Boris and Beijing

By Kerry Brown

The internal election of a new British Conservative Party leader at the end of July also meant that the United Kingdom （UK） got a new prime minister. Boris Johnson comes to power therefore via a route with no national election to legitimize him. He is also， even in his own party， a divisive fi gure.

In spite of this， he has promised to achieve what his two predecessors， David Cameron and Theresa May， failed to do： take the UK out of the European Union （EU）， fulfi lling the wishes of the British people in a referendum held in June 2016. A major part of this scheme will be to construct a new narrative for a “Global Britain，” and China will almost certainly fi gure in it.

Over confident？

Unlike Nigel Farage， former leader of the UK Independence Party and now heading the Brexit Party， Johnson has not shirked responsibility. When the chance came he put himself forward to implement something he was a key proponent of three years ago. This may well be due to hubris and over confidence rather than anything else however. Unlike May， Johnson has only a few months to prove he is about more than just empty rhetoric.

On the specific issue of relations with China， the Latin-and-Greek-quoting Johnson comes with some knowledge， but no real indication of any deep commitment or fresh vision. He does not， like former Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne， have any evident strong personal interest in China. He visited as Mayor of London in order to fulfill his duties as the succeeding host city of the Olympics in 2008. But during his time as foreign secretary， one characterized by poor judgment and under-performance， he postponed a number of proposed trips to China and in the end， he simply never visited.

This track record means that Beijing has good grounds for regarding him with skepticism， joining the very large group of people who are simply taking a wait and see approach to what actions， rather than words， fl ow from his leadership. One attribute Johnson does have is an ability to delegate well， and to gather credible advisors around him. On China， therefore， the key issue is not so much his lack of track record and any demonstrable knowledge， but whether he is honest about this and hires people he trusts and listens to who can compensate for his inexperience.

These figures may not be in the British Foreign Offi ce， where memories of his time in office from 2016 to 2018 are not happy ones. Johnsons often cavalier attitude toward their briefi ngs and advice， and his brittle relations with civil servants generally， means that his likely sources of advice will be from outside these fi elds.

At a crossroads

Johnson is a risk taker， however， and things could become more interesting. The relationship with China is at a crossroads： of the major global economies， the economic links between the UK and China are the most underwhelming. Unlike Australia， the United States or Germany， China is not the UKs largest trading partner. Ireland and Luxembourg rank higher， while Chinese investment in the UK is less than 2 percent. For the economic life of the average British person， China is peripheral， while Chinese companies are almost invisible.

As he drives the UK toward becoming a “Global Britain” no longer intimately linked to the EU， Johnson could fundamentally change this dynamic by raising the profile and priority of China for the British people

There is an associated point to this. While we now know—thanks to the 2016 EU referendum—what British people think of their European neighbors， warts and all， how they regard China is much more of a mystery. Engagement with China， whether in business， academia or more generally in society， is still a specialist area. The UK has world class expertise in these areas， but almost next to no capacity elsewhere. It produces 300 graduates in Chinese studies nationally a year， a 0 percent increase over the level from two decades ago. Therefore， the British can understand Tang Dynasty （618-907） era poetry but cant even say “thank you” in Mandarin. This is indicative of a huge variance， and levels in other areas of knowledge are similar.

To most British people， China is remote despite the fact that Beijing is much closer to London than Sydney. Chinese history， politics and culture are things that are largely passed by in the general education system. Someone can go through life in the UK barely conscious of what is happening in or with China. The simple fact is that from what little solid evidence there is at the moment， the British people are neither positive nor negative about the worlds second largest economy， they are on the whole indifferent.