The Global Economy Ten Years After十年后的世界經濟

吉姆·奧尼爾

In the decade since the collapse of Lehman Brothers1 and the start of the global financial crisis， the world economy has registered stronger growth than many realize， owing in large part to China. But in the years ahead， global economic imbalances and troubling trends in the business world will continue to pose economic as well as political risks.

The global economy has not been nearly as weak as many seem to think. According to the International Monetary Fund2， the rate of real （inflation-adjusted） world GDP growth averaged 3.7% in 2000-2010， and would have been close to 4% if not for the so-called Great Recession. By comparison， the average annual growth rate so far this decade has been 3.5%， which is slightly lower than the average rate in the 2000s， but above the 3.3% rate in the 1980s and 1990s.

By my reckoning3， China has contributed an even larger share of global growth in this decade than it did in the last， with its GDP having almost tripled from $4.6 trillion at the end of 2008 to around $13 trillion today. That additional $8 trillion accounts for more than half of the increase in global GDP over the past decade.

I have long attributed the financial crisis to imbalances within and between the United States and China， the world’s two largest economies. While the US’s current-account deficit4 was close to 5% of GDP in 2008 （and closer to 7% in some quarters of 2007）， China was maintaining a whopping5 current-account surplus of 9% or higher.

Following the crisis， I predicted that the US and China would have to swap places to some extent over the course of the next decade. China needed to save less and spend more; and the US needed to save more and spend less. Judging by their current accounts today， both countries appear to have made significant progress. In 2018， China’s surplus will have fallen to around 0.5-1% of GDP， which is remarkable considering that its GDP has more than doubled since 2008. Equally remarkable， the US will register a deficit of 2-2.5% of GDP， which is within the 2-3% range that many economists consider sustainable.

Other global indicators， however， are not as encouraging. Back in 2008， the eurozone ran a current-account deficit of 1.5% of GDP， with Germany recording a surplus of around 5.5%. But Germany’s large surplus owed much to large deficits in other eurozone countries， and that imbalance gave rise to the euro crisis after 2009. Worryingly， Germany’s surplus has since ballooned to around 8% of GDP. As a result， the eurozone now has a surplus close to 3.5%， despite， and probably because of， years of weak domestic demand in the Mediterranean member states. This is surely a sign of further instability ahead. In fact， the slow-brewing6 crisis in Italy may be a harbinger7 of what awaits the bloc8.

A central feature of the economy prior to the financial crisis was the US housing bubble， which itself resulted from the financial sector’s invention of increasingly intricate9 （and dubious） methods of recycling global savings. A decade on， it bears mentioning that many “global cities” like London， New York， Sydney， and Hong Kong now have home prices that only a very small minority of their permanent residents can afford， owing to the growing demand from wealthy investors abroad.

But there are growing signs that housing prices in these and other cities may be undergoing a reversal. This may simply reflect actions taken by municipal governments to provide more affordable housing to their residents; but it also could indicate that marginally10 affluent new buyers are becoming scarcer.

To be sure， a gradual decline in house prices in these cities would be a welcome development in terms of economic and social equality. But one would search in vain for a time when declining home prices did not produce damaging side effects.

Having now assumed the chairmanship at Chatham House11， I am eager to encourage more research into how factors such as housing costs relate to larger issues of income and wealth inequality. To my mind， the world needs much better metrics12 for tracing these interconnections.

For example， it is clear that wealth inequality has increased much more than income inequality over the past decade， with the rapid rise in urban housing prices playing a central role. In many developed countries， including the United Kingdom， economic inequality is a serious problem. Yet in terms of income， the latest data show that inequality has actually fallen back to the （still-too-high） levels of the 1980s.

If common perceptions about inequality tend to inflate what is actually happening， that is because many companies’ top executives are earning increasingly massive sums relative to the workers under them. Such compensation packages13 can be rationalized in the context of share-price performance， but that hardly makes them justifiable.

This is another issue that I hope we will be studying at Chatham House. The strange equity-market rally14 that has been proceeding almost uninterrupted since 2009 has been fueled in large part by major corporations’ stock buybacks. In some important cases， companies have even issued debt to finance the repurchase of their shares.

Does the growing prevalence15 of buybacks explain why fixed investment and productivity have remained so weak across the West？ And might those macroeconomic factors explain some of the political upheavals16 in Western democracies such as the UK and the US in recent years？

On both counts， I suspect that the answer is yes. Unless we can recover a world in which business profits actually serve a purpose， the likelihood of more economic， political， and social shocks will remain intolerably high.

十年前，金融巨頭雷曼兄弟破產，全球金融危機爆發，此后，世界經濟增長之強勁出乎很多人意料，這很大程度上歸功于中國的發展。不過，全球經濟發展失衡、商業領域各種問題層出不窮仍會帶來經濟和政治風險。

全球經濟并非很多人認為的那樣疲軟。根據國際貨幣基金組織的數據，2000年至2010年全球GDP實際年均增長率（考慮通貨膨脹因素后）為3.7%，如果沒有所謂經濟大蕭條的影響，此數字可能接近4%。相較而言，截至目前，這一個10年間全球GDP年均增長率為3.5%，略低于上一個10年，但是高于1980年代和1990年代的3.3%。

據我計算，中國在這10年在推動全球經濟增長上的巨大貢獻甚至超過了上一個10年，其GDP從2008年年底的4.6萬億增長到了如今的13萬億，幾乎翻了3倍，共計8萬多億的增長額占過去10年全球GDP增長額的一半以上。

中國和美國是世界最大的兩個經濟體。我一直認為，金融危機是由兩國內部和兩國之間的經濟發展不平衡所致。2008年，美國經常賬戶逆差接近其GDP的5%（2007年某些季度甚至接近7%）;中國的經常賬戶順差則相當高，達到其GDP的9%或更高。

金融危機爆發后，我曾預測，中美兩國的經濟策略在此后十年中會出現一定程度的換位。中國需要減少儲備增加支出，而美國需要增加儲備減少支出。從目前經常賬戶的情況來看，中美兩國都取得了卓越進展。2018年，中國經常賬戶順差將降至其GDP的0.5%至1%，在2008年后GDP總額翻一番還要多的情況下，能保持如此成績實屬難得;美國經常賬戶逆差將占其GDP的2%至2.5%，許多經濟學家認為經常賬戶逆差占GDP的2%至3%是符合可持續發展要求的，所以美國同樣表現不俗。

然而，其他全球指標卻不如人意。2008年，歐元區經常賬戶逆差為其GDP總量的1.5%，而德國則有約5.5%的順差。但德國的大量順差在很大程度上要歸因于歐元區其他國家的大量逆差，而這種不平衡激發了2009年后的歐元危機。令人擔憂的是，德國的順差自此激增至GDP的約8%。結果，盡管地中海沿岸成員國多年內需不足（很可能也正因此），歐元區目前的順差仍接近3.5%。這已明確提醒我們，不穩定因素仍將存在。事實上，緩慢醞釀中的意大利預算危機可能就預示著歐元區的未來。

金融危機之前，房地產泡沫是美國經濟的主要特征之一，其形成是由于金融機構創造了各種愈發復雜（甚至可疑）的方法循環利用全球性儲蓄資金。值得一提的是，在十年后的今天，富有的國外投資者對房地產的需求不斷增加，導致倫敦、紐約、悉尼和香港這樣的“全球化大都市”房價飛漲，當地永久居民已經很少有人能買得起房了。

但是，越來越多的跡象表明，各個城市的房價也許會下降。雖然這可能只是市級政府采取調控房價的措施來為居民提供價格適中的房源，但也表明本就比例不大的富裕階層中新近買房的人越來越少。

誠然，要實現經濟平等和社會公平，城市房價逐漸下降是好事。但事實上，房價下跌每次都會造成嚴重的負面影響，沒有例外。

作為查塔姆研究所的現任主席，我迫切地想鼓勵大家多去探討房價等因素會如何影響收入和財富不均這樣更大范圍內的問題。我認為應該采用更準確全面的指標去追蹤其中的關聯。

舉例而言，很明顯，過去十年，財富不均加劇的程度遠大于收入不均，城市房價飛漲是其主導因素。經濟發展失衡是包括英國在內的發達國家所面臨的嚴重問題。不過最新數據表明，目前收入失衡水平已經有所下降，回到了1980年代的水平，但其實當時的失衡程度在今天看來也是很高的。

大眾對不平等現象的認知往往會夸大實際情況，這是因為相對普通員工而言，很多公司高管拿的是愈漸增長的巨額薪酬。盡管股票分紅機制下存在這樣的薪酬體系還算合理，但也難說得上公平公正。

這就是我希望查塔姆研究所探討的另一個問題。自2009年起，股市一路走高，這很大程度上是大型企業回購股票促成的。在某些重要的案例中，我們發現企業不惜發行債券籌資回購股票。

那么，回購盛行是造成西方國家固定資產投資減少、生產力后勁不足的原因嗎？上述宏觀經濟因素是導致近年來英美等西方民主政治動蕩的原因嗎？

我認為兩者的答案都是肯定的。除非我們重建能真正有效利用營業利潤的商業體系，否則爆發經濟、政治和社會動蕩的風險就會極高，令人難以承受。

（譯者單位：北京航空航天大學）