China's Peripheral Security Situation

By Zhang Jie, Zhu Fengqing and Wu Zhaoli

China's Peripheral Security Situation

By Zhang Jie, Zhu Fengqing and Wu Zhaoli

Outlook Weekly Research Center

Peripheral Security Situation Challenges

In 2012, China's peripheral security situation has two characteristics: first, maritime disputes promote Chinese ocean policy adjustments; second, the Sino-U.S. competition affecting neighboring countries.

Maritime disputes in surrounding areas reached a new peak in 2012, with Philippines, Vietnam, Japan and others’ provocative activities, the Chinese maritime security policy had been adjusted substantially, and taken initiatives. Developing sea power is a strategic measure to ensure the realization of maintaining sovereign rights and stability in the surrounding areas.

In the foreseeable future, China's peripheral security will face four challenges: (1) How to respond to the run-in period of the top leadership change of both China and the United States? Undoubtedly, the start of diplomatic new deal policy in 2013 is the key for future China’s peripheral areas in the coming 5 to 10 years, which will not only affect structuring a new major powers relations, but also China's try-out efforts to build and manage a peripheral security pattern. (2) How to respond to the challenges from sea? Under the influence of the United States, China's neighboring countries have been building small-scale multilateral diplomacy, apparently aiming at China. China should be more determined, more clearly, and more strategically to promote the building of maritime strength. (3) How to respond to the challenges from the South-Central Peninsula. The South-Central Peninsula is one of the key points for the U.S. global strategy, with Burma’s strategic support. The deployments of the United States, Japan and India and other countries in South-Central Peninsula will test China's periphery stability. (4) How to respond to the new changes in the Korean Peninsula. The Korean Peninsula is always one of the significant factors affecting China's peripheral security. With the North Korean government of Kim Jeong-un being stabilized, South Korean government new shuffle and the new Japanese administration tilting to right-wing, China should adjust strategies to deal with these new factors that may bring new variables to the situation in the Korean Peninsula so as to seize the diplomatic initiative.

Maritime Disputes Become the Main Factors Influencing China's Peripheral Security

In the year 2012, there were concentrated outbreak of maritime disputes in China's surrounding areas, including Huangyan Island confrontation between China and the Philippines, China and Japan over the Diaoyu Islands Dispute, the Dokdo (Takeshima) disputes between South Korea and Japan, the four Northern islands (South Kuril Islands) disputes between Japan and Russia, which escalated quickly in a short period of time.

In the confrontation of the Huangyan Island, the Philippine and Chinese law enforcement vessels were directly meeting each other for rather long time, greatly increasing the probability of escalation. As a result, China succeeded in securing its sovereign position. The sovereignty dispute of Diaoyu Island has become the biggest obstacle to peaceful cooperation between China and Japan.

It seems not accidental for the Philippines and Japan to whip up disputes with China over islands sovereignty to the south and east of China. Although the two disputes occurred in different areas, the common objective of Japan and the Philippines seems clear, i.e. maximizing their controlled disputed areas and stalling China's rise with the help of the U.S. return to the Asia-Pacific region.

Turning point of Chinese marine policy

Neighboring countries adopt nibbling policies in an attempt to fossilize their illegal occupation of the disputed areas, which finally forces the Chinese government resolutely take effective measures to strengthen its maritime rights and interests, and to strive for achieving the dual goals of maintaining sovereignty and stability in the maritime disputes.

China states its formation of Sansha city to administer Xisha, Zhongsha and Nana islands; SINOPEC releases bidding on oil and gas development projects in the South China Sea on two occasions; China's first aircraft carrier "Liaoning" in official service, etc.. The Chinese Government releases a white paper on “the Diaoyu Island being inherent territory of China”. These convey a distinct signal that China wishes to share compromises with all sides concerned in stead of making its own only.

Inevitability in maritime disputes

With expansion of the Chinese strength and national interests, to accelerate building China Sea power has become an inevitable trend. In 2010, the State Oceanic Administration released the "China Ocean Development Report 2010", pointing out the need to maintain China’s global ocean rights and interests, building a marine economic power while shaping up a marine defense strategy and marine science and technology deveopment strategy.

For the United States, China is a traditional continental power, its military influence is basically restricted on land area, extension on high seas is extremely limited, does not form an effective deterrence to the U.S. military maritime influence, nor constitutes a substantial challenge to the global leadership of the United States. However, if China becomes a maritime power, then it will be taken as a serious challenge directly to the U.S. global leadership, especially its Asia-Pacific alliance system.

For neighboring countries, China Ocean dream will also stimulate them to come together. ASEAN promotes the South China Sea Code of Conduct as common standards to restrain all signatories’ behavior. The Philippines and Vietnam make frequent special moves to legalize their current control of the disputed areas and to seize more economic resources. Japan holds tight to Diaoyu Islands issue step by step.

It is true that India and Russia have maintained a good relationship with China and trade volumes of the two countries with China have grown many times over in recent years, yet, neither of them hopes to see China to play a real leading role in Asia-Pacific region, and even the whole world. Because they hate to see an Asia-Pacific country to compete with them on the one hand, and a strong China may become a challenge to their national security interests in the region on the other.

However, the CPC Eighteenth National Congress Report in late 2012 points out that China should improve capability to explore its marine resources, develop marine economy, protect marine environment, and resolutely safeguard the national marine rights and interests, and build marine power. This means China's maintaining its maritime rights and marine comprehensive ability-building will be irreversible. Therefore, how should China ensure its neighboring countries to trust its peaceful rise, and how neighboring countries co-exist with a rising China are both major issues faced by all sides concerned.

Develop a Chinese Ocean Security Strategy

China needs to develop ocean security strategy from the internal and external dimensions.

From the internal dimension, enhancing maritime capabilities. Since the founding of the PRC, China is lack of a complete set of marine strategy and its maritime security policy is response-oriented. Therefore, a complete development of ocean security strategy is the fundamental guarantee to maintain marine rights and interests.

Firstly, China should clarify its sovereignty over the disputed waters by means of legislation, which is the primary task of China to develop ocean strategy.

Secondly, it is high time to promote integration and reconfiguration of the existing marine management mechanisms, and form an effective capacity to jointly safeguard the national interests.

Thirdly, in recent years, the maritime administrative law enforcement capacity has improved, and become the main actor to maintain national maritime rights and interests.

In addition to strategic preparations, China continues to promote the development of marine economy. The State Council in recent years has approved marine economic zones for Shandong, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong provinces, promoted the new marine industrial development, and expanded the number of benefited people by marine resources.

From the external dimension: minimize risks through many channels.

Maritime disputes certainly exert negative impacts on China's peripheral security, while we also need to see there are big rooms for cooperation to achieve common security in the neighboring areas.

Firstly, ASEAN countries hope to maintain peace and stability in the region, strengthen the building of regional economic integration, and use the South China Sea Code of Conduct to standardize the behavior of all the parties not only China in the South China Sea.

Secondly, there are contradictions among U.S. allies. For example, in August 2012, South Korean President suddenly landed on the disputed island between Japan and South Korea. This first trip by the head of state triggered a strong protest by the Japanese side, the relations between them rapidly cooled down, thus, influencing ROK-Japan cooperation.

Besides, the dispute between Japan and Russia over the four northern islands (South Kuril Islands) may heat up again. The islands are not only rich in resources, but important in geographical location, has strategic importance. It seems these islands have become an important strategic platform for geopolitical game between Japan and Russia.

The U.S. Rebalancing and China's Peripheral Security Situation

The U.S. Asia-Pacific redeployment is a gradual process and expanding from "returning to Asia-Pacific" to strategic rebalancing, from the security field to the economic, political, cultural and other fields. For China, they are both challenges and opportunities.

"Rebalancing strategy"

After putting forward the "return to Asia-Pacific", the United States also ironed out the "concept of Pacific Century" in 2012, then, the U.S. defense secretary Panetta has directly labeled the U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy a "rebalancing". In November 2012, the first overseas stop Obama takes after being re-elected is Southeast Asian countries, indicating the U.S. again giving high attention to the Asia-Pacific region.

"Rebalancing" strategy is centered on keeping the United States of America the No.1 position in Asia-Pacific, with consolidating relations with old allies and making new friends and expanding the network of relationships as a fundamental one, and with gaining benefits at other's expense by whipping up disputes and squeezing China and Russia.

The U.S. "rebalancing" strategy consists of three elements. The first is military-related, including regional strategy, military deployment and restructure to meet challenges.

The second is to consolidate and update the alliance. The United States has an allied relationship with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines, formed a partnership with India, Singapore and Indonesia, and improve relations with other countries on the basis of these relationships.

The third is economy-related. The United States is not a TPP initiator, but it has soon dominated the TPP process direction. An important aspect of the U.S. strategy is to pull Japan into the TPP as soon as possible, so that the United States and Japan are in the absolute dominant position in the TPP architecture.

The neighboring countries reactions to the "rebalancing"

The responses to U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy by the regional countries are little different.

Under Putin's leadership, Russia has made strategic adjustments, gradually increased the "weight of Eurasia" in the national strategy, and paid more attention to the pillar role of the Asia-Pacific in achieving its comprehensive revival with the Eurasian support. Economically, Russia attaches much importance to the Asia-Pacific than the West. In the area of security, Russia implements security policy featured by relative neutrality and all-round cooperation, especially deploying half of its best troops and flag navy ships in the Far East in order to improve its "discourse" in Asia-Pacific affairs. Diplomatically, Russia gives attention to relations with Asian countries, particular with China and India to develop strategic partnership and to participate in the East Asia Summit.

India believes that rebalancing strategy provides it an unprecedented opportunity. Since 2010, India’s external favorable environment originates from deepening Indo-U.S. relations and favorable recognition of Indian strength development. India welcomes the American strategic adjustments, but shows some concerns to become a possible "pawn" against China and the loss of independence in the U.S. strategic framework. India hopes to form a "partnership" with the United States, not an ally against anyone. So in a few years to come, India is a strategic partner, a friend, but not an ally of the United States of America; and India is competitor, partner, but not an enemy of China.

Mongolia, as a landlocked country, sandwiched between Russia and China, formulates and vigorously promotes the "third countries" diplomacy in order to avoid the recurrence of being marginalized as during the cold war and balance with Russia and China. "The third countries" concept is led by the United States, including Japan, EU, India, South Korea, and Turkey, and has expanded bilateral and fruitful cooperation and exchanges in the political, economic, cultural, military and diplomatic areas.

The U.S. rebalancing strategy lays emphasis on Southeast Asia, but ASEAN countries for self-interests will develop relations with China, Russia, Japan, and India, EU and other countries, rebalancing skillfully in its external relations.

The uncertainty of the U.S. return to Asia-Pacific

The U.S. "rebalancing strategy" has dual motivations: to share the fruits of economic growth in Asia, and to stall a rising China. It seems since 2012, the complexity of China's peripheral security environment is raised to a new level. However, the implementation of the U.S. "rebalancing strategy" also is affected by many factors, the goal and effect of its return to Asia-Pacific needs further evaluation.

The new term of Obama presidency will face complicated domestic and international challenges. The Obama Administration needs to make quick decisions for domestic and international difficult developments, and for coping with two rising Asian giants -- China and India.

Whether all these issues and problems can be quickly and successfully handled is directly related to the effect of the U.S. return to Asia-Pacific.