S. consideration for further nuclear disarmament. When the new START is fully implemented, the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia are still too big. The new START stipulates that the deployed strategic nuclear warheads of the two countries should be no more than 1550 each. However, according to the counting rules, one strategic bomber counts only one strategic warhead instead of 20 warheads that a strategic bomber can carry. The counting rule has a big loophole and the actual number of strategic bombs carried by one strategic bomber should be at least 3 to 4. Therefore, the actual number of the deployed strategic warheads for each country in 2018 will be about 1900, which President Obama’s assistants now believe is still too big. The new START does not limit the number of stored nuclear warheads of each country. The United States estimates that it has 2700 stored strategic warheads and Russia 2680. According to the U.S. plan, the United States and Russia should not only agree to reduce the numbers of deployed strategic warheads to 1000, but also limit the size of other types of nuclear weapons. The total numbers of nuclear weapons for each country should be no more than 3500 or even less than 2500, which will not harm the national security.

The United States concludes that further nuclear disarmament is cautious. The United States believes that its recent potential rivalry with nuclear weapons is China rather than Russia. However, China only has 50 to 70 strategic nuclear warheads. Therefore, even it reduces one-third of its nuclear warheads, the U.S. strategic nuclear force is still ten times bigger than China and the United States still has overwhelming advantages. The strategic review report by the Department of Defense points out that a smaller nuclear arsenal is able to realize the U.S. goal of deterrence.

Second, the benefits of further nuclear arms negotiation between the United States and Russia. First, reduction of nuclear weapons can enhance the U.S. national security. A new round of nuclear disarmament negotiation between the two will help Russia invest less money in developing new type nuclear warheads and strategic missiles. Currently, Russia is developing modernized SS-27 missiles to replace the strategic missiles deployed during the Cold War and at the meantime plans to develop new, heavy, multi-warhead intercontinental missiles. If the two reach a new nuclear disarmament agreement, the numbers of Russia’s nuclear weapons will become less and the U.S. striking targets in Russia will be reduced. Ten years ago, the U.S. striking targets in Russia included 660 missile silos and now the targets are reduced almost half. In another 10 years, the number of targets in Russia will be much less. If they reach a new nuclear disarmament agreement, the United States can modernize its nuclear arsenal and spend less on developing new type strategic weapon systems. At the same time, the United States can spend the money saved from nuclear disarmament on maintaining the remaining nuclear forces, warhead life extension program and revitalization of nuclear facilities.

The United States can consolidate its superiority in nuclear and conventional weapons. If the United States and Russia reach a new nuclear disarmament agreement, the United States is able to restrict Russia from developing new, heavy and multi-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles that can penetrate the U.S. missile defense systems. And Russia’s space to develop strategic nuclear weapons will be squeezed and its deterrent capability will be lowered. Currently and in the future, only Russia’s nuclear weapons constitute a devastating blow to the United States Therefore, the United States tries to seek to reduce Russia’s size of nuclear arsenal, to reduce its tactical nuclear weapons and prevent it from developing new type strategic missiles. The United States already has absolute superiority in conventional forces and the missile defense systems and continues to develop more advanced multi-level interception capability than that of Russia and China. The United States has the absolute superiority in developing prompt global strike systems, space planes and conventional forces.

Third, Russia has turned down President Obama’s proposal to reduce nuclear arms and proposed that any further reduction of nuclear arms must consider the factors of missile defense systems, out-space weapons and the imbalance of conventional weapons. On June 19, 2013, Russian President Putin said that Russia should not allow its strategic deterrent system to be harmed and could not reduce the effectiveness of its nuclear forces. He has stated that many countries including the United States are actively improving their offensive systems, for example intermediate range missiles, and almost all Russia’s neighboring countries are developing such weapon systems. Currently, high precision weapons are developed quickly in the world and their striking capability is close to that of the strategic nuclear weapons. Those countries with high precision weapons have greatly strengthened their striking capability and at the same time the United States. is still developing and deploying strategic missile defense systems. Negotiations on further reduction of strategic offensive arms are only possible if all the factors influencing global strategic stability are duly taken into account. First of all, it concerns the plans of unilateral deployment of a strategic missile defense system; development of non-nuclear SOA; potential deployment of weapons in outer space; increasing quantitative and qualitative imbalances in conventional weapons, or emerging regional conflicts; uncertainty of the CTBT’s entry into force, etc. Further nuclear arms reduction should become multilateral. The international community needs to take into account the arsenals of all the states with military nuclear capabilities. And another pressing issue is how to get all countries that possess nuclear weapons, but are non- NPT members, involve in such a dialogue. The main efforts should be focused on creating conditions that enable phased movement towards nuclear disarmament, while strengthening the strategic stability on the basis of principles of equal and indivisible security for all states without exception.

In recent years, Russia’s military spending has increased considerably and has become No.3 in the world. Russia will continue to invest greatly in nuclear weapons and continue to modernize its nuclear triad by improving the quality instead of increasing the numbers. Therefore, some U.S. experts conclude that it is unlikely that Russia will join a new round of nuclear arms reduction.

At the same time, many non-nuclear weapon states have strengthened their appeal for nuclear disarmament. In October 2013, 125 countries in the UN issued a declaration proclaiming that non-use of nuclear weapons under any conditions would be conducive to human survival and opposing the use of nuclear weapons from humanitarian concerns and environment security.

Fourth, the United States and Russia continue developing their nuclear forces. The United Statescontinues to maintain its strategic nuclear triad and plans to invest US$ 118 billion in modernizing strategic missiles and US$ 90 billon in maintaining its nuclear weapon infrastructure. On January 3, 2013, President Obama signed the Defense Spending Act and the military expenditure for 2013 is US$ 633 billion. Russia steadily modernizes itsdeploys approximately 326 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) of six variants. A number of Soviet-era ICBMs, such as the R-36M2, UR-100NUTTH, and the Topol, are gradually being phased out in favor of the new silo-based and road-mobile Topol-M, and the Yars, a road-mobile version of the Topol-M equipped with Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRV). The deployment of the Topol-M and the Yars began in 2006 and 2010 respectively, and these variants are scheduled to be updated and maintained through 2013. Russian enterprises are also reportedly working on the development of other ICBM systems in response to the deployment of a U.S. missile defense architecture in Europe. The newest of these systems is currently undergoing testing and is scheduled for deployment in 2015 and is touted as a model at lower cost, easier to produce and capable of evading existing missile defense systems. Russia's active strategic ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force currently consists of three Project 667BDR Kalmar submarines and six Project 667BDRM Delfin submarines. The Delta IV class currently forms the backbone of Russia's naval deterrent. A new liquid-propelled SLBM, the RMS-54 “Sineva”, is developed and successfully tested for the Delta IV submarines. All of the Delta IV vessels are upgraded to carry the “Sineva”. In addition, Russia has several Typhoon-class SSBNs. A new class of SSBNs designatedis currently under construction. The first of these vessels, thehas recently completed sea tests, and entered active duty for the Northern fleet on 10 January 2013. The second of these vessels, thewas launched from the Sevmash shipyard on 23 December 2013. Two additional Borey class vessels, theand thewill be fully operational and at sea in 2014. Russia has two additionalclasssubmarines, theand thein production through 2013 in Severodvinsk. In addition to these named models, a total of eightclass submarines are scheduled to enter active service over the coming decade, which are expected to carry 16 missiles each. Their engagement is part of extensive naval modernization efforts. The air-pillar of Russia's triad is comprised of 72 strategic bombers that include 13 Tu-160 Blackjacks, 28 Tu-95 MS6 Bear H6s, and 31 Tu-95 MS16 Bear H16s. Since 2009, Russia has been researching designs for a new long-range strategic bomber, and hopes to have a prototype ready by 2020. Delivery vehicles include the AS-15A Kent air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), the AS-16 Kickback short-range attack missile, and a large but unknown number of nuclear gravity bombs. It has also been developing a new ALCM, the Kh-102, for over a decade. Its nuclear forces have conducted a few large scale military exercises. Some Russian experts believe that these exercises send a clear signal to its potential enemies that Russia has counter-nuclear attacks capability.

Ⅱ. The United States has continued to develop global missile defense systems which affect the international strategic stability.

First, the United States continues to develop and restructure the global missile defense systems. In March 2013, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced a series of steps the United States would take to stay ahead of the challenge posed by Iran and the DPRK’s development of longer-range ballistic missile capabilities and has missile defense systems in place to respond to the limited ICMB attacks.

The United States will strengthen homeland missile defense by deploying 14 additional Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) at Ft. Greely, Alaska. That will increase the number of deployed GBIs from 30 to 44, including the four GBIs at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. These additional GBIs will provide nearly a 50 percent increase in U.S. missile defense capability. With the support of the Japanese Government, the United States is planning to deploy an additional radar in Japan. This second TPY-2 radar will provide improved early warning and tracking of any missile launched from the DPRK at the United States or Japan. As directed by the U.S. Congress, studies on environmental impact by additional GBIs for a potential site in the United States are conducted, which will shorten the timeline for construction if the U.S. Government decides to proceed with an additional site. The United States is restructuring the SM-3 IIB program and plans to deploy the SM-3IIB as part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach. The purpose is to reinforce the protection of the U.S. homeland already provided by current GBIs against missile threats from the Middle East. The timeline for deploying this program is delayed to at least 2022 due to cuts in Congressional funding. By shifting resources from this program to fund the additional GBIs as well as advanced kill -vehicle technology that will improve the performance of the GBIs and other versions of the SM-3 interceptor, the United States will be able to strengthen protection against missiles from Iran sooner and also the DPRK threat. The U.S. missile deployments in phase one of the European Phased Adaptive Approach, including sites in Poland and Romania, will still be able to provide coverage of all European NATO territory as planned by 2018. These steps will strengthen the U.S. homeland defense, and maintain its commitments to its allies and partners. On October 22, NATO Secretary General Rasmussen said that the European missile defense system would be able to protect Europe and all NATO countries’ security.

The United States continuously states that it would like to cooperate on missile defense issues with Russia and remains convinced that missile defense cooperation between the United States and Russia (and between NATO and Russia) is in the national security interests of all countries involved. For that reason, the United States remains open to missile defense cooperation with Russia. The United States has repeatedly made it clear that its missile defense efforts are focused on defending its homeland as well as its European, Middle Eastern, and Asian allies and partners against ballistic missile threats coming from regional actors. In meeting those threats, it is important to note that the U.S. missile defenses are not designed for, or capable of, undermining the Russian or Chinese strategic deterrents. For its part, Russia has been insistent on legally binding guarantees that the U.S. missile defenses will not threaten its strategic deterrent. Rather than legal guarantees, the United States believes that the best way for Russia to see that U.S. and NATO missile defenses in Europe do not undermine its strategic deterrent would engage in cooperation and mutual transparency measures.

Second, the U.S. development of missile defense system is still the crux in the U.S.-Russia relations. In the beginning of 2013, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov expressed that the missile defense system is still the major stimulating factor in the U.S.-Russia relations, however, Russia would still like to have a dialogue. On February 27, President Putin pointed out that the U.S. promotion of the second phase of its missile defense system is actually to explore the possibility of NATO’s eastward expansion and this directly affects Russian interests. NATO has tried to use of all kinds of approaches to break global strategic balance. The quick change of the geopolitical situation has urged Russian military to build modernized armed forces with modern armaments. Responding to the U.S. announcement of abandoning the fourth phase of its missile defense system in Europe, Russia believes that the United States and NATO have gradually strengthened missile defense capability in Europe, which is detrimental to international stability and has a negative effect on Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. Russia has expressed worries of the U.S. deployment of 14 additional GBIs in the Asia-Pacific region. Russia has kept requesting the U.S. legally binding guarantees that its strategic deterrent is not threatened by the U.S. missile defenses.

Ⅲ. International Non-Proliferation Efforts Have Made Positive Progress.

Iran nuclear talks have broken a ten-year stalemate and Iran has agreed to accept international monitor and the United States will relief some sanctions. The Interim Geneva Accord was signed between P5+1 countries and Iran on November 24, 2013. The deal consists of the short-term freezing of key parts of the Iranian nuclear program in exchange for a decrease in sanctions, as both sides work towards a long-term agreement. The agreement makes the following stipulations on the Iranian nuclear-program: all uranium enriched beyond 5% will either be diluted or converted to uranium oxide; no new uranium at the 3.5% enrichment level will be added to Iran’s current stock. No new centrifuges will be installed or prepared for installation; 50% of the centrifuges at the Natanz enrichment facility and 75% at the Fordow enrichment facility will be left inoperable. Iran will not use its advanced IR-2 centrifuges for enrichment; Iran will not develop any new uranium enrichment or nuclear reprocessing facilities; no fuel will be produced, tested, or transferred to the Arak nuclear power plant; Iran will share design details of the reactor; the IAEA will be granted daily access to Natanz and Fordow and will have access to Iran’s uranium mines and centrifuge production facilities; Iran will address IAEA questions related to possible military dimensions of the nuclear program and provide data expected as part of an Additional Protocol. In exchange, Iran will receive relief from sanctions of approximately US$7 billion and no additional sanctions will be imposed. The agreement sets a six-month time frame for a more comprehensive follow-up agreement between Iran and the P5+1 negotiators to formalize Iran’s nuclear relationship with the world. The agreement recognizes Iran’s right to enrichment so long as the program is under IAEA control. President Obama says that the Interim Geneva Accord is an important first step toward a comprehensive solution that would address the U.S. concerns with Iran’s nuclear program. For the first time in nearly a decade, the United States has halted the progress of the Iranian nuclear program, and key parts of the program will be rolled back. These substantial limitations which will help prevent Iran from building a nuclear weapon. The United State has agreed to provide Iran with modest relief, while continuing to apply toughest sanction. Iran should be able to have access to peaceful nuclear energy, but it must accept strict limitations on its nuclear program that make it impossible to develop a nuclear weapon. The first step marks the most significant and tangible progress. However President Obama also recognizes that it is not easy, and huge challenges would remain ahead. Over the next six months, the United States will work to negotiate a comprehensive solution. The Interim Geneva Accord is conducive to the maintenance of the international non-proliferation regime and to the peace and stability in the Middle East.

The U.S. and Russia reached an agreement on Syrian chemical weapons and Syria has joined the Chemical Weapons Convention. On September 14, 2013, the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reached an agreement on a framework to secure and destroy Syria’s chemical weapons by mid-2014 and impose UN penalties if the Bashar al-Assad Government fails to comply. The Obama Administration has argued for weeks that the United States should launch military strikes against Syria for its alleged use of chemical weapons. On October 14, 2013, Syria met its obligations in applying for membership in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and its membership took effect on October 14. Syria becomes the 190th member state of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The U.S.-Russia agreement on Syria’s chemical weapons has prevented Syria from the U.S. military strike for the time being. However, the implementation of the agreement still faces lots of challenges and the civil war is still going on in Syria. In the future, the international community still has a long way to go to solve the Syrian crisis and help the Syrian suffering people through cooperation.

The UN General Assembly Adopts the Arms Trade Treaty. The UN General Assembly on April 2, 2013 voted to adopt the Arms Trade Treaty, which regulates the multi-billion dollars international arms trade. After its adoption by the General Assembly, the treaty needs to be signed and ratified by at least 50 countries to enter into force. Wang Min, China’s deputy permanent representative to the UN said that China has all along supported the negotiations on the Arms Trade Treaty; it expects all parties to reach consensus on an effective treaty to regulate the conventional arms trade and to combat illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons; it is not in favor of pushing through a multilateral arms control treaty at the GA which concerns the international security and the security of all nations; it has deep worries about the possible negative precedent for multilateral arms control negotiations; it could support a treaty reached through consensus, only by doing so can the universal support and effective implementation of the treaty be ensured.

The DPRK nuclear issue still remains in deadlock. On December 12, 2012, the DPRK successfully launched a rocket and put a Kwangmyong-3 satellite into orbit. This test proves a significant advancement in the DPRK’s missile technology. The launch led to strong responses from the international community. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2087 demanding the DRPK to comply with the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council and stop using ballistic missile technologies from launching rockets any more. Since then, the DPRK has made more tough stance and strongly condemned the UN Security Council’s resolution involving the DPRK and declared that the DPRK would never hide its intentions to launch all kinds of satellites and rockets and conduct higher level nuclear tests and target its old enemy -- the United States -- so as to protect its national security. After the DPRK conducted its third nuclear test in February 2013, the UN Security Council adopted a new resolution and imposed new sanctions on the DPRK in March, expanding financial sanctions on the DPRK, imposing controls on capital flows for weapon programs, allowing to inspect the DPRK’s airplanes, ships and diplomatic personnel carrying a large amount of cash which might be used to develop the DPRK’s nuclear programs.

In June, the DPRK reaffirmed that the denuclearization of the DPRK had been the DPRK’s constant position and proposed to hold senior level official talks with the United States Responding to the DPRK’s proposal, the United States said it would like to hold reliable talks with the DPRK, however the DPRK should implement its obligations to the world including compliance with the UN Security Council’s resolutions. In October 2013, the DPRK stated that action for action was the basic principle and it would go nowhere to ask the DPRK to take actions first. The DPRK’s foreign spokesperson states that the United States insists on proposing unjustified pre-conditions to block the re-start of the Six-Party Talks and that means it has never been interested in re-starting the Six-Party Talks. Since the two countries have such poles-apart differences on the precondition of restarting the talks, whether the talks can be held soon is still in question.