公司產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)、經(jīng)理管理防御與高質(zhì)量審計(jì)需求

張俊民,張 曉,肖志超

(天津財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué) 商學(xué)院，天津 300222)

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公司產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)、經(jīng)理管理防御與高質(zhì)量審計(jì)需求

張俊民,張 曉,肖志超

(天津財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué) 商學(xué)院，天津 300222)

以2008-2014年中國(guó)上市企業(yè)為樣本，本文考察不同產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)下經(jīng)理管理防御對(duì)高質(zhì)量審計(jì)需求的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，在國(guó)有企業(yè)中，經(jīng)理管理防御對(duì)高質(zhì)量審計(jì)需求具有負(fù)向影響；而在民營(yíng)企業(yè)中，經(jīng)理管理防御則引發(fā)了高質(zhì)量審計(jì)需求。進(jìn)一步發(fā)現(xiàn)，在國(guó)有企業(yè)中，產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與外部大股東持股均能顯著抑制經(jīng)理管理防御與高質(zhì)量審計(jì)需求之間的負(fù)向關(guān)系；而在民營(yíng)企業(yè)中，這兩種外部治理機(jī)制均不具有顯著的調(diào)節(jié)效應(yīng)。本文提供了不同產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)企業(yè)經(jīng)理管理防御經(jīng)濟(jì)后果的證據(jù)，對(duì)進(jìn)一步推進(jìn)國(guó)有企業(yè)改革具有借鑒意義。

公司產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)；經(jīng)理管理防御；市場(chǎng)約束機(jī)制；高質(zhì)量審計(jì)需求

一、引 言

經(jīng)理管理防御為管理層代理問(wèn)題的內(nèi)容之一，是指經(jīng)理人主動(dòng)應(yīng)對(duì)公司內(nèi)外部治理機(jī)制以實(shí)現(xiàn)自身職位穩(wěn)固的行為。在我國(guó)新興加轉(zhuǎn)軌的制度背景下，經(jīng)理管理防御是一項(xiàng)重要的研究議題。現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)主要研究了公司財(cái)務(wù)政策領(lǐng)域的經(jīng)理管理防御行為[1-2]，然而，注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)所具備的鑒證以及信號(hào)傳遞功能也能夠?qū)?jīng)理人的職位穩(wěn)固產(chǎn)生影響[3-6]；而且，隨著管理者權(quán)力的日益膨脹，審計(jì)師的選聘權(quán)也往往掌握在經(jīng)理人手中[7-8]。在這樣的情況下，審計(jì)便可能成為經(jīng)理人進(jìn)行管理防御的工具。那么，經(jīng)理人的防御動(dòng)機(jī)將如何影響審計(jì)需求呢？進(jìn)一步，相比于民營(yíng)企業(yè)，市場(chǎng)機(jī)制對(duì)我國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)經(jīng)理人的約束力較弱，那么，在企業(yè)不同的產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)下，經(jīng)理管理防御對(duì)審計(jì)需求的影響相同嗎？本文嘗試對(duì)以上問(wèn)題做出回答。

以2008-2014年我國(guó)A股上市公司為樣本，本文分別考察了國(guó)有企業(yè)和民營(yíng)企業(yè)中，經(jīng)理管理防御對(duì)審計(jì)收費(fèi)以及審計(jì)師選擇的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，由于市場(chǎng)機(jī)制對(duì)國(guó)有企業(yè)經(jīng)理人的約束力較弱，國(guó)有企業(yè)經(jīng)理管理防御與上市公司支付的審計(jì)費(fèi)用以及選擇“十大”會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所的概率均呈顯著的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系；而在民營(yíng)企業(yè)中，經(jīng)理管理防御顯著增加了上市公司的審計(jì)費(fèi)用水平以及選擇“十大”會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所的概率。進(jìn)一步發(fā)現(xiàn)，在國(guó)有企業(yè)中，產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與外部大股東持股具有治理作用，顯著降低了經(jīng)理管理防御與高質(zhì)量審計(jì)需求之間的負(fù)向關(guān)系；而在民營(yíng)企業(yè)中，這一調(diào)節(jié)效應(yīng)并不顯著。

本文突破了以往研究中股東利益最大化的假定，首次驗(yàn)證了經(jīng)理人的防御動(dòng)機(jī)對(duì)高質(zhì)量審計(jì)需求的影響，豐富了我國(guó)經(jīng)理管理防御經(jīng)濟(jì)后果以及審計(jì)需求影響因素的相關(guān)研究。同時(shí)發(fā)現(xiàn)，不同于民營(yíng)企業(yè)，在市場(chǎng)機(jī)制對(duì)經(jīng)理人約束力較弱的國(guó)有企業(yè)中，經(jīng)理的防御動(dòng)機(jī)導(dǎo)致了低質(zhì)量審計(jì)需求，說(shuō)明進(jìn)一步推進(jìn)國(guó)有企業(yè)經(jīng)理人約束機(jī)制改革的重要性。經(jīng)研究，本文進(jìn)一步發(fā)現(xiàn)，在國(guó)有企業(yè)中，產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與外部大股東持股對(duì)經(jīng)理人的機(jī)會(huì)主義行為具有治理作用，說(shuō)明完善市場(chǎng)機(jī)制以及形成有效的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)有助于減輕經(jīng)理管理防御對(duì)股東利益的損害。

二、文獻(xiàn)綜述

經(jīng)理管理防御假說(shuō)最早由Morck等[9]在發(fā)現(xiàn)經(jīng)理人持股與公司價(jià)值之間的非線性關(guān)系時(shí)提出，當(dāng)經(jīng)理人投票權(quán)增加到一定程度后，能對(duì)公司決策施加較強(qiáng)的影響力，此時(shí)經(jīng)理持股比例的增加會(huì)產(chǎn)生防御效應(yīng)，對(duì)公司價(jià)值具有負(fù)面影響。韓亮亮和李凱[10]發(fā)現(xiàn)了我國(guó)上市公司中經(jīng)理人持股比例與公司價(jià)值之間的非單調(diào)關(guān)系，從而證明我國(guó)上市公司的經(jīng)理人處于防御狀態(tài)。現(xiàn)有關(guān)于經(jīng)理管理防御的相關(guān)研究主要涉及公司財(cái)務(wù)政策領(lǐng)域。例如，Novaes和Zingales[2]研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，在資本結(jié)構(gòu)決策中，經(jīng)理人往往將負(fù)債作為防御策略，與股東對(duì)資本結(jié)構(gòu)的選擇具有很大不同；Farinha[1]對(duì)英國(guó)公司的研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，經(jīng)理層持股比例與股利支付率之間存在U型關(guān)系，當(dāng)經(jīng)理層持股比例達(dá)到30%后，經(jīng)理人將通過(guò)支付更多的股利以獲取私人收益；我國(guó)學(xué)者袁春生和楊淑娥[11]則指出，管理層的防御動(dòng)機(jī)是導(dǎo)致企業(yè)非效率投資的深層次原因。除此之外，王志強(qiáng)等[12]研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，公司的高層管理者會(huì)通過(guò)要求較高的薪酬水平來(lái)補(bǔ)償人力資本破產(chǎn)成本，說(shuō)明我國(guó)上市公司中普遍存在管理層防御現(xiàn)象；李秉祥等[13]則發(fā)現(xiàn)，經(jīng)理人會(huì)通過(guò)長(zhǎng)期資產(chǎn)減值政策選擇來(lái)進(jìn)行管理防御。

傳統(tǒng)代理理論下，審計(jì)在公司治理中起著監(jiān)督作用，能夠降低企業(yè)的代理成本，提高企業(yè)市場(chǎng)價(jià)值[14]。沿著這一思路，眾多學(xué)者從公司規(guī)模、負(fù)債、股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)以及管理層權(quán)力等角度，探討了代理成本與高質(zhì)量審計(jì)需求之間的關(guān)系，發(fā)現(xiàn)審計(jì)對(duì)代理問(wèn)題具有治理作用[3, 15-19]。然而，尚未有文獻(xiàn)研究經(jīng)理人如何將審計(jì)作為其防御工具。盡管如此，一些學(xué)者開(kāi)始關(guān)注管理者權(quán)力與會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量的關(guān)系：黎文靖和盧銳[20]研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，我國(guó)上市公司中管理者權(quán)力對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量具有顯著的負(fù)向影響；趙息和徐寧寧[21]認(rèn)為，管理者權(quán)力越大，則越有可能隱瞞公司的內(nèi)部控制缺陷，并且，相對(duì)于非國(guó)有企業(yè)，這種現(xiàn)象在國(guó)有企業(yè)中更加顯著；周冬華[22]則發(fā)現(xiàn)，管理者權(quán)力與上市公司盈余管理程度顯著正相關(guān)。上述研究表明，管理者會(huì)通過(guò)操縱會(huì)計(jì)信息來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)個(gè)人利益。然而，會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量與審計(jì)是緊密聯(lián)系的，現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)忽略了經(jīng)理人的自利動(dòng)機(jī)與審計(jì)需求之間的關(guān)系研究。基于以上考慮，本文按照公司產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)區(qū)分國(guó)有企業(yè)樣本和非國(guó)有企業(yè)樣本，考察經(jīng)理管理防御對(duì)審計(jì)需求的影響。

三、理論分析與研究假設(shè)

控制權(quán)收益的不可補(bǔ)償性以及經(jīng)理失業(yè)成本的存在，使得經(jīng)理具有強(qiáng)烈的防御動(dòng)機(jī)[9]。而經(jīng)理人的防御行為表現(xiàn)在其對(duì)公司經(jīng)營(yíng)的各項(xiàng)決策上[1,23-24]。我國(guó)公司法規(guī)定，股東大會(huì)和董事會(huì)擁有對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所選聘和解聘的決策權(quán)。然而現(xiàn)實(shí)中，隨著管理者權(quán)力的日益膨脹，往往是經(jīng)理人決定審計(jì)師的選聘[7-8]，這為經(jīng)理人將審計(jì)作為防御工具創(chuàng)造了條件。

審計(jì)作為公司的一項(xiàng)外部治理機(jī)制，從兩個(gè)方面影響經(jīng)理人的職位穩(wěn)固。一方面，審計(jì)具有信號(hào)傳遞功能，高質(zhì)量的審計(jì)通過(guò)向資本市場(chǎng)傳遞積極信號(hào)，能夠增加投資者的信任，有利于提高企業(yè)的融資能力以及市場(chǎng)價(jià)值，從而降低企業(yè)破產(chǎn)清算或被接管的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)[5-6]。因此，在企業(yè)經(jīng)理人受市場(chǎng)機(jī)制約束較大的情況下，高質(zhì)量的審計(jì)有利于其職位穩(wěn)固。另一方面，審計(jì)還具有鑒證價(jià)值[3-4]，高質(zhì)量審計(jì)通過(guò)對(duì)上市公司披露的財(cái)務(wù)信息進(jìn)行鑒證并出具審計(jì)意見(jiàn)，能夠揭發(fā)經(jīng)理人的自利行為，對(duì)其職位產(chǎn)生威脅。因此，當(dāng)企業(yè)經(jīng)理人受市場(chǎng)機(jī)制的約束較小時(shí)，低質(zhì)量審計(jì)更有利于其職位穩(wěn)固。

在我國(guó)，國(guó)有企業(yè)與民營(yíng)企業(yè)對(duì)經(jīng)理人的約束機(jī)制具有很大差異。具體而言，一方面相對(duì)于民營(yíng)企業(yè)，我國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)經(jīng)理人的聘請(qǐng)多是行政任命，經(jīng)理人的考核機(jī)制也主要關(guān)注會(huì)計(jì)盈余指標(biāo)[25]，經(jīng)理追求高市場(chǎng)業(yè)績(jī)的動(dòng)機(jī)較弱。另一方面，國(guó)有企業(yè)“所有者缺位”導(dǎo)致其治理機(jī)制相對(duì)弱化，加劇了經(jīng)理人的機(jī)會(huì)主義行為[26]；而國(guó)有企業(yè)經(jīng)理人的自利行為一旦被高質(zhì)量審計(jì)揭發(fā)，經(jīng)理人不僅面臨解雇風(fēng)險(xiǎn)而且還要受到嚴(yán)厲的行政處罰，其失業(yè)成本較民營(yíng)企業(yè)經(jīng)理人更大。因此，在管理防御狀態(tài)下，國(guó)有企業(yè)經(jīng)理人缺乏對(duì)高質(zhì)量審計(jì)的需求，甚至傾向于聘用低質(zhì)量審計(jì)師以掩飾自利行為，降低解雇風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。因此，提出如下假設(shè)：

H1：國(guó)有企業(yè)經(jīng)理管理防御與高質(zhì)量審計(jì)需求呈負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系。

對(duì)于民營(yíng)企業(yè)，由于其市場(chǎng)化程度相對(duì)較高，因業(yè)績(jī)不佳而被并購(gòu)或接管的可能性更大，從而市場(chǎng)績(jī)效對(duì)民營(yíng)企業(yè)經(jīng)理人具有較強(qiáng)的約束；再加上民營(yíng)企業(yè)面臨較大的融資約束[27]，資金鏈斷裂導(dǎo)致的企業(yè)破產(chǎn)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)較高，因而經(jīng)理人具有強(qiáng)烈的動(dòng)機(jī)聘請(qǐng)高質(zhì)量審計(jì)師以向市場(chǎng)傳遞積極信號(hào)，從而增加投資者的信任，提高融資能力，降低企業(yè)破產(chǎn)或被接管的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。因此，提出如下假設(shè)：

H2：民營(yíng)企業(yè)經(jīng)理管理防御與高質(zhì)量審計(jì)需求呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系。

四、研究設(shè)計(jì)

(一)數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)源與樣本選擇

本文選取2008—2014年滬深兩市A股上市公司為研究樣本，并在樣本選擇過(guò)程中，進(jìn)行以下處理：(1)剔除金融行業(yè)樣本；(2)剔除同時(shí)發(fā)行B股和H股的樣本；(3)剔除相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)缺失的樣本；(4)刪除極端異常值并對(duì)所有連續(xù)變量進(jìn)行上下1%水平的縮尾處理。最后，本文共計(jì)得到18554個(gè)非平衡面板觀察值，其中：國(guó)有企業(yè)樣本量為8625個(gè)；民營(yíng)企業(yè)樣本量為9929個(gè)。CEO背景特征、公司治理以及財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)自國(guó)泰安和萬(wàn)德數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)。

(二)變量定義及度量

1.經(jīng)理管理防御的計(jì)量

對(duì)經(jīng)理管理防御的度量一直是學(xué)術(shù)界關(guān)注的問(wèn)題。由于權(quán)力是經(jīng)理管理防御的基礎(chǔ)，在英美股權(quán)高度分散的國(guó)家，學(xué)者通常使用經(jīng)理人持股比例來(lái)衡量其防御水平[9,28]。然而，F(xiàn)inkelstein[29]認(rèn)為經(jīng)理權(quán)力表現(xiàn)為組織權(quán)力、專家權(quán)力、所有權(quán)權(quán)力和聲望權(quán)力四個(gè)維度，所有權(quán)并非經(jīng)理人權(quán)力的唯一來(lái)源，因此僅從所有權(quán)角度衡量經(jīng)理管理防御水平是不全面的。本文借鑒Chen[30]、Nejla[31]以及Finkelstein[29]的研究，從經(jīng)理的任期、學(xué)歷、是否有外部兼職、是否兼任董事長(zhǎng)、是否持股等五個(gè)維度衡量管理防御水平，賦予各變量相同的權(quán)重，計(jì)算其算術(shù)平均值，得到經(jīng)理管理防御指數(shù)。

表1 變量定義

2.高質(zhì)量審計(jì)的計(jì)量

由于審計(jì)質(zhì)量的不可觀測(cè)性，學(xué)者們?yōu)閷ふ覍徲?jì)質(zhì)量的替代變量展開(kāi)了大量研究。DeAngelo[32]采用事務(wù)所規(guī)模作為審計(jì)質(zhì)量的替代變量，認(rèn)為規(guī)模較大的事務(wù)所維護(hù)其品牌聲譽(yù)的內(nèi)在動(dòng)機(jī)更為強(qiáng)烈，因而會(huì)提供較高質(zhì)量的審計(jì)服務(wù)。O’Sullivan[33]則指出，審計(jì)質(zhì)量高的事務(wù)所具有更高的審計(jì)收費(fèi)溢價(jià)，因此采用了審計(jì)費(fèi)用來(lái)衡量審計(jì)質(zhì)量。國(guó)內(nèi)研究也大多按照這兩種思路對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量進(jìn)行度量[34-38]。因此，本文使用“十大”以及審計(jì)費(fèi)用的自然對(duì)數(shù)作為審計(jì)質(zhì)量的替代變量。

3.其他控制變量

借鑒Carcello等[39]和Gul等[40]的研究，本文選取董事會(huì)會(huì)議次數(shù)、董事會(huì)人數(shù)、獨(dú)立董事的辦公地點(diǎn)與上市公司所在地是否一致、大股東持股比例、大股東持股比例的平方、存貨比率、應(yīng)收賬款比率、公司規(guī)模、資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率等變量作為控制變量，并設(shè)置了行業(yè)和年度啞變量以控制行業(yè)和年度效應(yīng)。

以上變量的具體定義見(jiàn)表1。

(三)模型設(shè)計(jì)

為了檢驗(yàn)經(jīng)理管理防御對(duì)高質(zhì)量審計(jì)需求的影響，本文建立以下兩個(gè)基礎(chǔ)模型：

Lnfee=α0+α1ME+α2Fhold+α3Fhold2+α4Meeting+α5Number+α6Place+α7Arr+α8Invr+α9Lev+α10Size+∑Year+∑Industry+ε

(1)

Big10=β0+β1ME+β2Fhold+β3Fhold2+β4Meeting+β5Number+β6Place+β7Arr+β8Invr+β9Lev+β10Size+∑Year+∑Industry+ε

(2)

在檢驗(yàn)過(guò)程中，我們對(duì)模型(1)采用最小二乘法進(jìn)行檢驗(yàn)分析，對(duì)模型(2)采用Logistic估計(jì)方法進(jìn)行回歸分析。根據(jù)本文假設(shè)，我們預(yù)測(cè)在國(guó)有企業(yè)樣本組，α1和β1顯著為負(fù)，說(shuō)明經(jīng)理管理防御對(duì)高質(zhì)量審計(jì)需求具有負(fù)向影響；而在民營(yíng)企業(yè)樣本組，α1和β1顯著為正，說(shuō)明經(jīng)理管理防御能夠產(chǎn)生高質(zhì)量審計(jì)需求。

(四)描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)

各變量的描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)結(jié)果見(jiàn)表2。可以看出，國(guó)有企業(yè)審計(jì)費(fèi)用自然對(duì)數(shù)的均值為13.431，大于民營(yíng)企業(yè)的13.272，這可能是因?yàn)閲?guó)有企業(yè)的規(guī)模較民營(yíng)企業(yè)更大。國(guó)有企業(yè)選擇“十大”會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所的比例為58.9%，略低于民營(yíng)企業(yè)的59.5%。國(guó)有企業(yè)的經(jīng)理管理防御指數(shù)均值為0.363，中位值為0.4，均遠(yuǎn)低于民營(yíng)企業(yè)。具體而言，國(guó)有企業(yè)經(jīng)理人除了受教育程度高于民營(yíng)企業(yè)外，其他特征均遠(yuǎn)低于民營(yíng)企業(yè)。其他控制變量的情況詳見(jiàn)表2。

表2 主要變量描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)

由于國(guó)有企業(yè)和民營(yíng)企業(yè)的產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)不同，二者之間存在較大差異。為了進(jìn)一步分析主要變量的差異是否顯著，本文對(duì)國(guó)有企業(yè)樣本和民營(yíng)企業(yè)樣本的均值進(jìn)行了檢驗(yàn)，如表3所示。可以發(fā)現(xiàn)，國(guó)有企業(yè)和民營(yíng)企業(yè)的審計(jì)收費(fèi)以及經(jīng)理管理防御指數(shù)都存在顯著差異，初步說(shuō)明在兩組樣本中，經(jīng)理管理防御可能會(huì)對(duì)高質(zhì)量審計(jì)需求產(chǎn)生不同的影響。

表3 主要變量的均值檢驗(yàn)

五、實(shí)證結(jié)果分析與討論

(一)模型回歸結(jié)果

表4的一、三兩列報(bào)告了國(guó)有企業(yè)樣本的回歸結(jié)果。其中，模型(1)的被解釋變量為審計(jì)費(fèi)用，模型(2)的被解釋變量為“十大”。模型(1)中，ME的回歸系數(shù)在1%水平上顯著負(fù)相關(guān)，這說(shuō)明經(jīng)理管理防御水平越高，上市公司支付的審計(jì)費(fèi)用越低；模型(2)中，ME的回歸系數(shù)同樣在1%水平上負(fù)向顯著，說(shuō)明經(jīng)理管理防御水平越高，上市公司聘請(qǐng)“十大”會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所的概率越大。以上結(jié)果說(shuō)明，在國(guó)有企業(yè)中，出于防御動(dòng)機(jī)的經(jīng)理人缺乏對(duì)高質(zhì)量審計(jì)的需求，甚至?xí)赣玫唾|(zhì)量審計(jì)師以掩蓋其敗德行為，對(duì)上市公司信息披露質(zhì)量產(chǎn)生負(fù)面影響。

表4的二、四兩列報(bào)告了民營(yíng)企業(yè)樣本的檢驗(yàn)結(jié)果。可以發(fā)現(xiàn)，模型(1)中ME的回歸系數(shù)在1%水平上顯著正相關(guān)，這說(shuō)明隨著經(jīng)理管理防御水平的提高，上市公司支付了更多的審計(jì)費(fèi)用；模型(2)中ME的系數(shù)也在1%水平上正向顯著，說(shuō)明上市公司經(jīng)理管理防御水平越高，越會(huì)聘請(qǐng)“十大”會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所。以上結(jié)果表明，在民營(yíng)企業(yè)中，經(jīng)理人為了維護(hù)控制權(quán)地位，更傾向于聘請(qǐng)高質(zhì)量審計(jì)師以向市場(chǎng)傳遞積極信號(hào)，對(duì)上市公司信息披露質(zhì)量具有正面效應(yīng)。

(二)進(jìn)一步分析

上述結(jié)果表明，在國(guó)有企業(yè)相對(duì)較弱的公司治理環(huán)境下，市場(chǎng)機(jī)制的約束力有限，經(jīng)理人出于防御動(dòng)機(jī)往往會(huì)選擇低質(zhì)量審計(jì)師，對(duì)上市公司的信息披露質(zhì)量產(chǎn)生負(fù)面影響。然而，公司其他外部治理機(jī)制是否能夠改善這一狀況呢？借鑒Kim等[41]的研究，本文選擇產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)和外部大股東持股兩種外部治理機(jī)制，進(jìn)一步分析它們對(duì)我國(guó)上市公司經(jīng)理管理防御與高質(zhì)量審計(jì)需求之間關(guān)系的影響。

表4 經(jīng)理管理防御與高質(zhì)量審計(jì)需求的回歸結(jié)果

1.產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與經(jīng)理管理防御

激烈的產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)增加了企業(yè)破產(chǎn)清算的威脅，給企業(yè)和管理者帶來(lái)極大的財(cái)務(wù)壓力，迫使企業(yè)產(chǎn)生較大的外部融資需求[42-44]。在這樣的情況下，為了維護(hù)控制權(quán)地位，經(jīng)理人必須更加關(guān)注企業(yè)發(fā)展，并努力降低資金供需雙方的信息不對(duì)稱。可見(jiàn)，產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)作為一種市場(chǎng)約束機(jī)制，有利于實(shí)現(xiàn)經(jīng)理人與投資者之間的利益協(xié)同，對(duì)經(jīng)理人的機(jī)會(huì)主義行為具有約束作用。因此，本文認(rèn)為，在國(guó)有企業(yè)中，產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)能夠顯著抑制經(jīng)理管理防御與高質(zhì)量審計(jì)需求之間的負(fù)向關(guān)系；而對(duì)于民營(yíng)企業(yè)，由于其本身具有較高的市場(chǎng)化水平，因而產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的治理效應(yīng)并不明顯。

為了對(duì)上述關(guān)系進(jìn)行檢驗(yàn)，本文借鑒Kim[41]的研究，采用赫芬達(dá)爾指數(shù)(HHI)①赫芬達(dá)爾指數(shù)的計(jì)算公式如下：衡量產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)程度，并構(gòu)建模型(3)和模型(4)：

Lnfee=α0+α1ME+α2HII+α3ME×HII+α4Fhold+α5Fhold2+α6Meeting+α7Number+α8Place+α9Arr+α10Invr+α11Lev+α12Size+∑Year+∑Industry+ε

(3)

Big10=Lnfee=β0+β1ME+β2HII+β3ME×HII+β4Fhold+β5Fhold2+β6Meeting+β7Number+β8Place+β9Arr+β10Invr+β11Lev+β12Size+∑Year+∑Industry+ε

(4)

其中，HHI為赫芬達(dá)爾指數(shù)的啞變量，若該指數(shù)小于樣本中位數(shù)，取值為1，否則取值為0。兩個(gè)模型中交叉項(xiàng)ME×HHI的系數(shù)α3和β3衡量產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)經(jīng)理管理防御與高質(zhì)量審計(jì)需求之間關(guān)系的影響，根據(jù)本文預(yù)測(cè)，國(guó)有企業(yè)樣本中α3和β3應(yīng)正向顯著，而民營(yíng)企業(yè)樣本中α3和β3不顯著。

表5為產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)經(jīng)理管理防御與高質(zhì)量審計(jì)需求之間關(guān)系的回歸結(jié)果。可以看出，加入產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)變量后，兩個(gè)模型中ME的系數(shù)方向在兩個(gè)樣本中均未發(fā)生變化，只是在民營(yíng)企業(yè)樣本中，模型(3)ME的系數(shù)顯著性略有不同；兩個(gè)模型中ME×HHI的系數(shù)在國(guó)有企業(yè)樣本中正向顯著，而在民營(yíng)企業(yè)樣本中則不再顯著，與預(yù)測(cè)一致。

2.外部大股東持股與經(jīng)理管理防御

相比于分散的小股東，大股東更具有動(dòng)機(jī)和能力去監(jiān)督管理者[45]。一方面，隨著股權(quán)集中度的提高，監(jiān)督管理者能夠?qū)Υ蠊蓶|產(chǎn)生足夠的利益激勵(lì)；另一方面，他們持有的大量股票能夠?qū)ΜF(xiàn)有管理層產(chǎn)生潛在的接管威脅。因此，外部大股東持股對(duì)公司治理機(jī)制具有替代作用[46]。基于上述分析，本文認(rèn)為，在治理機(jī)制相對(duì)弱化的國(guó)有企業(yè)中，外部大股東HHI=∑(xi/x)2,x=∑xi

其中，Xi為行業(yè)內(nèi)企業(yè)i的銷售額。當(dāng)行業(yè)內(nèi)企業(yè)數(shù)目一定時(shí)，該指數(shù)越小，表示同一行業(yè)內(nèi)相同規(guī)模的企業(yè)數(shù)量越多，市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)越激烈。

持股能夠發(fā)揮治理作用，有效抑制經(jīng)理人聘請(qǐng)低質(zhì)量審計(jì)師的防御行為；而在民營(yíng)企業(yè)中，外部大股東相比于內(nèi)部股東發(fā)揮作用的空間較小，因而不具有顯著的調(diào)節(jié)效應(yīng)。

表5 產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)經(jīng)理管理防御與高質(zhì)量審計(jì)需求之間關(guān)系的回歸結(jié)果

為了對(duì)上述關(guān)系進(jìn)行檢驗(yàn)，本文構(gòu)建模型(5)和模型(6)：

Lnfee=α0+α1ME+α2OS+α3ME×OS+α4Fhold+α5Fhold2+α6Meeting+α7Number+α8Place+α9Arr+α10Invr+α11Lev+α12Size+∑Year+∑Industry+ε

(5)

Big10=Lnfee=β0+β1ME+β2OS+β3ME×OS+β4Fhold+β5Fhold2+β6Meeting+β7Number+β8Place+β9Arr+β10Invr+β11Lev+β12Size+∑Year+∑Industry+ε

(6)

其中，OS為外部大股東持股啞變量，若上市公司第二至第十大股東的持股比例之和大于第一大股東的持股比例，則取值為1，否則取值為0。兩個(gè)模型中交叉項(xiàng)ME×OS的系數(shù)α3和β3衡量外部大股東持股對(duì)管理者防御與高質(zhì)量審計(jì)需求之間關(guān)系的影響，根據(jù)本文預(yù)測(cè)，國(guó)有企業(yè)樣本中α3和β3應(yīng)正向顯著，而民營(yíng)企業(yè)樣本中α3和β3不顯著。

表6描述了外部大股東持股對(duì)經(jīng)理管理防御與高質(zhì)量審計(jì)需求之間關(guān)系的回歸結(jié)果。可以看出，加入外部大股東持股變量后，無(wú)論是在國(guó)有企業(yè)樣本還是民營(yíng)企業(yè)樣本中，兩個(gè)模型中ME的系數(shù)方向依然與之前一致；而且ME×OS的系數(shù)在國(guó)有企業(yè)樣本中正向顯著，在民營(yíng)企業(yè)則樣本不顯著，與預(yù)測(cè)一致。

以上結(jié)果說(shuō)明，在國(guó)有企業(yè)中，產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與外部大股東持股均具有顯著的治理作用，能夠有效抑制經(jīng)理人聘請(qǐng)低質(zhì)量審計(jì)師的防御行為，一定程度上有利于上市公司信息披露質(zhì)量的提高；而在民營(yíng)企業(yè)中，產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與外部大股東持股的治理效應(yīng)并不明顯。

(三)穩(wěn)健性檢驗(yàn)

此外，為驗(yàn)證研究結(jié)論的可靠性，本文還進(jìn)行了如下穩(wěn)健性檢驗(yàn)：(1)重新構(gòu)建經(jīng)理管理防御指數(shù)。借鑒張海龍和李秉祥[47]的研究，我們?cè)谇拔挠脕?lái)構(gòu)建經(jīng)理管理防御指數(shù)的五個(gè)變量的基礎(chǔ)上，加入年齡變量，計(jì)算其算術(shù)平均值，得到新的經(jīng)理管理防御指數(shù)并進(jìn)行回歸分析，結(jié)果基本一致。(2)變更審計(jì)質(zhì)量替代變量。除了使用審計(jì)收費(fèi)和“十大”衡量審計(jì)質(zhì)量外，很多學(xué)者還將“國(guó)際四大”作為審計(jì)質(zhì)量的替代變量[18,48]，因此我們采用“國(guó)際四大”重新衡量審計(jì)質(zhì)量，結(jié)果基本一致。由于篇幅限制，文中不再報(bào)告回歸結(jié)果，見(jiàn)附錄。

表6 外部大股東持股對(duì)經(jīng)理管理防御與高質(zhì)量審計(jì)需求之間關(guān)系的回歸結(jié)果

六、研究結(jié)論

隨著管理者權(quán)力的不斷增加，經(jīng)理管理防御現(xiàn)象日益嚴(yán)重，審計(jì)成為經(jīng)理借以影響信息披露質(zhì)量進(jìn)而實(shí)現(xiàn)職位穩(wěn)固的工具。本文以2008年至2014年中國(guó)上市企業(yè)為樣本，區(qū)分國(guó)有企業(yè)和民營(yíng)企業(yè)，研究了上市公司經(jīng)理管理防御與高質(zhì)量審計(jì)需求之間的關(guān)系。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，由于國(guó)有企業(yè)和民營(yíng)企業(yè)對(duì)經(jīng)理人具有不同的約束機(jī)制，在國(guó)有企業(yè)中，出于防御動(dòng)機(jī)的經(jīng)理人傾向于選擇低質(zhì)量審計(jì)師以掩飾其自利行為，降低解雇風(fēng)險(xiǎn)；而在民營(yíng)企業(yè)中，由于市場(chǎng)機(jī)制對(duì)經(jīng)理人具有較大的約束，較高的經(jīng)理管理防御水平能夠引發(fā)高質(zhì)量的審計(jì)需求。進(jìn)一步研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，在國(guó)有企業(yè)中，產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)和外部大股東持股均能顯著抑制出于防御動(dòng)機(jī)的經(jīng)理人選擇低質(zhì)量審計(jì)師的行為；而在民營(yíng)企業(yè)中，這兩種外部治理機(jī)制并不具有顯著的調(diào)節(jié)效應(yīng)。以上結(jié)論說(shuō)明，國(guó)有企業(yè)的市場(chǎng)化改革能夠增強(qiáng)市場(chǎng)機(jī)制對(duì)經(jīng)理人的約束，有利于實(shí)現(xiàn)經(jīng)理人與投資者之間的利益協(xié)同；其次，有效的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)能夠增加對(duì)經(jīng)理人的約束，減輕經(jīng)理人的防御行為對(duì)股東利益的損害。本文的貢獻(xiàn)在于：(1)現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)多基于股東利益最大化假設(shè)，將外部審計(jì)為緩解代理沖突的公司治理機(jī)制，是能夠?qū)Υ沓杀臼┘佑绊懙闹黧w。而本文中，外部審計(jì)作為經(jīng)理人謀求職位穩(wěn)固的工具，是經(jīng)理人施加權(quán)力影響的客體。本文從第一類代理成本的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果入手，試圖對(duì)管理層權(quán)力與外部審計(jì)之間關(guān)系及影響進(jìn)行反向解讀，是對(duì)現(xiàn)有研究范式的重要擴(kuò)展。(2)本研究表明，不同所有權(quán)背景下，經(jīng)理管理防御動(dòng)機(jī)的差異對(duì)審計(jì)需求表現(xiàn)出不同的影響特征，為我國(guó)特殊制度背景下的審計(jì)需求理論提供了更本土化的解釋，促使學(xué)術(shù)界和政策制定者思考如何在制度設(shè)計(jì)中避免審計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)的選擇被管理層干擾，為進(jìn)一步完善國(guó)企公司治理機(jī)制提供了借鑒。(3)激烈的市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)和權(quán)力制衡方的引入，能發(fā)揮有效的外部治理作用，提高資本市場(chǎng)運(yùn)行效率，進(jìn)一步突出了讓市場(chǎng)在資源配置中發(fā)揮決定性作用的重大意義。未來(lái)的研究中，學(xué)術(shù)界應(yīng)嘗試關(guān)注若將審計(jì)作經(jīng)理防御動(dòng)機(jī)影響的客體，是否會(huì)同現(xiàn)有范式下的思路及結(jié)論產(chǎn)生沖突，并且應(yīng)進(jìn)一步將法制環(huán)境、媒體監(jiān)督等其他外部治理機(jī)制的作用納入考察范圍。

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責(zé)任編輯、校對(duì)：李斌泉

穩(wěn)健性檢驗(yàn)附錄：

(1)重新構(gòu)建經(jīng)理管理防御指數(shù)。借鑒張海龍和李秉祥的研究，我們?cè)谇拔挠脕?lái)構(gòu)建經(jīng)理管理防御指數(shù)的五個(gè)變量的基礎(chǔ)上，加入年齡變量，計(jì)算其算術(shù)平均值，得到新的經(jīng)理管理防御指數(shù)并進(jìn)行回歸分析，結(jié)果基本一致。

表7 穩(wěn)健性檢驗(yàn)—重新構(gòu)建經(jīng)理管理防御指數(shù)后的回歸結(jié)果

(2)變更審計(jì)質(zhì)量替代變量。除了使用審計(jì)收費(fèi)和“十大”衡量審計(jì)質(zhì)量外，很多學(xué)者還將“國(guó)際四大”作為審計(jì)質(zhì)量的替代變量，因此我們采用“國(guó)際四大”重新衡量審計(jì)質(zhì)量，結(jié)果基本一致。

表8 穩(wěn)健性檢驗(yàn)—使用“國(guó)際四大”衡量審計(jì)質(zhì)量后的回歸結(jié)果

Market Structure and Loss Ratio: Health Insurance in China from 2004 to 2014

WANG Xiangnan1, BIAN Wenlong2

(1. Institute of Finance and Banking, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100028, China;2. School of Finance, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, Guangzhou 510006, China)

The loss ratio of health insurance is relatively low in China. Using the data of prefectural-level cities from 2004 to 2014, this article studies the relation between the market structure and the loss ratio of China’s health insurance market for the first time. Regarding three general market structure indexes, we find that the health insurance loss ratio is positively and significantly related to the number of firms and negatively and significantly related to the market concentration, while the (negative) relation between the loss ratio and inequality of market share is not robust. For the market structure indexes with insurance market feature, we find that the health insurance loss ratio is negatively and significantly related to the market share of nonlife insurers and positively and significantly related to the market share of foreign insurers, while is not significantly related with the insurers’ ages. Those results support the “structure-performance hypothesis” and indicate that, in order to increase health insurance loss ratio, we should carry the “supply side” reform and expand the insurance market openness to domestic and foreign insurers.

Health insurance; Martket structure; Loss ratio; China

Financial Decentralization, Bank Institution Change and Economic Growth—Based on the Empirical Analysis of Inter-provincial Panel Data during 1993～2012

XIE Zongfan1, JIANG Junsong2

(1.School of Public Administration, Hunan Normal University, Changsha 410006, China;2. School of Business, Xiangtan University, Xiangtan 411105, China)

Abstract: Chinese decentralization has been seen as one of important reasons to Chinese economic miracle. But the Chinese government delayed the decentralization process in the banking sector, which has been criticized by many scholars with market-oriented view. From the perspective of power, this paper reviews the repeatedly process of financial decentralization and centralization in the process of banking institution change, and analyzes its reasons, then analyzes the performance of banking institution change under the background of financial decentralization by using inter-provincial panel data during 1993～2012. The results find that the higher level of financial decentralization is conducive to improving the performance of the banking institution, and promoting the economic growth, but our country’s financial decentralization level is still at a low level, the government should further construct the market-oriented banking institution on the basis of improving the level of financial decentralization.

Keywords: Financial decentralization; Financial centralization; Bank institution change; Economic growth

How Regional Differences Affect P2P Lending Behavior—Evidence from Renrendai

PENG Hongfeng, YANG Liuming, TAN Xiaoyu

(Economics and Management School, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China)

Abstract: Using lending transaction data from Renrendai, this paper empirically examines the impact of regional differences on the P2P borrowing respectively from four perspectives: the economy level, financial ecological environment, education level and regular financial penetration. The results show that there is a significant discrepancy in the funding success rate among different regions in the domestic P2P lending market. More specifically, borrowers whose provinces enjoy higher economic level, better financial ecological environment, and higher degree of education are more likely to obtain loans; while the degree of regular financial penetration has a negative impact on the funding success rate, and indicate that the P2P network lending is an effective complement to the formal finance. The results presented in this paper have some policy implications on how to further understand the cause of the regional discrimination and how to create a harmonious online lending environment.

Key words:Regional discrimination; P2P network lending; Funding success rate

Regional Differences and Information Transmission in China’s Internet Lending Markets

YANG Hecan1, YANG Xianyue2

(1. School of Economics and Management, Anhui Normal University, Wuhu 241003, China;2. Institute of Applied Economics, Shanghai Academy of Social Science, Shanghai 200020, China)

Abstract: This paper examines regional differences and information transmission of China’s internet lending markets. The rapid development of the network lending markets has surpassed the limitation of time and space, positioning their service for "grassroots" class across the country. However, the difference of interest rates is significant around the country with serious regional segmentation, which is in sharp contrast to changes of interest rates with no regional differences and to free flows of market information. The main reason is that lending platforms have deeply involved in lending transactions and become a similar role of commercial bank credit intermediation, which results in the market pricing confusion. The further development of Internet lending market should aim to enhance market efficiency comprehensively and eliminate market segmentation

Key words:Internet lending; Regional differences; Information transmission

The Join Forces Theory of Economic Development:A Framework for Economic Development Analysis

SHAO Hongwei1,2, JIN Tao1

(1. School of Economics, Xiamen University, Xiamen 361005, China;2. College of Business and Economics, Australian National University, Canberra 2601, Australia)

Abstract: This paper synthesizes former scholars’ insights on economic development and argues that economic development is the result of the join forces produced by the interaction of all parts in the social economic system. This system includes the institution forming the relationship between peoples, namely relation of production and superstructure; science and technology, and productivity forming the relationship between human and nature; the content and structure of economic activity; the platform bearing the economic activity, such as geography, natural resources, infrastructure, fictitious economy, historic background, international environment and so on. Technology and institution interact in the social economic system, technology innovation improves productivity and causes institution change, a favorable institution innovation is beneficial for technology innovation and productivity improvement, technology innovation and institution change decides economic development jointly in their interaction.

Keywords: Economic development; Join forces; Institution; Technology; Structure

Transformation Effect of Public Services on the Urban-Rural Income Disparity:an Empirical Test of Data across the Country

ZHAN Guohui, ZHANG Xinwen, DU Chunlin

(College of Public Administration, Nanjing Agriculture University, Nanjing 210095, China)

Abstract:Income disparity between urban and rural areas is the endogenous structure obstacles of affecting the symbiotic development of the current urban and rural, and then the equalization level of public services has the adverse effect on the urban-rural income disparity, thus effectively straightening out the transformation effect of public service on the urban-rural income disparity is the necessary premise to achieve symbiotic development between urban and rural areas. The paper reviews the existing literature about the urban-rural income disparity, then constructs the smooth transfer model of the public service on urban-rural income disparity. With the aid of the test model of threshold cointegration, this article finds that the transformation effect of development level of public services presents a difference in different level of transfer mechanism. At the same time, by constructing dynamic panel model of the public service and the urban-rural income disparity and using GMM two-step estimation, this article concludes that public service has the significant positively influence on the transformation effect for urban-rural income disparity. To this end, we should make the corresponding path to optimize the public service level, which aims to further narrow the urban-rural income disparity.

Key words:Public services; The urban-rural income disparity; Transformation effect; Smooth transfer

Do Technological Innovation and Upgrading of Industrial Structure Promote the Development of New-type Urbanization

HE Jianfeng1, WU Hui2

(1. School of Economics and Commerce, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 510006, China;2.School of Economics and Management, South China Normal University, Guangzhou 510006, China)

Abstract:Using 2005-2014 panel data of China’s provinces, this paper calculated every provinces’ new-type urbanization level through comprehensive index method, and analyzed the effects of the science and technology innovation and the upgrading of the industrial structure by using the panel data model. The results show that: (1) In the past ten years, the new-type urbanization level in eastern China was the highest, the middle took second place, the west was the lowest. The top three provinces were Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin. (2) There was a lagging promotion effect of technological innovation to new-type urbanization. The upgrading of industrial structure had a significant positive effect on the new-type urbanization. (3) The impact of technological innovation on the urbanization of the population was significantly positive, and negative impact on the urbanization of the society. The upgrading of the industrial structure had significantly different degrees of effect on population, economic and social urbanization.

Key words: New-type urbanization; Technological innovation; Upgrading of industrial structure; Panel data

Agricultural Insurance, Agricultural Loan and Per capita Net Income of Rural Households—An Empirical Analysis Based on Provincial Panel Data in China

RUAN Guilin, MENG Weidong

(School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University 400044， China)

Abstract:Based on the panel data of 31 provinces from 2001 to 2013, this paper establishes a PVAR model to investigate the relationship among agricultural insurance, agricultural loan and per capita net income of rural households. The results show that only agricultural insurance of the west area has no positive promoting effect on the per capita net income of rural households; the agricultural loans of every region play positive promoting roles on per capita net income of rural households, but there is a time lag of 1-2 years; The effect of agricultural loan on per capita net income of rural households is greater than that of agricultural insurance. Besides, the interaction between agricultural insurance and agricultural loan has a regional difference.

Key words: Agricultural insurance; Agricultural loan; Per capita net income of rural households; The panel VAR model

How Banking Market Structure Promote Industry Resource Allocation—Based on the Analysis of Heterogeneous Firms Entry and Exit

WU Han1,2, JIA Runsong3,4

(1.Economics School, Nankai University, Tianjin, 300071 China;2.Business School, Durham University, UK, DH1 2HD;3.Postdoctoral Programme of Peking University, Beijing, 100871, China;4.China Banking Regulatory Commission, Beijing, 100140, China)

Abstract:This paper uses Chinese manufacturing firms data to test the promote impact of banking market structure on industry resource allocation, stating that the expansion of the market share of small and medium sized banks can improve the condition of the credit allocation between firms. On the one hand, the development of small and medium-sized banks can supply enough credit to the potential small sized entry firms and promote firm entry, especially for the entry of SMEs; On the other hand, the development of small and medium-sized banks can effectively relief the financial constraints of SMEs and decrease the exit risk of SMEs. While the improvement of banking market structure is beneficial for firm entry and improve the industry resource allocation efficiency.

Key words:Banking market structure; Small and medium-sized banks; Financial dependence; Firm entry; firm exit

Study on the Driving Factors in China’s Energy Intensity Change—Based on LMDI Decomposition Technique

HAN Song1, ZHANG Baosheng1, TANG Xu1, QI Shuai1, MENG Fanyan2

(1. School of Business Administration, China University of Petroleum, Beijing 102249, China;2. National Engineering Laboratory for Pipeline Safety, China Petroleum Pipeline Research Institute, Langfang 065000, China)

Abstract:Energy shortage has been the bottleneck of economic and social sustainable development in China. The new task to improve energy efficiency has been put on the agenda of the "13th Five-Year" Plan. Therefore, exploring the driving factors that lead to the change of energy intensity is an important premise to improve the comprehensive energy efficiency in China. The study computes and analyzes the sources of the changes of energy intensity in China during the period 2001-2013 by using the decomposition method. With the logarithmic mean Divisia index technique, the change of energy intensity has been decomposed into four factors: the energy substitution, the technological progress, the changes of industry structure and sector structure. The results show that the technological progress effect is confirmed as the dominant contributor to the decline in energy intensity. Secondly, the energy substitution effect has no significant effect on overall energy intensity. Thirdly, the industry structure increases energy intensity and the structure change effect at the sector level decreases energy intensity.

Key words:Energy intensity; LMDI; Energy substitution; Technology progress; Industry structure; Sector structure

The Influence of Government Funding and Industry-University-Research Cooperation on Innovation Performance of Enterprises: Based on the Empirical Study on Guangdong Province’ Questionnaire Data

HU Junyan1, CHEN Zihong1, ZHOU Mingze2, JIN Yun1

(1. School of Economics and Commerce, South China University of Technology, Guangdong 510006, China;2. School of Business Administration, South China University of Technology, Guangdong 510006, China)

Abstract: The goal of government funding Industry-University-Research (IUR) is to enhance enterprises’ independent innovation ability. To examine whether this expected goal is achieved, this paper divides enterprises’ innovation performance into two types, namely market performance and the performance of research and development (R&D) reserve, and studies the effect of government funding and IUR on these two different innovation performance by using the questionnaire data of IUR in Guangdong province. The empirical results indicate that government funding has a significant positive effect on the performance of R&D reserve and has no significant effect on market performance. And there exists a non-significant positive relationship between IUR interaction and market performance, but a negative significant relationship between IUR interaction and the performance of R&D reserve. That means, it is necessary for the government to finance IUR to achieve the goal of promoting the performance of R&D reserve. However, the function mechanism of IUR interaction in the relationship between government funding and enterprises’ innovation performance is non-liner. Only when a certain threshold is reached, can IUR interaction work. In addition, the performance of R&D reserve has a higher threshold than market performance. And accordingly some policy implications are proposed.

Keywords: Government funding; Industry-University-Research (IUR) interaction; Innovation performance

Study on Managers’ Power Connection with Shareholders and Its Performance Influence in Private Firms

WANG Xinxia1, LIU Chun2

(1. School of Economics and Finance, Xi’an International Studies University, Shaanxi Xi’an 710128, China;2. Jinhe Center for Economic Research, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Shaanxi Xi’an 710049, China)

Abstract: Taking the actual controller as logical starting point, this paper theoretically analyzed managers’ power connection with shareholders and its performance influence in private firms, and discussed the moderating effect of compensation incentive on the performance influence. The empirical tests found that: (1)Managers’ power connection with shareholders has no significant influence on performance in firms with two posts syncretic; (2)In firms with two posts respective, chairman’s power connection with shareholders helps to improve firm performance while CEO’s power connection with shareholders has no significant or adverse impact on firm performance; (3)Compensation incentive is helpful to strengthen the positive influence of managers’ power connection with shareholders and restrain its negative influence.

Keywords: Manager; Power connection with shareholders; Compensation incentive; Performance influence

Company Property Rights, Managerial Entrenchment and the Demand for High Quality Audit

ZHANG Junmin, ZHANG Xiao, XIAO Zhichao

(School of Business, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222, China)

Abstract: Using the data from the Chinese listed companies during the periods 2008-2014, the study examines the effects of managerial entrenchment on the demand for high quality audit among companies with different nature of property rights. The results show that managerial entrenchment has a negative effect on the demand for high quality audit in state-owned companies but in non-state-owned companies it leads to the demand for higher quality audit. The results also show that in state-owned companies both product market competition and ownership of outside blockholders have negative effects on the relationship between managerial entrenchment and the demand for high quality audit. However, none of the two corporate governance mechanism shows obvious effects in non-state-owned companies. The study provides evidence of the economic consequences of managerial entrenchment in the companies with different nature of property rights and has great significance for further promoting the reform of state-owned companies.

Keywords: Company property rights; Managerial entrenchment; The market restraint mechanism; The demand for high quality audit

2016-06-16

國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金面上項(xiàng)目“產(chǎn)權(quán)視角下的審計(jì)師聲譽(yù)機(jī)制及其經(jīng)濟(jì)后果研究”(71272189)。

張俊民(1960-)，山東省濟(jì)寧市人，天津財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)商學(xué)院教授，博士生導(dǎo)師，研究方向：會(huì)計(jì)、審計(jì)；張曉(1989-)，女，山東省德州市人，天津財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)商學(xué)院博士研究生，研究方向：公司治理、審計(jì)；肖志超(1989-)，河北省邢臺(tái)市人，天津財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)商學(xué)院博士研究生，研究方向：會(huì)計(jì)、審計(jì)。

A

1002-2848-2016(05)-0114-10