FOIP 2.0: The Evolution of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategyi

Senior Researcher at the Nakasone Yasuhiro Peace Institute,Professor at the Faculty Of Laws, Keio University

Introduction

Since Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe launched a new foreign policy doctrine at the opening session of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI)on August 27, 2016,Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy,or FOIP, has stimulated a broader debate on the future Indo-Pacific regional order.ii

No Japanese prime minister has ever presented such a globally discussed foreign policy vision before.One of the reasons for this would be the fact that Shinzo Abe is now becoming the longest-serving prime minister in Japanese history.If he can remain in power until November 20, 2019, Abe will surpass Katsura Taro as the longest-serving prime minister in the history of Japan’s constitutional government.iiiBased on a stable majority in Japan’s National Diet, Abe has been able to pursue a long-term foreign policy vision, such as the FOIP.

Abe’s role in today’s international politics is significant.He now becomes the second longest-serving leader at the G7 summit meeting next only to German Chancellor Angela Merkel.In addition, Abe has been playing a key role in defending the rules-based international order.Soon after Donald Trump became president of the United States, John Ikenberry, professor at Princeton University,wrote in his article toForeign Affairsthat the future of the liberal international order “will rest on the shoulders of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan and Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, the only two leaders of consequence left standing who support it.”ivLikewise,Jeffrey Hornung, a security expert at RAND Corporation, wrote that, “Under the current prime minister, Shinzo Abe, Japan’s role in supporting the international order has been particularly notable.”vHornung also noted that “It was part of his broader Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy, which the Trump administration later endorsed, and which places more of the burden on Japan for protecting freedom, the rule of law, and market economies in the region.”vi

On the other hand, Japan’s Free and Indo-Pacific strategy has also invited criticism from several quarters.Michael Swaine, a China expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, warned that, while the“FOIP would aim to defend against the ways a rising China ostensibly threatens the rules-based international order, universal liberal values, and free access to the maritime global commons,” in reality, the “FOIP is likely to have the opposite effect, provoking Beijing,alarming other Asian nations, and driving the region toward a highly tense, zero-sum competition.”vii

The FOIP is an amorphous concept.Ash Rossiter, a professor at Khalifa University at Abu Dhabi, correctly argued that “there is little consensus as to what the FOIP actually entails,let alone the ways by which it may influence future Japanese foreign policy.”viiiIn this article, while admitting Rossiter’s argument that the FOIP is indeed an amorphous concept,it will be argued that the current Japan’s FOIP strategy is different from what Shinzo Abe once proposed in his article toProject Syndicate,namely, “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond.”ixAs the current version of Japan’s FOIP is less confrontational, less divisive, and more cooperative toward China, it should be called “FOIP 2.0.”

Origins of the FOIP 1.0 in the era of China’s rise

The Japanese government had not officially used the term the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”before its first launch in August 2016.However,after Shinzo Abe became prime minister in his first administration in September 2006, the Japanese government often implied that cooperation among democracies in the Indo-Pacific region should become the core of the regional order.

The FOIP 1.0 originated in Prime Minister Abe’s policy speech at the Parliament of India on August 22, 2007.Abe argued that, “by Japan and India coming together in this way, this‘broader Asia’ will evolve into an immense network spanning the entirety of the Pacific Ocean, incorporating the United States of America and Australia.Open and transparent,this network will allow people, goods, capital,and knowledge to flow freely.”xIn this speech, Abe mentioned key components of the FOIP, such as openness, freedom, broader Asia,and the cooperation among the United States of America, Australia, India, and Japan.Then,Abe presented his vision of a new regional order in his speech by combining the two Seas.He stated that, “now, as this new ‘broader Asia’takes shape at the confluence of the two seas of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, I feel that it is imperative that the democratic nations located at opposite edges of these seas deepen the friendship among their citizens at every possible level.”xi

At this moment, Abe’s administration had simultaneously promoted a long-term grand strategy named the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity.”xiiThis strategy was based on the values-oriented diplomacy that aimed at promoting democracy, freedom, human rights,and the rule of law “along the Eurasian continent to form a rich and stable region based on universal values.”xiiiThis largely overlaps geopolitically with the region that is indicated in the FOIP.

We can notice that there exist some links in the personnel level.National Security Advisor to Prime Minister Shotaro Yachi, who is also Head of Japan’s National Security Secretariat(NSS), was Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs in Abe’s first administration from 2006 to 2007,and Nobukatsu Kanehara, who is currently the Deputy Head of the NSS, was then the Director at the Policy Coordination Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA).Those who drafted the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” in October 2006 are main designers of the FOIP in Abe’s second administration.

These Japanese initiatives can be regarded as a response to rapidly rising China.xivJapanese policymakers were trying to shape a regional order, rather than to be shaped by China.They believed that the United States,India, and Australia, together with Japan,should be the main players in this regional architecture, as they shared core values such as democracy, freedom, and the rule of law.Therefore, the Japanese government began to promote security cooperation with Australia and India during this period.In May 2007, the first Quadrilateral strategic dialogue, or the“Quad,” began with the initiative of Prime Minister Abe and the then American Vice-President Dick Cheney.

This “Quad” faced several difficulties.First,the Chinese government began to consider that this security cooperation was aimed at encircling China.Therefore, China endeavored to criticize this initiative by enhancing bilateral cooperation with Japan and with Australia.Lavina Lee of Macquarie University appropriately summarized that “Japan’s first attempt to engender deeper strategic cooperation between Japan, Australia, India and the United States—the Quadrilateral Dialogue(QD)of 2007—was a short-lived experiment that ultimately failed to gain traction in the face of strong Chinese opposition and the loss of office by its major proponents in Australia,Japan and the United States.”xvLee also pointed out that “Prime Minister Abe was widely acknowledged as the main protagonist behind the QD, with firm support from the Bush Administration, particularly U.S.Vice President Dick Cheney.”xviSoon after Abe stepped down from office, Japan’s new administration began to enhance its cooperation with China, leaving the “Quad” aside.Both Japan’s new Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda and Australia’s new Prime Minister Kevin Rudd prioritized their friendly relationships with their Chinese counterparts to the advancement of the“Quad.”

Second, some ASEAN countries presented serious concern over the development of the“Quad,” as this would seemingly depart from the basic principle of ASEAN centrality.Until that time, Asian regional cooperation had been based on ASEAN centrality.ASEAN countries did not like to see the move towards great powers-led situation in the region.

Third, the U.S.government under its new president, Barak Obama, started to prioritize the bilateral relationship between the United States and China to the “Quad.” There existed an optimistic view within the U.S.administration that the United States could enjoy developing its friendly bilateral partnership with then the second largest economy in the world, namely China.This move coincided with the difficult bilateral relationship between the United States and Japan due partly to Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s mishandling of the Futenma U.S.bases reallocation issue.

Since 2008, China had begun to become more assertive particularly in the South China Sea and the East China Sea.A Chinese trawler collision incident in the Senkaku Islands in September 2010 marked an important turning point for Japanese officials and public opinion,and the Japanese government started to become more vigilant toward China’s activities in the surrounding areas.xviiWhile the Obama administration noticed the difficulty of creating a cooperative relationship with China, Tokyo became aware of the necessity of using a different approach for responding to the rise of China.

Around this period, several experts began to write on the new regional concept of the Indo-Pacific.xviiiFor example, Michael Auslin wrote in a report for American Enterprise Institute that “The Indo-Pacific’s economic strength, military power, and political dynamism will make it the world’s most important region in the coming decades, and its significance will be felt throughout the globe.”xixAuslin encouraged the United States and its allies to have an Indo-Pacific regional strategy.In 2011, Rory Medcalf and Raoul Heinrichs, both of the Lowy Institute, also highlighted the importance of a regional concept of Indo-Pacific in their report.xxLikewise, David Scott wrote in his article forAsia-Pacific Reviewin 2012 that “Political practices in the Indo-Pacific involve institutional frameworks and inter-state operations that mesh the two oceans together.”xxi

In Japan, security experts such as Matake Kamiya, professor at the National Defense Academy, began to focus on the importance of the Indo-Pacific region for the foreign policy of Abe’s second administration.xxiiKamiya noted the importance of Prime Minister Abe’s usage of the regional concept of the“Indo-Pacific” in his speech in Washington, DC on February 22, 2013.xxiiiShinzo Abe can be regarded as the first political leader who identified the significance of the new regional concept of the “Indo-Pacific.”

When he returned to Prime Minister’s Office in December 2012, Shinzo Abe revived the old idea of the “Quad” in his article toProject Syndicate, entitled “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond.”xxivRecalling his own speech to the Indian Parliament five years previously, Abe wrote in this article that “Peace,stability, and freedom of navigation in the Pacific Ocean are inseparable from peace,stability, and freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean.”xxvHe “spoke in India of the need of the Indian and Japanese governments to join together to shoulder more responsibility as guardians of navigational freedom across the Pacific and Indian Oceans.”xxvi

Abe’s two important messages, namely the“Confluence of the Two Seas” and “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond,” created the core of the FOIP 1.0.The basic feature of the FOIP 1.0 was a competitive strategy towards China.Professor Ken Jimbo of Keio University argues that Japan’s Indo-Pacific vision clearly has both the dimension of “competitive strategy” and the dimension of “cooperative strategy.”xxviiAs the FOIP 1.0 has a much stronger character of “competitive strategy” in it, it would be natural that Japan’s initiative invited criticism from several Asian capitals, as it seemed that it would create division and confrontation in the Indo-Pacific region.Remembering these criticisms, Prime Minister Abe has refrained from using the concept“Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond” since then.xxviii

From FOIP 1.0 to FOIP 2.0

The FOIP 1.0 has a clear dilemma, that it now becomes clearer that not so many Asian countries would welcome an increasing division between China and America and its alliances.If Japan’s initiative is seen as an attempt to isolate China in a broader regional framework of the Indo-Pacific, a majority of Asian countries would hesitate to participate in that initiative, as China is their largest trading partner.

At this moment, China and the United States were intensifying their rivalry particularly in the South China Sea.Richard Javad Heydarian, a Manila-based foreign affairs analyst, wrote on Japan’s initiative that,“If implemented, Abe’s policies will inject Japan into the intensifying struggle between Beijing and Washington for Pacific maritime dominance and stir new concerns, especially in China, over a possible re-emergence of Japan’s militaristic past.”xxix

It would be important to understand that a Japan-China bilateral relationship has been recovered since the first summit meeting between Prime Minister Abe and President Xi Jinping on November 10, 2014.Abe showed his desire to rebuild the relationship on the concept of a Mutually Beneficial Relationship based on Common Strategic Interests.xxxSince then, Japan under Prime Minister Abe has developed a stable bilateral relationship with China, leaving the territorial issue beside.

When Abe launched his “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy at the TICAD VI meeting in Nairobi, Japan needed to maintain Japan’s cooperative relationship with China.In his speech, Abe underlined the importance of combining two oceans, as well as combining two continents.Abe stated that “What will give stability and prosperity to the world is none other than the enormous liveliness brought forth through the union of two free and open oceans and two continents.”xxxiHe implied the importance of the “union of two free and open oceans,” namely the Indo-Pacific region.

A factsheet published by Japan’s MOFA in April 2017 stated that “Japan will promote strategic and effective development cooperation to advance its foreign policy, including the‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy.’”xxxiiIt also said that “a key for stability and prosperity of the international community is dynamism that is created by combining ‘Two Continents’and ‘Two Oceans.’”xxxiiiIn Africa, this factsheet explains that “Japan will provide nation-building support in the area of development as well as politics and governance,in a way that respects the sovereignty of African countries.”xxxiv

In Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook of 2017,there is a special section on the FOIP.It explains that “Japan considers the key to the stability and prosperity of the international community to be the dynamism created by the synergy between the ‘two continents’—Asia,which is recording remarkable growth, and Africa, which is full of potential—and two free and open seas—the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean.By regarding these continents and seas as an integrated region, Japan intends to open up a new frontier of Japanese diplomacy.”xxxvIt can be understood that the FOIP is aiming at enlarging Japan’s economic interests as well as at contributing to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.As this diplomatic initiative tends to be a more cooperative strategy than a competitive strategy toward China, this should be regarded as the FOIP 2.0.

On June 5, 2017, Prime Minister Abe clearly showed his willingness to support China’s One Belt and One Road Initiative in his speech for the first time.Abe stated that “I would expect that the “One Belt andOne Road”initiative will fully incorporate such a common frame of thinking, and come into harmony with the free and fair Trans- Pacific economic zone,and contribute to the peace and prosperity of the region and the world.”xxxviIt was reported in the editorial ofThe Japan Timesthat reversing his position, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has indicated that Japan is ready to cooperate with China’s “One Belt and One Road” (OBOR)Initiative for cross-continental infrastructure development under certain conditions.”xxxvii

Then, at the Japan-China Summit meeting on July 8, 2017, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Xi Jinping shared the following view that “Japan and China will discuss how to contribute to the stability and prosperity of the region and the world, including the One Belt and One Road Initiative.”xxxviiiAround this time, the Japanese government seemingly endeavored to coordinate two diplomatic initiatives, namely China’s BRI and Japan’s FOIP.Although there existed several hurdles to clear, the two governments began to refrain from criticism towards the respective diplomatic visions.This signifies that the FOIP 2.0 is different from the FOIP 1.0 which was regarded as a competitive strategy to deny China’s diplomatic initiatives.

Therefore, Akihiko Tanaka, former President of Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), criticizes that “The Media often explain that a free and open Indo-Pacific strategy is Japan’s diplomacy to counter China’s One Belt and One Road Initiative.”xxxixTanaka wrote that “it is short-sighted to conceive of a strategy toward such broad and promising region as the Indo-Pacific only to counter activities of other countries,” and “the emergence of the Indo-Pacific as a regional concept combining the Indian and Pacific Oceans reflects the long-term development of the global economy.”xl

David Brewster correctly argued that“Japan’s vision involves developing new economic and transportation corridors from the Pacific across the Indian Ocean to Africa.As the name implies, its stated focus is on building an open and not exclusive system of infrastructure.”xli

In his speech to the National Diet on January 22, 2018, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe clearly proclaimed the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy.” He stated: “A vast expanse of sea stretches from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean.Since ancient times the people of this region have enjoyed affluence and prosperity from this large and free body of water.Freedom of navigation and the rule of law form their bedrock.We must ensure that these waters are a public good that brings peace and prosperity to all people without discrimination into the future.To this end we will promote the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy.”xliiHe showed no intention to divide the Indo-Pacific region into two blocs, and underlined the importance of including “all people” who can benefit from it.China can also naturally enjoy such peace and prosperity within the free and open Indo-Pacific.

Conclusion

One of the most significant problems for Japan’s FOIP is that this diplomatic initiative is often confused with the American Indo-Pacific strategy, which is centered at the more military-oriented “Quad.” Particularly, in AmericanNational Security Strategy(NSS)of 2017, it is stated that “A geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region.”xliiiThose who read this document would naturally have an impression that the Indo-Pacific region was divided into two camps, namely the U.S.-Japan alliance’s FOIP and China’s BRI.However, Japan’s approach to the free and open Indo-Pacific is more comprehensive, more inclusive, and more cooperative than what is written inNSSof the United States.

In China, as well as in several ASEAN countries, some experts previously presented their concern over the future division of the Indo-Pacific region, and then the FOIP was denounced by them as a tool to divide the region.However, as this article already described, Japan’s FOIP 2.0 has been carefully avoiding the impression that Japan and the United States are intending to contain China.The period when Japan has been promoting this diplomatic initiative largely overlaps the time of Japan-China rapprochement.As Donald Trump’s administration intensifies its confrontational stance towards China, the Chinese government approaches to Tokyo have become more conciliatory than before.

Abe’s more cooperative approach to China is basically welcomed not just by China, but more broadly as well.Andreea Brinza wrote inThe Japan Timesthat “the steps that Abe has taken may bring peace into the region and may enable Japan to strengthen its presence in the Asia-Pacific region.”xlivIn this way, Japan’s FOIP would be acceptable to ASEAN countries,as well as to India and Australia, which are less confrontational to China than the United States is.Thus, Japan’s move from FOIP 1.0 to FOIP 2.0 was a necessary evolution to respond to the voices of Asian countries.

iThis paper is originally written forAsia-Pacific Review, Volume 26, Issue 1, 2019.

iiAddress by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI), August 27, 2016, Nairobi, Kenya.https://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/page4e_000496.html.This FOIP is now generally regarded as a "vision", rather than a"strategy".See Shinichi Kitaoka's "Vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific" in this issue.However, I will use the term "strategy", as Japan's government had also used repeatedly until recently.

iiiJapan Data, “Abe Shinzo on Track to Become Japan’s Longest-Serving Prime Minister,” October 3, 2018,Nippon.com.https://www.nippon.com/en/features/h00296/abe-shinzo-on-track-to-become-japan%E2%80%99s-longestserving-prime-minister.html

ivJohn Ikenberry, “The Plot Against American Foreign Policy”,Foreign Affairs, May/June 2017, p.3.

vJeffrey W.Hornung, “The Fate of the World Order Rests on Tokyo’s Shoulder”,Foreign Policy, October 30, 2018.https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/30/the-fate-of-the-world-order-rests-on-tokyos-shoulders/.

viIbid.

viiMichael D.Swaine, “A Counterproductive Cold War With China: Washington’s ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’strategy Will Make Asia Less Open and Less Free”,Foreign Affairs, March 2, 2018.https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-03-02/counterproductive-cold-war-china.

viiiAsh Rossiter, “The “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” Strategy and Japan’s Emerging Security Posture”,Rising Powers Quarterly, Volume 3, Issue 2, 2018, p.114.

ixShinzo Abe, “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond”,Project Syndicate,December 27, 2012.https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe.

xSpeech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Parliament of the Republic of India, “Confluence of the Two Seas”,August 22, 2007.https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html.

xiIbid.

xiiOn the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity”, see Yuichi Hosoya, “The Rise and Fall of Japan’s Grand Strategy: The“Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” and the Future Asian Order”,Asia-Pacific Review, 18 (1), pp.13-24

xiiiSpeech by Foreign Minister Taro Aso, “Thee Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan’s Expanding Diplomatic Horizons”, 30 November 2006.https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0611.html.

xivMie Oba, “Nihon no ‘indo-taiheiyo’ koso”,Kokusai Anzenhosho, vol.46, no.3, 2018, p.15; Rossiter, “The ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ Strategy and Japan’s Emerging Security Posture”, p.114.

xvLavina Lee, “Abe’s Democratic Security Diamond and New Quadrilateral Initiative: an Australian Perspective”,The Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol.30, No.2, Fall/Winter 2016, p.3.

xviIbid.

xviiRoyoseiKokubun, Yoshihide Soeya, Akio Takahara and Shin Kawashima,Japan-China Relations in the Modern Era,translated by Keith Krulak (London: Routledge, 2017)p.180.

xviiiOn the development in the regional concept of “Indo-Pacific”, see Yoshinobu Yamamoto, “Indo-taiheiyogainen wo megutte”, in Japan Institute of International Affairs (ed.),Ajia (tokuniminamishinakai – indoyo)niokeruanzenhoshochitsujo(Tokyo: JIIA, 2015)pp.5-23; Kazutoshi Tamari, “ ‘Indotaiheiyo’ gainen no fukyukatei”,Kokusai Anzenhosho, Vol.43, No.1, 2015, pp.68-86; TeruakiAizawa, “The Philosophy and Practice of the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIP)’ decoded from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website”, Ocean Policy Research Institute, The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, July 30, 2018; and Oba, Nihon no ‘indo-taiheiyo’ koso”.

xixMichael Auslin, “Security in the Indo-Pacific Commons: Toward a Regional Strategy”, A Report of the American Enterprise Institute, December 2010, p.5.

xxRory Medcalf and Raoul Heinrichs with Justin Jones, “Crisis and Confidence: Major Powers and Maritime Security in Indo-Pacific Asia”, Lowy Institute for International Policy, June 2011.

xxiDavid Scott, “The ‘Indo-Pacific’ – New Regional Formulations and New Maritime Frameworks for US-India Strategic Convergence”,Asia-Pacific Review, Vol.19, No.2, 2012, p.87.

xxiiMatake Kamiya, “Nihon to ‘Indo-taiheiyo’ – kitai to mondaiten”, Japan Institute of International Affairs (ed.),Ajia(tokuniminamishinakai – indoyo)niokeruanzenhoshochitsujo(Tokyo: JIIA, 2015)pp.25-45.

xxiiiSpeech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, “Japan is Back”, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),February 22, 2013.https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201302/22speech_e.html.

xxivAbe, “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond,”Project Syndicate, December 27, 2012.

xxvIbid.

xxviIbid.

xxviiKen Jimbo, “‘Indo taiheiyo’ koso no shatei to kadai”,Kokusai Anzenhosho, vol.46, no.3, 2018, pp.4-5.

xxviiiOba, Nihon no ‘indo-taiheiyo’ koso”, p.18.

xxixRichard JavadHeydarian, “Japan’s ‘democratic security diamond’”,East Asia Forum, 15 February, 2013.https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/02/15/japans-democratic-security-diamond/.

xxxKokubunet al, Japan-China Relations in the Modern Era, pp.192-4.

xxxiAddress by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI), August 27, 2016, Nairobi, Kenya

xxxiiInternational Cooperation Bureau (MOFA), “Priority Policy for Development Cooperation FY2017”, April 2017,Tokyo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000259285.pdf.

xxxiiiIbid.

xxxivIbid.

xxxvMinistry of Foreign Affairs, Japan,Diplomatic Bluebook 2017: Japanese Diplomacy and International Situation in 2016(Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 2017)p.26.

xxxviSpeech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, “Asia’s Dream: Linking the Pacific and Eurasia”, the Banquet of the 23rd International Conference on The Future of Asia June 5, 2017.https://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201706/1222768_11579.html.

xxxvii“The Editorial: Japan and ‘One Belt, One Road’”,The Japan Times,June 24, 2017,

xxxviiiMinistry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, “Japan-China Summit Meeting”, July 8, 2017.https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/c_m1/cn/page4e_000636.html.

xxxixAkihiko Tanaka, “The Range of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”,Discuss Japan – Japan Foreign Policy Forum, No.44, March 8, 2018.https://www.japanpolicyforum.jp/archives/diplomacy/pt20180308182133.html.

xlIbid.

xliDavid Brewster, “A ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ and what it means for Australia”, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 7 March 2018.https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/free-and-open-indo-pacific-and-what-it-means-australia.

xliiSpeech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the 196th Session of the Diet, January 22, 2018.https://japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/statement/201801/_00002.html

xliiiThe White House,National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, D.C., December 2017,p.45.

xlivAndreeaBrinza, “Abe Strikes a ‘Belt and Road’ Balancing Act”,The Japan Times,November 13, 2018.