International Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament Posture in 2016

By Shi Jianbin and Zheng Yan

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International Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament Posture in 2016

By Shi Jianbin and Zheng Yan

Center for Strategic Studies, China Academy of Engineering Physics

The international nuclear arms control and disarmament posture in 2016 was nothing surprising on the surface, but the inside hidden waves surging high, generally showed a situation featured by four complexities, three bans, two hotspots and one concern. The four complexities refer to, in the area of nuclear disarmament, the complexity of further nuclear cut between the United States and Russia, the complexity between bilateral nuclear disarmament and multilateral nuclear disarmament, the complexity between non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear weapon states and the complexity between nuclear arsenals modernization and nuclear cuts. The three bans refer to the widely concerned three arms control treaties featuring bans, namely to promote the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) enter into effect on the early date possible, start negotiations on Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons (FMCT) and promote the United Nations to negotiate a Comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty. The two hotspots refer to the nuclear issues of both North Korea and Iran, neither of which gets cooled down. One concern refers to the international community continuous concern of the impact of the U.S. presidential election on international nuclear posture. These issues get entangled with each other and become more inextricable by intended solution, which makes the international nuclear arms control and disarmament process stagnating in 2016, and the future development gets more uncertain.

The Four Complexities

Since the new START is signed and enters into effect, the United States and Russia have normally complied with the Treaty, with no exception in the year 2016. According to the latest data exchanged between the United States and Russia, up to September 1, 2016, with the new rules for counting in the START Treaty, the U.S. and Russian active deployments of strategic vehicles in service are 681 and 508 respectively, with strategic nuclear warheads of 1367 and 1796 respectively. Since Russia has deployed new vehicles and not timely retired old vehicles, so that the current deployment of strategic warheads are 259 more than that provided by the Treaty as it took effect in 2011.

The strategic nuclear weapons the United States and Russia actively deploy still have a room for reduction, so as to maintain strategic stability with smaller nuclear arsenals. U.S. President Obama in the 2013 Berlin Speech proposed to Russia to further cut 1/3 of the active strategic weapons deployed based on the new START i.e. to reduce the arsenals below 1000 scale; this reduction proposal once again was mentioned by the Nuclear Weapons Modernization Program of U.S. government in October 2016. Russia, facing the problem of aging nuclear arsenal and financial pressure of maintaining a huge nuclear arsenal, needs nuclear disarmament, but due to the worry about the U.S. missile defense system, the long-range precise attack system, the advantages of conventional forces and nuclear weapons inventory, shows anxieties to further reduce nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, the United States is also worried about the security issues generated by Russia's advantage in the number of non-strategic nuclear weapons (or tactical nuclear weapons).

The sound bilateral political relations between the United States and Russia is the basic condition to promote the bilateral nuclear disarmament process, but after the Ukrainian crisis, the political relationship between the two countries dropped to the lowest point in 2016 since the end of the cold war, while Russia also announced the suspension of implementing the Plutonium Management and Disposal Agreement signed in 2000, which aims to reduce and dispose weapons grade plutonium, and also brought the U.S.-Russian relationship down to a new low. The change of the U.S. Administration seems to provide an opportunity for the improvement of relations between the United States and Russia, but the hard rhetoric of Trump and Putin in December 2016 on strengthening the nuclear strike capability make people in the world feel it difficult to see further cuts between the United States and Russia in recent future.

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Because the United States and Russia (Soviet Union) posses extraordinary proportion of the global nuclear weapons and military-grade fissile materials, so far, the nuclear arms control and reduction are negotiated only between the United States and Russia (the Soviet Union), including the new START treaty entry into effect in February 2011. With the developing international nuclear posture, the United States and Russia will not only maintain the basic nuclear balance between them in the nuclear reduction process, but also hope to continuously maintain nuclear superiority over other countries, thus requesting other nuclear countries to join the nuclear disarmament process, for example Russia since 2013 has repeatedly stressed that the next round of negotiations on nuclear disarmament should be in a multilateral form.

Although under the new START framework, in 2016 the U.S. and Russian bilateral nuclear disarmament was progressing smoothly, yet it is worth noting that the United States and Russia cut only strategic nuclear forces of active deployment, do not tough on thousands of non-strategic (tactical) nuclear warheads and non-deployed strategic nuclear warheads in the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals. In addition, the United State and Russia both have a large number of decommissioned nuclear warheads to be demolished. Therefore, even if the United States and Russia fulfill their nuclear disarmament commitments under the new START Treaty, they still hold more than 90% of the world's nuclear weapons. Under the circumstances that nuclear arsenals sizes of other countries are still in great disparity with the United States and Russia, in the case the two countries fail to have deeper nuclear cut, so the condition to promote multilateral nuclear reduction negotiations is not mature.

In the current international security environment, nuclear weapons still play an important role in maintaining national security and global strategic stability. As far as nuclear weapon states are concerned, so long as there are existential nuclear weapons, they must modernize them in order to maintain the safety, security and reliability of nuclear weapons. In 2016 all nuclear weapons states modernized their nuclear arsenals, and especially the United States and Russia were leading.

The United States was continuing to push the modernization of three-in-one strategic nuclear force in 2016, including the Militia III land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) replaced by the ground-based strategic deterrent (GBSD), using long-range stand-off cruise missile (LRSO) to replace the existing air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) as well as implementing B61-12 life extension project (LEP). In October 2016, the U.S. State Department issued the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Modernization Program, which says the U.S. nuclear weapons modernization program is designed to maintain strategic stability and effective nuclear deterrence. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report, from 2014 to 2023, the annual average cost of U.S. nuclear modernization is about $8.9 billion.

In 2016, Russia continued to deploy Bulava SLBM, began to build the eighth or the last Borey class strategic nuclear submarine, accelerated the R&D of Russian Sarkozy (RS-28) intercontinental ballistic missiles and Barguzin missile trains carrying Yaersi (RS) ballistic missiles, and improved and upgraded the Tu -160 strategic bombers. From 2011 to 2020, Russia will spend $70 billion for the modernization of strategic nuclear forces.

The U.S. and the Russian governments both launched the ambitious nuclear arsenals modernization programs, which run contradictory with the international nuclear disarmament process. On the one hand, the improved quality of nuclear weapons can help reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons for nuclear deterrence, thereby making it possible for further nuclear cuts; on the other hand, from the perspective of overall nuclear capacity, the improved quality of nuclear weapons can make up for the reduced quantity of nuclear weapons, and therefore the global nuclear threats are not substantially reduced.

4.nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states

Nuclear Weapon States (NWS)and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) have a different understanding and concern of the role of nuclear weapons and the nuclear disarmament process. The former believes that in the current international security posture, nuclear weapons still indispensably play an important role in maintaining international peace and regional stability. The latter generally believes that the development and possession of nuclear weapons can not ensure the security and stability, but cause international tension. Because of the different understanding of the role of nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon states initiate a step-by-step and verifiable nuclear disarmament process, but the non-nuclear weapon states actively promote "radical" steps.

In 2016, the non-nuclear weapon states continued to complain about the stalled international nuclear disarmament process, and used nuclear weapons humanitarian issues to whip up movement waves, including pursuit of the negotiation on the FMCT outside of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD), and of the negotiation on Comprehensively Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty under the UN General Assembly Mechanism. Signs show that the non-nuclear weapon states have purposely watered down the multilateral nuclear disarmament mechanism under the CD, bypassed the CD decisions by consensus, and turned to the UN General Assembly decision by majority, thus weakening the influence of the nuclear weapon states, and rapidly pushing for the advance of international nuclear arms control and disarmament depending on their numbers advantages.

In the face of pressure from non-nuclear weapons countries, the nuclear weapon states have strengthened coordination of their positions and continued to emphasize the necessity and importance of step-by-step nuclear disarmament. In September 2016 the five nuclear-weapons states held a closed door meeting in New York in order to reach consensus. International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), as the exchanges and cooperation platform for nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states in nuclear disarmament verification technology, since 2015 held the two plenary sessions, and in 2016 in Japan and the United Arab Emirates held the Third and Fourth Plenary Session respectively. With the help of the IPNDV platform, the nuclear weapon states expect the non-nuclear weapon states to raise their awareness of related difficulties in the field of nuclear disarmament verification, show their concerns of the verification technology effects on protection of sensitive information and nuclear non-proliferation and promote their identity for nuclear disarmament process in a step-by-step way.

The Three "Ban" Treaties

CTBT aims at capping quality of nuclear weapons, while FMCT capping the numbers of global nuclear arsenals, the two of which coordinate with each other and become major issues for the international multilateral nuclear arms control and disarmament field for many years running. In 2016, the Comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty became a new subject in the field of nuclear arms control.

Since September 1996, CTBT is adopted and opened for signature by the United Nations General Assembly, so far, 183 countries have signed it, of which 166 countries have ratified (in 2016 two more countries Swaziland and Burma ratified the Treaty). The entry into force of the CTBT requires 44 key countries to ratify, but 8 of the key countries, including the United States, have not yet signed or ratified.

The year 2016 coincides with the 20 anniversary of the CTBT adoption, the international community shows a more positive attitude of promoting the early entry into force of CTBT. After a closed door meeting in September, the Five nuclear states issued a joint statement to support CTBT. U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, after a lapse of years, held a hearing on CTBT in September 2016. President Obama intended to push the ratification process of CTBT, under the conditions that it was difficult to get enough Republican senators to support, turned away from it in the last year of his office and explored an opportunity to have a resolution on the nuclear test ban from the United Nations Security Council. On September 23, 2016, the United Nations Security Council adopted the Resolution 2310, which called for an end to nuclear testing and an early entry into force of the CTBT. In order to meet the requirements of the "nuclear test ban" monitoring and verification, the international community, according to the verification mechanism of the CTBT, continues to invest in building the international monitoring systems around the world. As of August 2016, this system plans 337 facilities (321 monitoring stations and 16 radionuclide laboratories), a total of 302 is completed, of which 283 is technically accepted.

Among all nuclear countries, the United States has the most nuclear tests, the highest level of nuclear weapons design, and the management plan for nuclear weapons stockpile is carried out smoothly, hence, without nuclear testing, it also can ensure the security, safety and reliability of nuclear weapons. If the United States, requiring the least nuclear test, does not ratify the Treaty, then the CTBT entry into effect is out of reach.

In 1993 the UN General Assembly passed the Resolution 48/75L, proposing to negotiate and conclude a Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons or other Explosive Devices (FMCT) that is non-discriminatory, multilateral, effective international verifiable in the most appropriate international form. According to the requirements of the resolution, the CD in Geneva began in 1994 to handle the issue of Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty.

In 2016 the international community continuously paid close attention to the long-delayed problem of fissile materials cut-off, but the treaty negotiation is yet to start. Pakistan, since 2010 having made use of the CD principle of consultative consensus, proposed that the treaty should not only ban the production of new fissile material for military purposes, but also reduce the existing inventory, and with this as an excuse stalled the start of the negotiations alone. In order to break the deadlock, some radical countries vigorously seek the FMCT negotiations beyond CD mechanism and challenge the CD stance as the only international multilateral arms control negotiations venue. In October 2016 the UN General Assembly passed a resolution, requesting a high level of FMCT expert preparatory group to be established and to convene a two-week meeting in 2017 and 2018 respectively, and discuss FMCT related matters and make proposals as well as review the report by the UN Group of Governmental Experts on fissile materials cut-off.

It is expected that in the near future there is low possibility of starting the FMCT negotiations. Even if the negotiations get started, negotiations participants will also face many challenges, mainly how to reach a consensus on defining the special terms used, setting the provisions of the FMCT scope, handling the existing nuclear materials inventory, establishing verification mechanisms and identifying the conditions for the treaty to enter into effect, unless the group of governmental experts and expert preparatory group have done effective foundational work in advance.

The Open Ended Working Group(OEWG), established according to the UN General Assembly Resolution 33 / 70, in February, May and August 2016 in Geneva held three meetings respectively to promote the UN General Assembly to negotiate a legally binding instrument for the prohibition of nuclear weapons. The UN First Committee (i.e. Disarmament and International Security Committee) and the United Nations General Assembly in October and December 2016 adopted the resolution proposed by Austria, Mexico and other non-nuclear weapon states, provided that in March 2017 negotiations on theComprehensive Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty will be officially launched at the UN General Assembly.

The Comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty looks more likely to be adopted through negotiations in 2017, even though the negotiations talks may be resisted by nuclear weapon states and U.S. allies. First of all, the treaty is mainly to prohibit nuclear weapons from the legal perspective, and easy to get support from most of the non- nuclear weapon states. Secondly, the Treaty does not require the verification and transparency measures temporarily, thus bypassing the differences and disputes of verification technology, easy for the negotiating parties to reach a consensus. What is more important is that the treaty negotiations is done with the United Nations General Assembly as the platform, bypassing the CD consultative consensus, is beneficial for the quantity-dominated non-nuclear weapon states to lead the negotiations.

Although the ban of nuclear weapons is not equivalent to the destruction of nuclear weapons, yet once theComprehensive Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty is concluded, the international standards on the ban of the development, possess and use of nuclear weapons will be established, which is hopefully to pave the way for a verifiable nuclear disarmament mechanism to be negotiated.

Two hotspots of nuclear proliferation

2016 was a landmark year in the history of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea's (DPRKorea or North Korea) nuclear proliferation. North Korea for the first time in a year conducted two underground nuclear tests, the international community estimated that the explosion of the second nuclear test is about 15000 tons of TNT equivalent, the highest in its nuclear tests so far. The statement in Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) says that "The nuclear test finally examined and confirmed the structure and specific features of the movement of nuclear warhead that has been standardized to be able to be mounted on strategic ballistic rockets." In addition to the two nuclear tests unprecedentedly in 2016, North Korea also frequently fired ground-based medium-range ballistic missiles, is determined to develop submarine launched ballistic missiles, and high-powered rocket engine ground test firing for a new intercontinental ballistic missile. Apparently, North Korea is speeding up the integration of nuclear warheads and missiles to achieve long-range nuclear strike capability. In addition, the international community believes that North Korea in 2016 produced more military-use nuclear materials for manufacturing nuclear weapons.

North Korea's nuclear issue sustainably causes great concern of the international community, which results in the Korean Peninsula escalating tensions, leading further to a more complex security situation in Northeast Asia. South Korea shows tough stance, accepts the deployment of "THAAD" system in South Korea, the United States, Japan and South Korea collaborate together to impose sanctions against North Korea, the UN Security Council also adopts sanctions resolution. The North Korean nuclear issue is in the prospects of worries.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was reached In 2015 in order to settle the Iranian nuclear issue, which is formally implemented on January 16, 2016.

JCPOA has set a bottom line for the Iranian nuclear power development in order to ensure the Iran’s nuclear program for civil purposes thoroughly; planned a red line for drawing up measures in order to limit Iran's nuclear capabilities, including transformation of the Arak heavy water reactor, significantly reducing the number of centrifuges, and confining the reserved quantity and enrichment of low grade uranium; deployed a line of defense in order to restrict Iran's breach of the agreement through establishment of the "fast resuming sanctions" mechanism; buried a line of information by establishing the most stringent monitoring and verification mechanism on Iran's nuclear activities. So far, JCPOA is smoothly implemented. Amano Nomiya, IAEA Director General said at a meeting with President of Iran in Tehran on December 18, 2016 that Iran has strictly complied with all terms of the JCPOA.

Nevertheless, the hidden problems of JCPOA in 2016 gradually became highlighted and caused a controversy. Firstly, the suspicions between Iran and Western countries represented by the United States were in existence for many years, the ingrained mutual trust crisis is hard to turn for the better, the tense relationship cannot be resolved shortly by a piece of paper. Around the lifting of economic sanctions, there is continuous dispute between the United States and Iran. On December 15, 2016, the U.S. Congress passed the Sanctions Bill against Iran, decided to extend the sanctions against Iran for a decade to come. Secondly, JCPOA can not solve all the problems arising from the Iran's nuclear program, there is not short of questioning or even voices against the agreement in the international community. Thirdly, both the U.S. and Iranian governments are subject to pressures and constraints from domestic opposition and hard liners, and the shuffle of both governments drops a new variable from the blue to implement the agreement, U.S. President Trump during his campaign in a speech in March 2016 also criticized JCPOA, and stated to dismantle it, and renegotiate it. The prospects for JCPOA execution remain to be seen.

One concern

In today’s political architecture that the United States is the superpower, the U.S. nuclear policy affects the international nuclear arms control and disarmament posture. The year 2016 is an election year in the United States, the views and positions of the two presidential candidates on nuclear weapons issues are concerned by the international community. After the election results on November 6th, President-elect Trump's remarks about nuclear weapons are becoming the focus of attention.

Obama before moving into the White House initiatively called for the realization of the nuclear-free world, while Trump's remarks are in stark contrast with that of Obama. According to media reports, in March 2016, Trump said Japan and South Korea can develop nuclear weapons, and support more countries to possess "nuclear capability"; in August, Trump questioned why the United States cannot use nuclear weapons in crisis and war, and does not exclude striking ISIS with nuclear weapons; in December, Trump declared that the United States must strengthen and expand its nuclear capabilities. These comments apparently counter with the global non-proliferation efforts, intend to lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, and seem to have played a preface for a new round of nuclear arms race.

Maybe this series of comments by Trump before taking office is casual, but will undoubtedly generate the international community concerns about future U.S. nuclear policy, especially concerned about the uncertain international nuclear arms control and disarmament prospects after Trump in the White House.

The future development trend of the international nuclear arms control and disarmament

The future development trend of the international nuclear arms control and disarmament will move along the above-mentioned four complexities, three bans, two hotspots and one concern. The United States and Russia before February 2018 comply with nuclear disarmament commitments under the framework of the new START, which should be in no suspense, but further bilateral nuclear cuts are temporarily difficult to be continuously carried on. Before the U.S. and Russian nuclear deeper cuts, the multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament is hard to progress. The United States and Russia will not stop the nuclear arsenals modernization, overall quality of nuclear weapons is improved while the overall quantity is reduced in the world, which makes the international nuclear arms control and disarmament more complex. The special role of nuclear weapons in the international security will not change shortly, the nuclear weapon states will advocate step-by-step and verifiable nuclear disarmament process, while the non- nuclear weapon states will continue to aggressively promote deepening of the nuclear disarmament process. In the foreseeable future, the early entry into effect of CTBT and start of negotiations on FMCT are both hard to attain, and negotiations of the Comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty at the UN General Assembly will become a highlight of 2017.

It is expected that North Korea in the future will not change its intention of having medium- and long-range nuclear missiles or even intercontinental ballistic missiles, if there is no corresponding diplomatic mediation mechanism, North Korea will not stop its nuclear and missile tests. The hidden problems of Iran nuclear agreement will continue to get fermented, follow-up implementation remains to be seen. After Trump is in the White House, any change of the American nuclear policy will have a profound impact on the global nuclear arms control posture. In addition, the 2015 NPT Review Conference was completed fruitlessly, the participating parties in 2016 gathered strength, and will start the game-play again from 2017 onwards with the 10th session of the NPT review conference as a platform.

In short, the international nuclear arms control and disarmament situation is in the process of transformation, the traditional process and mechanism are badly impacted, new problems emerge endlessly, the future is full of uncertainty, what course to follow remains to be seen.