Reshaping European Security Order

Zhao Long

The Russia-Ukraine Conflict breaking out in the early February 2022 has gone on with no end in sight， its stalemate and impact far exceeding anticipations of all parties. Overall， the final outcome of the crisis depends on the comprehensive contest on strategic will， war damage tolerance， and internal coordination between Russia and Ukraine and among Russia， the U.S. and Europe. Moreover， as the largest military confrontation in Europe since the 21st century began， the Russia-Ukraine conflicts reshaping effect for regional and global security order is gradually unfolding.

Regional Security Conflict Quickens Forming of Opposing Alliances

A hot war breaking out in the European continent caused security panic， resulting in further enhancement of the concept of the U.S.-Europe alliance security. On strategic orientation plane， not only did the North Atlantic Treaty Organization （NATO） Madrid Summit reposition Russia from strategic partner to most important and immediate threat， it also set to increase its rapid reaction force by seven folds to over 300，000 troops so as to strengthen its containment and deterrence to the so-called Russia threat. On policy and practical plane， some of the European countries have drastically adjusted defense and security policies. For instance， Austria and Switzerland as countries of neutrality have for the first time joined the camp of sanctions against Russia; Germany has changed its Merkel line of Russia policy and significantly increased its defense spending， including the approval of a special fund of 100 billion euros and projection of increasing the GDP ratio of its annual defense spending to more than 2 percent from 2024. More important， Sweden and Finland have discarded their previous nonaligned military policy and officially applied to join the NATO. As the representatives of all of the NATO member states signed the Accession Protocols concerning Finlands and Swedens NATO membership. On July 5， 2022， the NATO northward expansion was formally launched， an expansion that will give rise to a strategic offensive and defensive longitudinal axis from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea and all the way to the Arctic Sea. At the same time， Russia has also accelerated the military integration of the Union State of Russia and Belarus， and attempted to revive the Collective Security Treaty Organization. As a result， small and middle-sized countries sitting in between the two confronting sides are forced to attain their security through ganging up for self-protection. Against this background， the antagonistic pattern has come about fast， a pattern based on counterposing security and order concepts.

Affected by the Russia-Ukraine conflict， the Cold War legacy between Russia and the West is underscored at cognitive level. For instance， the U.S. and Europe hold on to the theory of the end of history for basic understanding of the disintegration of the Soviet Union， handling their relations with Russia from the binary opposition of winner and loser. But in the eye of Russia， it was the Soviet Unions active strategic choice to end the Cold War， and Russia deserves to inherit the identity and status of the Soviet Union and participate on equal footing in the construction of global and European regional political and security architectures， and its traditional geopolitical security space deserves to be respected. In practice， on top of the U.S. that has long pursued a strategy to contain and weaken Russia， Europe continues to attempt to replace mutual security guarantees as promoted by Russia with an integration process based on the future of Europe. The NATO insists on an open door policy and denies that it has reached an agreement with Russia on not to expand eastward， and emphasized time and again that its eastward expansion will not pose a threat to Russia. However， NATO， as a legacy of the Cold War， continues to expand to post-Soviet region， which inevitably results in Russia's increasing security concern. For Russia， its special military operation in Ukraine can not only resolve security pressure in its neighborhood and counter NATO eastward expansion， but also help to remove the label of loser in the Cold War and reconstruct the U.S. and West-led world order. To a certain degree， the Russia-Ukraine conflict has brought the world back to a Great War era， signifying an end to the uni-polar world order since the Cold War ended. Should Russia and Ukraine achieve an armistice， all the existing political issues would not go away， and there will be a long and irreversible military confrontation in Europe. In the future， antagonism between Russia and the West on ideology and strategic orientation can only intensify and may lead to more regional conflicts.

Negative Effect Continues to Spillover

Some of the countries seek exclusive and absolute security， neglecting the collateral damage and chain reaction caused by their measures for security interests， which attributes to the outbreak and lasting Russia-Ukraine conflict. For instance， running through important documents like the Helsinki Final Act of 1975， the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of 1990， the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997， and the Charter for European Security of 1999， the principle of indivisible security is one of the bedrocks for post-War European security architecture whose core is not to sacrifice one countrys security to guarantee that of another country. In spite of this， the U.S.-led NATO has strengthened its exclusive security interests， using its continued expansion to deter Russia as its imaginary enemy， continuing to squeeze the buffer zone that gives both sides security comfort. Before the conflict happened， Russian President Putin had called for the West to have a dialogue in search of rational compromise and take into account each others interests， but failed to get due attention. Since the conflict broke out， the U.S. and Europe have failed to reflect on their strategic orientation of exclusive security but rather hardened the priority of providing Ukraine with military assistance， resulting in the fact that both sides lack the will for mutual compromise， neither wishing to give up actions to consolidate its position in negotiations by achieving new gains in the battlefield.

At the same time， the U.S. has availed itself of a prolonged Russia-Ukraine conflict to consolidate its allies-partners system beyond Europe so as to maintain its leadership in the international pattern. On April 5， 2022， NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg called for democracies to stand together， and protect their values and the rules-based international order， alleging that China poses a systemic challenge to the NATOs security and democracies. The NATO attempts to arbitrarily label China and Russia order breakers， produce a globe narrative of “democracies vs. autocracies”， and apply the notion of global partners and extraterritorial missions in extending its boundary of function and agenda to Asia， bringing uncertainties to security and stability of the Asian region. As Germany makes a turn in its defense strategy from security consumer to security supplier， its co-vanquished nation of the World War II Japan quickens the pace to break its pacifist constitution so as to enhance its military and overseas intervention capacity by writing its Self Defense Force into the constitution and increasing the GDP ratio of its defense spending. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has also become a leverage for the U.S. to advance its process of containing China in the Asia-Pacific by strengthening the Five Eyes Alliance， peddling the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue， and rigging up the AUKUS. Revolving around its values and sphere of geopolitical influence， the U.S. has artificially carved up and destructed the regional security pattern， making countries beyond the region of Russia-Ukraine conflict indirect victims.

Transatlantic Relationship Accelerates its Reshaping

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has radically reversed the trend of weakening the transatlantic relationship caused by strategic alienation， interest deviation and identity decline. During the Trump presidency， compound effect of geopolitical policy differences， economic competition， and internal social and political changes led to changes in the transatlantic relationship， with glaring differences between the two sides on military spending of NATO member nations， digital taxation， and trade protectionism. As a strong believer of Atlanticism， President Biden has been engaged in reshaping the transatlantic relationship since taking office， which is regarded as the cornerstone for achieving all objectives. However the process has been obstructed by trust deficit among the allies caused by the hasty U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the diplomatic crisis coming out of the announcement of the U.S.， the UK and Australia to form the AUKUS and their plan for military cooperation. Since the Russia-Ukraine conflict broke out， the G7 Summit， the EU Summit， and the NATO Summit have been held in the fashion of back to back. Not only did themes like how to increase the force of punishing Russia and assisting Ukraine and how to defend the rule-based order become the core items of agenda， they also turned out to be important breaching points to resolve various contradictions between the U.S. and Europe and display the cohesion of transatlantic relationship. Besides， the U.S. and the EU have collaborated with one another on finance， economic and trade， science and technology， and energy and rolled out six rounds of sanctions against Russia， significantly improving previous asynchrony in force， scale， and timing of sanctions. It can be predicted that the Russia threat in the long run can serve as rationale behind sustaining the NATO and adhesive of the U.S.-Europe value alliance.

It is worth noting that the EU relies on the Russia-Ukraine conflict for effectively removing the identity gap between the new and old Europe， but its interests on security and energy agenda binding with the U.S. is on the increase， resulting in the process of strategic independence promoted by France and Germany in recent years in want of readjustment， as their security and foreign policy making increasingly depends on the overall transatlantic framework. However， it would be necessary to observe that the strategic independence sought after by the EU is double-dimensional， not just pertaining to the U.S. or the transatlantic relationship. As a bylined report published by the European Council on Foreign Relations titled “Strategic Sovereignty： How Europe Can Regain the Capacity to Act” suggested， sovereign Europe is to empower EU member states in a world of geopolitical competition， especially independently address the challenges other powerful states like the U.S.， China and Russia present， inspire and integrate their comparative edge and influence， and increase their overall ability to act independently of other great powers. German Chancellor Scholz held that the EU should have a leading role in globe politics， and no longer afford to keep national vetoes when deciding on EU foreign and security policy， which also helps advance internal unity of the EU. There is a reason to believe that the EU has made clear its interests as a geopolitical player and reached consensus to enhance its geopolitical strength. In the future， as debate on security and defense policy among European countries continues to go into depth， the appeal of EU as normative power is likely to be replaced by its geopolitical character， and its compound linkage feature with the NATO will be further underlined.

At present， European governments， corporations and public opinions are at the stage of traumatic stress response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict， and there are things to show for U.S.-Europe strategic coordination against Russia. However， as the conflict develops into a long event， pressure on the U.S. and Europe to sustain the synergistic effect will gradually increase. First， war fatigue at public opinion level， U.S.-Europe mainstay medias coverage on the conflict is on the decrease， leading to a divided defeating Russia opinion atmosphere. Second， increased inward looking tendency at social level， facing peak inflation for decades， to prioritize handling inflation or assisting Ukraine becomes a focus of dispute in a number of societies. Third， follow-up sanction faltering， energy sanction on Russia is approaching the limit for Europe to bear. As international energy prices continue to be high， Russian energy exports have achieved increased value for decreased volume. According to the statistics of the International Energy Agency， since the onset of 2022， Russia has earned 20 billion U.S. dollars per month on crude oil and related products， an increase of over 50 percent year on year. The continuously high priced natural gas will bring Russia an income of about 80 billion U.S. dollars. In the backdrop of lacking a new subject matter for sanctions， perceived differentiation between the U.S. and Europe on energy crisis， food crisis， humanitarian crisis and military threat may be amplified. Although it is necessary for neither the U.S. nor Europe to show the sign of abandoning Ukraine， most of the countries are reluctant to give a free hand to support Ukraine at the expenses of domestic economy and living standard， and aim to avert being dragged down by Ukraines set objective for negotiations deviating from war situation， the ambivalence wherein may lead to the U.S. and Europe again being out of tune concerning their positions on Russia.

Security Reassurance as Strategic Priority

In recent years， the EU had considered Russia target of normative diplomacy and nominal partner， cooperating with it on political， economic， social and diplomatic affairs. France and Germany had reached consensus on Russia， postponing the process of Russia-Europe relations moving from political alienation to all out antagonism and， to a certain degree， limiting the extensiveness and intensity of conflict between both sides. For instance， French President Macron had called for reflecting upon EU strategic vision on Russia， observing that European antagonistic policy in recent years had failed. Former German Chancellor Merkel had called for maintaining dialogue with Russia， remarking that European energy policy should not be decided by Washington. Although solid economic， trade and cultural ties between Russia and Europe have prevented a new iron curtain from descending across the continent， the ever escalating struggle over sanction and counter-sanction between both sides over the Russia-Ukraine conflict has led to large scale finance war， energy war， and information war， making the traditional ballast stone of Russia-Europe relations a thing of the past. The hybrid warfare centering on the Russia-Ukraine conflict accelerates friend-shoring of global industrial chain， supply chain and value chain， stimulating the demand of all countries for setting up trade firewall and industrial isolation belt. At the same time secondary disasters created by the Russia-Ukraine conflict continue to intensify. According to the estimates of the World Bank， energy price in 2022 will rise by 50.5 percent， and food price， by 22.9 percent. It becomes a new challenge that faces all countries how to deal with a hybrid warfare that instrumentalize and weaponize finance， economic and trade， science and technology， and information.

Furthermore， the extreme measures taken by parties to the Russia-Ukraine conflict to advance their security interests have prompted countries concerned to seek security reassurance. On top of countries like Germany， Finland and Sweden having actively adjusted their defense policies， the EU came up with “A Strategic Compass for Security and Defense” in March 2022， observing that a more hostile security environment requires the EU to make a quantum leap forward and increase its capacity， strengthen its resilience， and putting forward measures to develop an EU Rapid Deployment Capacity that will allow it to swiftly deploy up to 5，000 troops for different types of crises by 2025. Intensified security contest through measures like maximum pressure， frontal confrontation and proxy war taken by concerned countries may invoke more countries impulse to use military means to address security concerns， embolden an alliance to demonstrate its security deterrence and its will to use coercive force by getting involved in geopolitical confrontation， and therefore intensify global and regional security dilemma.

It is worthwhile to observe that though the Ukrainian Crisis is in essence a crisis of European security framework， its significance far exceeds the geographical scope. Strengthening the notion of alliance security to highlight internal cohesion， seeking ones own absolute security while continuing to overlook others security comfort， and playing values card to draw in countries beyond the region to take side and even force them to do so， not only is it difficult for all the above to decide the final direction of the Russia-Ukraine conflict， it will also continue to increase the sense of insecurity for countries outside the system， and therefore induce new conflicts and crises. Judging by Russian drafts for a treaty between Russia and the U.S. on security guarantees and an agreement on measures to ensure the security of Russia and NATO member states， and judging by its proposals for negotiations， Russias main security interest is to reconstruct a mutual security reassurance mechanism and to restructure a European security architecture. Hence， no matter how the war situation goes， and when the talks can restart， a core issue that requires all pertinent parties to make joint efforts to address is to break and then make a European security architecture in the spirit of indivisible security and on a balanced， effective， sustainable basis.

Zhao Long is Senior Research Fellow at Shanghai Institutes of International Studies