US-built Mini-multilateral Mechanisms in Asia-Pacific Region: Progress, Features and Its Impact

Zhao Minghao

In recent years， to advance its so-called strategic competition with China， the United States （US） has increasingly prioritized forming cliques in an attempt to construct a topic-oriented “multilateral camp” for a more agile and nested partnership system. In particular， the US quickens its pace in putting together all sorts of mini-multilateral mechanisms， such as the US-Japan-India-Australia Quadrilateral Security Dialogue （QUAD）， through which the US hopes to shape China cognition of concerned countries， integrate their China strategies， and promote multiple policy objectives of security deterrence， reshaping supply chains， technology competition， and ideological suppression. The complex impact of US-built Asia-Pacific mini-multilateral mechanisms on Chinas neighborhood strategic environment deserves high alert.

New Progress of US-Built

mini-multilateral Mechanisms in Asia-Pacific Region

Advocating strategic competition with China， and continuing to play up so-called “China threat”， the Biden administration tries its best to construct “a latticework of strong and mutually reinforcing coalitions” in the Asian-Pacific region， especially focusing on diversiform and agile mini-multilateral mechanisms， promoting profound integration of its treaty allies and security partners like India， and seeking so-called position of strength vs. China.

First， comprehensively elevating the QUAD mechanism. The Biden administration has taken the QUAD as the core platform to advance its Indo-Pacific strategy， and elevated it to a heads-of-state and heads-of-government mechanism， with several summits having been held so far. The domains of cooperation for the QUAD have continued to expand， setting up working groups centering on agenda of maritime security， global health security， critical and emerging technologies， cyberspace， and infrastructure. Besides， the QUAD mechanism has further extended its partnership， first to cajole South Korea and Vietnam into becoming its partners to increase strategic restraint on China through such middle-sized powers， second to include other members of the Five Eyes Alliance like Canada and New Zealand， and third to stress on interaction with the ASEAN， on which the Biden administrations Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States gives emphasis.

Second， accelerating consolidation of the AUKUS， a trilateral security pact between Australia， the United Kingdom （UK）， and the United States. In September 2021， the US， the UK and Australia announced the trilateral security partnership. As an alliance mechanism with evident offensive features， it also has become an important platform for the Biden administration to pursue integrated deterrence to China. To provide Australia with nuclear-powered submarines is an important AUKUS objective， by which the US intends to enhance its allys blue-water submarine capabilities. On top of that， the AUKUS sets store by coordinating front-line military technologies and defense industries， reflecting US policy orientation of outsourcing defense capabilities. The mechanism focuses on such front-line military technologies as hypersonic and counter-hypersonic， electronic warfare， cyber-warfare， artificial intelligence and autonomous systems， quantum technology， and ocean floor capabilities. The military-industrial complexes of the US， the UK and Australia have also deepened cooperation， attempting to enhance integration of defense supply chains and defense industrial base， and joint R&D and production of military equipment and ammunition. It is worth noting that New Zealand， South Korea and India wish to participate in pertinent cooperation under the AUKUS trilateral security partnership framework.

Third， continuing to deepen trilateral coordination mechanisms such as the US-Japan-South Korea， and the US-Japan-Australia trilateral relations. The Biden administration takes promotion of the US-Japan-South Korea trilateral relations for a main focal point. In its Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States， to enhance the US-Japan-South Korea trilateral relations is one of the ten items in action plan. In recent years， the US， Japan and South Korea have held several trilateral summits and conducted trilateral consultations of department heads on diplomacy， national security， military， and intelligence. Besides， the US-Japan-Australia trilateral relations have been substantially enhanced. Vigorously supported by the US， security relations between Japan and Australia have been markedly strengthened with the two Heads of states releasing a new Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation. Both sides have hold several “two plus two” consultations of Foreign and Defense ministers， signing military agreements like Reciprocal Access Agreement. The US and Australia have invited Japan to station military forces in Australia， and Japan also considers sending advanced weaponry purchased from the US such as F-35s and other fighter aircraft on rotating deployment in Australia. It is noteworthy that the US wishes to rely on US-Japan-Australia trilateral relations for advancing its strategic alignment in Southeast Asia and South Pacific regions. For instance， the US， Japan and Australia have jointly enhanced the defense capabilities of the Philippines.

Features of US-Built

Mini-multilateral Mechanisms in Asia-Pacific Region

Continuing to strengthen Asia-Pacific mini-multilateral mechanisms is an important link for the Biden administration to reshape its alliance strategy to address the so-called China threat. Such mini-multilateral mechanisms feature flexibility， cross-region， and extensiveness， by which the US tries to forge a multi-tiered， networking and nested alliance-partnership framework so as to organize camp confrontation and composite containment and suppression against China. Its main features are as follows：

First， Japan plays an increasingly critical role in US-built Asia-Pacific mini-multilateral mechanisms. The Biden administration vigorously promote modernization of US-Japan alliance， enhancing its security offensiveness， whereas Japan has availed itself of factors like the Ukraine crisis to make major adjustment to its military policy. In December 2022， the Japanese government released three major security papers， the National Security Strategy， the National Defense Strategy， and the Defense Buildup Plan， declaring to boost its defense spending from 1% to 2% of GDP in five years， and develop “enemy base strike capability”. As Japans defense spending increases from top nine in the world to top three， and as Japan continues to deepen security relations with Australia， India and Vietnam， the US wishes to urge Japan to take up the role of “co-sheriff” in US-led Asia-Pacific alliance-partnership system. The US has welcomed the Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement and supports Japan to enter into agreements of military alliance with its European allies such as the UK and France. In economic and technological domains， Japan also plays a core role in US-built Asia-Pacific mini-multilateral mechanisms， for instance in Chip 4 alliance， part of a US strategy to put China under export control and reshape semiconductor supply chains.

Second， the US vigorously plays the “Taiwan card” in driving the building of mini-multilateral mechanisms. As the Ukraine crisis lingers on， the US has continued to play up the tension in Taiwan Strait， American top military brass untruthfully alleging that the Chinese mainland “will assault Taiwan by 2027”， and further cajoling its allies and partners into aligning with its position and into forming collective deterrence against China. One of the focal points for the US to pursue its “containing Chinese Mainland with Taiwan” strategy is to push for “internationalization” of the Taiwan question， make the Taiwan region the front-line of so-called “confrontation between democracy and autocracy”， and call for its allies and partners to deepen economic， technological and security relations with the Taiwan region. As such， visibility of the Taiwan question has increased somewhat in US-built Asia-Pacific mini-multilateral mechanisms， with strengthened coordination of US allies and partners against changing so-called “status quo” in the Taiwan Strait. In November 2022， US President Joe Biden， Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and South Korean President Yoon Seok-Youl held a summit in Phnom Penh， Cambodia， and released a joint statement after the meeting， noting “the importance of maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait”. Moreover， the AUKUS trilateral security partnership is highly related to the US enlarging its military superiority in the Taiwan Strait region， with British and Australian politicians jumping on the bandwagon， manipulating the Taiwan question， and making a presumptuous claim that “Global NATO” should “protect Taiwan against Chinese intrusion”.

Third， US-built Asia-Pacific mini-multilateral mechanisms are increasingly cross- boundary. At agenda levels， US-built Asia-Pacific mini-multilateral mechanisms aim to advance policy coordination between allies and partners on various levels of economy， security and technology， over-interpreting the concept of security and making them ideology-centric so as to push forward cross-boundary competition with China. For instance， the QUAD mechanism has set up a critical and emerging technologies working group， whose job is to work out principles for technological R&D and application and promote pluralization of supply of advanced technological products. The Biden administration has planted ideological element to technological cooperation under the QUAD framework， formulating technological standard based on consensus and meeting value requirements. At the same time， US-built Asia-Pacific mini-multilateral mechanisms also focus on agenda like digital infrastructure， management of water resources， and training of young leaders， through which they attempt to build on interaction and mutual trust between all parties. For instance， the US wishes to promote US-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation in low sensitivity areas like empowering women and digital technology and increase essence of a value alliance. At the level of geographical regions， US-built Asia-Pacific mini-multilateral mechanisms have continuously enhanced linkage with US allies in Europe， with the US， France， Germany and even the European Union making their respective Indo-Pacific strategies， which provides an important condition for the US to pursue a “bringing Europe into Asia” strategy. For instance， in recent years， France has continuously enhanced linkage with US-built Asia-Pacific mini-multilateral mechanisms， conducting joint military exercises with the QUAD countries in the Bay of Bengal area and carrying out amphibious war games with the US and Japan.

Impact of US-Built

mini-multilateral Mechanisms in Asia-Pacific Region

The Biden administration advocates ten years in the future being a “decisive decade” of US-China competition， increasingly focusing on converging its diplomatic and military resources to the Asian-Pacific region. Against the background of US continuing to push forward its mini-multilateral mechanisms， it is necessary for China to examine the complex impact of those mini-multilateral mechanisms with a broader and longer-term perspective， and ingeniously manage the interaction between China-US strategic competition and Chinas neighborhood diplomacy.

First， US-built Asia-Pacific mini-multilateral mechanisms may weaken strategic trust between China and its neighboring countries， and increase Chinas political cost for participation and leadership in the regional affairs. The US attempts to isolate China in values and ideology， labeling China as a “saboteur” of the regional order and a “threat” to the regional security， and building on “China threat” cognition of the Asia-Pacific countries by its “binding China to Russia” strategy. The US has made use of its Asia-Pacific mini-multilateral mechanisms to shape and galvanize China cognition of its allies and partners， and disseminate negative China-related messages in the international arena through releasing their joint statements. Relying on all types of mini-multilateral mechanisms， the US has made the Diaoyu Island issue， the South China Sea issue， the Taiwan question， and China-India border issue intertwine， continuing to build “counter China” consensus among its Asian-Pacific allies and partners， and setting the tone for creating a “turbulent arch” in Chinas neighborhood. As the US-Japan-India-Australian， the US- Japan-Australia， and the US-Japan-India mini-multilateral mechanisms continue to be strengthened， pressure on middle and small Asian-Pacific countries to take sides between China and the US may increase， which will undermine the building of an Asia-Pacific community with a shared future.

Second， US-built Asia-Pacific mini-multilateral mechanisms will intensify regional arms race， and increase military security pressure on China in its neighborhood. According to statistics of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute （SIPRI）， military expenditure of the Asian-Pacific region stood at US$586.9 billion in 2021 with an increase of 3.5%， surpassing that of Europe at US$418 billion with an increase of 3%. The Asia-Pacific mini-multilateral mechanisms like the US-Japan-Australia trilateral relations focus on military security cooperation， and it is inevitable for military buildup of Asian-Pacific countries to be stimulated. It will also bring new tests for regional countries to control military conflict， and prevent escalation of security crisis. Based on its “China threat” allegations， the US has continued to strengthen US-led regional security cooperative framework through the US-Japan-Australia and the US-Japan-South Korea trilateral relations， whose strategic orientation against China is becoming more salient for pertinent mini-multilateral mechanisms with growing offensiveness and combat readiness. In particular， deepening the US-Japan-South Korea military security cooperation will change strategic profile of the Northeast Asian region， posing a new threat to Chinas national security interests. China has over the years made positive contributions to Asia-Pacific security through participating in ASEAN-led regional security mechanisms like the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus （ADMM+）. As the US pushes forward all kinds of mini-multilateral mechanisms， there is a tendency to weaken and hollow out the ASEAN-led regional security mechanisms， which will lead to obstruction to Chinas efforts to guide regional security affairs through concerned mechanisms.

Third， US-built Asia-Pacific mini-multilateral mechanisms will to certain extent impact on Chinas influence on regional industrial and supply chains and on regional innovation chains. As such mini-multilateral mechanisms form a composite camp， the US attempts to integrate forces among governments， corporations， financial institutions， academic institutions， non-governmental organizations and the media， and to put pressure on China by means of public-private partnerships， especially in US-China economic and trade relations and technological competition. The US has made use of security policy coordination mechanisms under the QUAD， the US-Japan-Australia， and the US-Japan-South Korea framework and relied on the “Indo-Pacific Economic Framework” （IPEF） to cajole regional countries into “coordinated decoupling” with China， reducing Chinas influence on industrial and supply chains in the Asian-Pacific region， and weakening Chinas economic ties with US allies. US-built Asia-Pacific mini-multilateral mechanisms focus on agenda items like digital economy， cybersecurity， energy and infrastructure development. The US， Japan and Australia have attempted to restrain the Belt and Road Initiative cooperation by introducing so-called business corruption， labor rights， and environmental pollution. In a “Democratic Technology Alliance” the Biden administration wishes to create， Asian-Pacific countries like Japan， South Korea， Australia， and India take important positions. The US deepens technology cooperation with its allies and partners through the QUAD， the AUKUS， and the US-Japan-Australia frameworks， focusing on expanding leading edge in critical technologies like chips， artificial intelligence， and quantum computation to compete with China.

To sum up， the impact of US-built Asia-Pacific mini-multilateral mechanisms on Chinas neighborhood strategic environment should not be overlooked. At the same time， it is necessary to see the limits of the US advancing its Asia-Pacific mini-multilateral mechanisms， to accurately understand the differences and contradictions between the US and its allies and partners on security threat cognition， objectives of China strategies， and economic interests. In essence， the US enhancing its Asia-Pacific mini-multilateral mechanisms is to ask its allies and partners to share its responsibilities. The US has asked Japan， South Korea， and Australia to increase their military expenditure， to purchase more US arms， and to foot more bills for the US to station troops in their territories. Under the profound influence of “America First” strategy， the US has even less room to make concessions to its allies and partners， hardly possible to decouple supply chains with China， and even less possible to fully compensate or replace what its allies and partners lose in technology Cold War. Besides， there are quite a few contradictions between the US and its allies and partners. For instance， contest between South Korea and Japan over historical and territorial issues will linger on， and the former is on guard against the latter taking a freeride to re-militarize. It is necessary for China to increase strategic communications with Asian-Pacific countries， maintain the regional cooperative framework with ASEAN countries， and deal with the effect on the regional order caused by US-led Asia-Pacific mini-multilateral mechanisms featuring fragmentation， camp politics， and building an Asia-Pacific version of NATO.

Zhao Minghao is Professor， Center for American Studies， Fudan University， China