Characteristics of Obama Administration's Nuclear Security Diplomacy and a Future Trend

By Guo Xiaobing,

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Characteristics of Obama Administration's Nuclear Security Diplomacy and a Future Trend

By Guo Xiaobing,

Institutes of Contemporary International Relations

Nuclear security diplomacy is one of the composition of Obama's diplomacy with most special characteristics. The United States initiates from the perspective of nuclear security, an originally marginal issue, actively builds momentum, mobilizes multilateral diplomacy and major countries diplomacy, has not only improved the global nuclear security situation, reduced the risks of nuclear terrorism facing the United States, but also reversed the U.S. negative image in the field of arms control, and enhanced its discourse. On April 1, 2016, leaders of 52 countries and representatives of 4 international organizations gathered in Washington, held the Fourth Nuclear Security Summit, made plans for the post-Summit international nuclear security cooperation. On this occasion, to make an inventory of and screen the nuclear diplomacy of the Obama Administration, and forecast the future trend is inevitably helpful to activate the Chinese nuclear diplomacy.

I. Three prominent features of Obama Administration's nuclear security diplomacy

The United States has long been concerned about nuclear terrorism, previous administrations had also taken a number of measures to promote international nuclear security cooperation. But compared with the past, the Obama Administration's nuclear security diplomacy presents three prominent features.

security strategy. The U.S. awareness of the threat of nuclear terrorism has a gradual deepening process. In 1944, before the successful R&D of nuclear weapons, the atomic bomb experts participating in the "Manhattan project" development submitted the "Jeffries Report" to the U.S. Government, pointed out that nuclear weapons can give the attackers asymmetric advantage, invaders with nuclear weapons can defeat much more powerful countries through successful attack process1which already contains concerns about nuclear terrorism. After the advent of nuclear weapons, the U.S. guard against nuclear terrorism is divided into three stages. The first stage is in the 1950s-1980s, the United States initially established mechanism and strength to prevent nuclear terrorism. It is initially worried about the risk of nuclear terrorism which is not from a terrorist organization, but from the USSR-Eastern Europe Socialist camp. In 1949, the former Soviet Union conduced the first nuclear test, the United States Defense Science Board launched the "Screwdriver Plan" (1950-1952), and the "Threshold Plan" (1953-1970), searching for how to use the means of detection, information, certification and other means to prevent diplomats of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to smuggle nuclear materials with the United States. In the 1970s, international terrorism was becoming more active, major terrorist attacks such as Munich Olympics Massacre and others occurred. The United States began assessing the possibility of terrorist organizations to acquire and use nuclear weapons, and strengthened the management of nuclear material storage and transport, prevented them from falling into the hands of terrorists. The second stage is the 1990s, the U.S. priority shifted to prevent Soviet nuclear materials, nuclear technology and talents drain, so as to avoid from giving the terrorists a chance.2The United States, through the famous Nunn-Lugar act, implemented the Cooperation to Reduce Threat Program, helped the former Soviet Union, especially Russia to dismantle nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, enhanced nuclear weapons and nuclear materials security. The third stage is since the 21st Century, due to the "9/11" terrorist attacks and international nuclear black market exposure, the United States comes to realize that those weapons of mass destruction fall into the hands of the hostile countries and terrorists are the most serious threats to the U.S. security3. The Obama Administration went further, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report makes it clear that nuclear terrorism is the most urgent and most serious threat".4From "one of the most serious threats" to "the most urgent and serious threat", the emphasis on the threat of nuclear terrorism is raised to an unprecedented height. Interestingly thought-provoking, the report is also published unprecedentedly in 6 languages of English, Chinese, French, Spanish, Russian, and Arabic. This is tantamount to notice the world that nuclear security has become a priority task of the United States of America.

In the aspect of making nuclear safety regulations, and launching initiatives, the previous U.S. administrations had done a lot of work. First is promoting the adoption of Resolution 1540 within the framework of the United Nations and supporting the conclusion of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Second is supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency to amend the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, extending its coverage. Third is initiating a series of volunteer initiatives, such as Global Partnership Against Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction? under the framework of G-8, and jointly launched with Russia the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative to Prevent Nuclear and Containers Security Initiative, Megaports Initiative, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative. In contrast, the Obama Administration did not put too much efforts to conclude a new legal instrument, but focused on implementation.

The key to the implementation of the Obama Administration is to ensure the safety of nuclear materials. There are four forms of nuclear terrorism: steal and use nuclear weapons; manufacture and use nuclear weapons; attack on nuclear facilities; manufacture and use radioactive dirty bombs. The terrorists obtain nuclear materials and make nuclear weapons, which constitutes serious harm, has relatively high probability, and is the focus of prevention. The simplest way for terrorists to build a nuclear explosive device is high enriched uranium. There are about 61 tons of civil-use highly enriched uranium in the world, distributed in the 100 facilities in 25 countries, enough to manufacture several thousand nuclear weapons.5In addition, there are about 250 tons of civil-separate plutonium in the world.6In order to prevent terrorists access to these materials, Obama in 2009 in his Brak Speech proposed the goal to assure the global easy-loss of nuclear material safety in 4 years. The following year, the United States launched the Nuclear Security Summit process, and mobilizes all countries to work together. Over the past 6 years, the global security situation of nuclear materials has been greatly improved. Firstly, countries with weapons grade fissile material are on speedy reduction. In the 17 years from 1992 to 2009 before the Summit, a total of 14 countries removed their weapons grade fissile materials. In the 6 years from the First Summit held in 2010 to 2016, there are 13 countries to have removed their weapons grade fissile material.7Isotope production is for the important uses of civil highly enriched uranium. Since the start of the Summit process, major isotope producing countries such as Belgium, Canada, France, Holland, South Africa are committed to reducing the production of highly enriched uranium, and some have switched to low enriched uranium.8

Secondly, more and more countries participate in the international nuclear security cooperation, which enhances the performance effects of the international nuclear security mechanism. There are two cornerstones of the international nuclear security regime, the Convention on the Physical Protection of the Nuclear Materials and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. The former is the only international instrument on the physical protection of nuclear material, signed and entered into effect in 1980, initially focused on ensuring the safety of nuclear material transport. After the amendment of the Convention in 2005, the scope of application is extended to civil nuclear materials and nuclear facilities. However, the amendment has so far failed to take effect because the signature has not yet met the requirements of the 2/3 Member States, i.e. 101 member countries to ratify for it officially to entre into force. At the end of 2009 before the start of the Summit process, only 33 countries including China ratified the amendment to the Convention.9By May 2016, the amendment to the Convention is ratified by 101 member countries, and finally comes into force, provides the necessary legal framework to strengthen international nuclear security cooperation. The International Convention for the Suppression of the Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, being formulated in 2005 and requiring all countries to cooperate in the fight against transnational nuclear terrorism, which took effect in 2007. But before the Summit, there were only about 60 member states. Under the impetus of the Summit process, the universality of the Convention has been enhanced, by March 2016, Member States increase to 101.10The Summit process also produced pressure on the U.S. Congress. In July 2015, the United States finally ratified these two Conventions after years of delay.

To ensure international cooperation on nuclear security will not lose impetus due to the end of theSsummit process, at the Fourth Nuclear Security Summit, the multilateral mechanisms including the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Criminal Police Organization, Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Global Partnership Against Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction and others formulate an action plan. The IAEA Nuclear Security Conference will be the main carrier after the end of the Summit process, which will be held every three years. So far, the meeting was held in July 2013 and in December 2016.

At the beginning of the Obama Administration, the United States was being increasingly criticized because of the one-sided emphasis on non-proliferation, blindly launching the Iraq war, reducing the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, etc., and faced with the poor image of arms control. The Obama Administration was in an urgent need to reverse the decline, and the nuclear security subject provides the appropriate starting point, which gathers the heads of state of major countries together, but can easily bypass the differences and frictions between nuclear weapon states like that of nuclear disarmament issue, and is unlikely to trigger quarrels between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states like that of the non-proliferation issue. Through the Nuclear Security Summit, the Obama Administration started innovative diplomacy, and achieved the multiple diplomatic goals.

Firstly, carrying out the Gift Basket diplomacy, structuring big and small multilateral nuclear security cooperation networks. The Gift Basket diplomacy is one of the U.S. great inventions during preparations of the Nuclear Security Summit. Because of large number of participants in the Nuclear Security Summit, the Summit Communique can only get the lowest standard according to the principle of consultative consensus, cannot fully meet the U.S. policy goals. In order to solve this problem, the United States in preparation for the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit proposed various participating countries to make their nuclear security commitments in line with their actual reality as a Gift Basket presented to the Summit. Other like-minded countries can make joint proposals, or join these Gift Baskets. The fruits are rich, the Seoul Summit received 3 dozen countries to participate in the 14 Gift Baskets, the Hague Summit received 46 countries to participate in the 14 Gift Baskets.

Their contents involve all aspects, from anti-nuclear smuggling to nuclear law, from the removal of highly enriched uranium to strengthening nuclear safety enforcement, etc.. This approach speeds up substantive progress in nuclear security cooperation, reducing the burden on the United States. By participating in the majority of the Gift Baskets, the United States also achieves a leadership from behind, attains a special hub position in the new-type nuclear safety cooperation network. Secondly, by making use of the platform, the United States has held a series of bilateral meetings to discuss security hotspots, handled the relationship between major powers. During the Seoul Summit, the "Microphone Door" incident exposed the U.S.- Russia Summit on the anti-missile plan consultation. At the Hague Summit, the focus shifted to the Crimea crisis, the Western leaders of the Group-8 had marginal meetings, which kicked Russians out of the Group. Thirdly, taking advantage of the Summit campaign, Obama successfully created the nuclear arms control promoter image. He won the Nobel peace prize, American arms control discourse also improved. This in turn had created favorable conditions for Obama to seek international support, join forces to promote negotiations to put pressure to solve the Iran nuclear issue.

II. The nuclear security issue may gradually withdraw from summit diplomacy's agenda in the future and return to the technical exchanges and cooperation

With the changing situation, the momentum of international nuclear security cooperation has declined. The nuclear security issue may gradually withdraw from summit diplomacy's agenda in the future and return to the technical exchanges and cooperation.

From the security perspective, the attitude of the United States on nuclear security and nuclear modernization in recent years has shown a shifting trend. In response to its military strategy readjustments, the U.S. nuclear strategy is preparing for a return to major-countries conflicts. The U.S. defense budget for 2017 fiscal year makes it clear that the strengthening nuclear weapons is to counter the "Russian aggressive act".11Meanwhile, the U.S. attention on the nuclear security issue is on decline. This trend is clearly reflected in its budget application. For the 2015 fiscal year budget, the Obama Administration cut $40 million for nuclear security program including nonproliferation project spending by the Ministry of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration, but increased $50 million for the nuclear weapons planning program. Not only that, from 2011 to 2016, the U.S. nuclear security budget application decreased progressively for 5 years running. Some nuclear security projects is postponed for the complete deadline. For example, due to the U.S. "Global Threat Reduction Initiative" budget cuts, the complete deadline of transformation or closure of 200 highly enriched uranium research reactors is postponed from the years 2020 to 2030, and then to the year 2035.12

From the perspective of diplomacy, nuclear arms control issues are in the conversion, non-nuclear weapon states launched the "Humanitarian Initiative" having brought disarmament pressure to the United States, but the Nuclear Security Summit offered little help to respond to the pressure. Dissatisfied with the stagnation of the nuclear disarmament process, the non-nuclear weapon states have erected the banner of "Humanitarian Initiative" to try to make the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons illegal. Currently, there are about 100 countries involved. Regarding the nuclear terrorism issue the Nuclear Security Summit kept focused, many non-nuclear weapon states believe that it has little to do with them. Therefore, the effect of nuclear safety issues serving as cohesion of people, and promotion and publicity was weakened. In order to cope with the new pressure, the United States figures out new tactics. For example, it sends representatives to participate in the "Humanitarian Initiative" Conference. Again for example, it advocates the establishment of International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, inviting non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear weapon states together to have dialogues on nuclear disarmament verification issue so as to resolve their grievances. The favor status of nuclear security issue is something in the past.

In the field of nuclear security, the United States and Russia are still the superpowers for other countries too far behind to catch up. The two countries have 90% of the world's HEU stock, more than 50% of HEU reactors, and most of HEU reactors in other regions come from the United States and Russia, thus bear great significance for improving the global nuclear security situation and ensuring the practical results of nuclear safety cooperation. But in recent years, the tense relations between the United States and Russia is exerting an impact on nuclear security cooperation. In 2012, Russia announced that the Cooperation on Threat Reduction Program expires in May 2013, and will no longer be extended because Russia no longer needs foreign aid, and is also worried about the disclosure of sensitive information. In June 2013, after consultations between the two countries, nuclear security cooperation in the Program based on the "2003 Russian Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme Framework Agreement will continue, but the cooperation on removal and destruction of missiles and bombers, chemical weapons comes to a stop. After the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis, the U.S.- Russian nuclear security cooperation is further affected. After the G-8 expelled Russia in March 2014, Russia will no longer participate in the Group's Global Partnership Against Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Material. Russia was not only absent from the Fourth Nuclear Security Summit, and in October also suspended the Russian-U.S. Weapons-grade Plutonium Disposal Agreement. So far, the U.S.-Russian nuclear security cooperation is not completely cut off, and they still work together to ship highly enriched uranium in Kazakhstan and Poland back to Russia, and have also co-chaired the "Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism". But undoubtedly, Russia's negative attitude will cast a shadow over the prospects of the U.S.-launched nuclear security cooperation.

The goal of ensuring global easy-loss nuclear material safety is not accomplished on time. By April 2013, the deadline for the Obama-proposed goal to ensure the safety of the world's easy-loss nuclear materials was missed, so the goal was not reached. In May 2013, the National Nuclear Security Administration of the United States said in an internal report that, despite the great progress, the world's civil weapons-grade fissile material is still enough to make 40000 nuclear weapons.13Not only that, the global stock of plutonium still in contrarian growth, the plutonium of current annual production is enough to produce 740 nuclear weapons.14Japan's plutonium problem is particularly serious. According to the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association and China Institute Of Nuclear Information and Economics, Japan has 208.8 tons of separated plutonium, only domestic storage of 10.8 tons of separated plutonium is enough to manufacture 1350 nuclear warheads. If the Japanese Rokkasho reprocessing facility put in operation in March 2016 according to the plan, and the full scale operation in 2019, it will produce a total of 8 tons of separated plutonium annually.15In addition, Russia, Britain, India, Pakistan, North Korea also continue to produce high enriched uranium or separated plutonium.16

The Nuclear Security Summit focused on civil nuclear materials, but the United States intended to include the issue of military-use nuclear material in its agenda, the reason is that civil nuclear materials account for only 15% of global nuclear materials stock, the remaining 85% is the military-use nuclear materials, so the comprehensive nuclear security mechanism must cover the military use nuclear materials. But it faced many difficulties. The idea of setting safety standards for nuclear materials is opposed by France and Russia, and India, Pakistan, Israel de facto nuclear weapon states do not agree. Samore, a former coordinator for control of weapons of mass destruction and counterterrorism, said that even the U.S. military is hard to accept.17Based on practical considerations, the United States did not advance rashly.

The United States intends to standardize more stringent transparency measures, give the IAEA greater decision-making to perform supervision and accountability. In addition, it was proposed to sign the Nuclear Security Convention and other recommendations. But the Non- Aligned Movement clearly stated that the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy by developing countries cannot be infringed, rejected or restricted with strengthening nuclear security or nuclear safety as an excuse or means.18In order to take care of the concerns of developing countries, the future international nuclear security cooperation still relies on the IAEA, strengthens nuclear security peer review, experience sharing and technical cooperation. Those countries in more urgent needs should take the Gift Basket approach to increase cooperation efforts, implement the relevant provisions of the IAEA, but no institutions or regulations are set by using one size to fit all approach.

China is an important partner of the Obama Administration's Nuclear Security Diplomacy. Chinese leaders took an active part in the previous Nuclear Security Summits and carried out a series of fruitful dialogue and cooperation with the United States. Nuclear security has become a new tie to link the Sino-U.S. relations. With the Nuclear Security Summit coming to an end, the U.S. nuclear security diplomacy with a strong Obama personal brand will be cooling down. Trump almost never mentioned the issue of nuclear security in the general elections, so that some nuclear safety experts laughed at him when mentioning nuclear safety, what is on his mind is to ensure that nuclear weapons to be promptly and effectively launched, but not to combat nuclear terrorism. It cannot be expected that after being in the White House he will continue to promote international nuclear security cooperation as a policy priority. Those who wish to strengthen their ties and improve relations with the United States by nuclear security will also gradually lose interest. In December this year, the IAEA convened a Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety, only 1/3 of the members designated the ministerial level leaders to attend the meeting. But the threat of nuclear terrorism remains. On March 1st, the media exposed that terrorists in close contact with the Islamic State were trying to kidnap the Belgian nuclear scientists, and grab nuclear materials. In order to prevent the nightmare of nuclear terrorism from becoming a reality, it is necessary for China and the United States to deepen practical cooperation on nuclear law, anti-nuclear smuggling, nuclear safety training, and nuclear facilities network security and other issues, and safeguard common security interests.

Footnotes:

1.“Prospectus on Nucleonics,” a report submitted to Arthur H. Compton, November 18, 1944.

2.Oleg Bukharin , The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism and the Physical Security of Nuclear Installations and Materials in the former Soviet Union, Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1992.

3.National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002, p.1, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/16092.pdf. （Internet date March 4, 2016）

4.Nuclear Posture Review, April 2010, p.iv， http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/NPR. （Internet date March 4, 2016）

5.International Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile Material Report 2013: Increasing Transparency of Nuclear Warhead and Fissile Material Stocks as a Step,Toward Disarmament, October 22, 2013, p. 11, http://fissilematerials.org/library/gfmr13.pdf. （Internet date March 4, 2016）

6.International Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile Material Report 2013: Increasing Transparency of Nuclear Warhead and Fissile Material Stocks as a Step,Toward Disarmament, October 22, 2013, p.8, http://fissilematerials.org/library/gfmr13.pdf. （Internet date March 4, 2016）

7.Deepti Choubey, “From Sprint to Marathon: The 2014 Nuclear Security Summit and the Path Ahead”, Arms Control Today, May 1, 2014,

https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014_05/From-Sprint-to-Marathon-The-2014-Nuclear-Security-Summit-and-the-Path-Ahead. （Internet date March 4, 2016）

8.Gareth Evans, Tanya Ogilvie-White and Ramesh Thakur, Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play 2015, February 2015, p.200.

9.https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/nuclear_safety_and_security.pdf. （Internet date March 4, 2016）

10.STATUS AS AT : 04-03-2016 05:01:12 EDT, International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, March 4, 2016, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-15&chapter=18&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en. （Internet date March 4, 2016）

11.Alex Emmons, “Obama’s Russian Rationale for $1 Trillion Nuke Plan Signals New Arms Race”, the Intercept, Feb. 23 2016, https://theintercept.com/2016/02/23/obamas-new-rationale-for-1-trillion-nuclear-program-augurs-a-new-arms-race-with-russia/.（Internet date March 4, 2016）

12.?Nickolas Roth, “US Budget Request Shows Eroding Focus on Nuclear Security”, March 25, 2014，http://nuclearsecuritymatters.belfercenter.org/blog/nnsa-budget-shows-eroding-focus-nuclear-security. （Internet date March 4, 2016）

13. Douglas Birch, “Obama curbs nuclear security goals as bomb-building budget grows”, July 29, 2014, ?http://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/07/29/15164/obama-curbs-nuclear-security-goals-bomb-buil. （Internet date March 4, 2016）

14. Ibid.

15.http://www.cacda.org.cn/ueditor/php/upload/file/20151010/1444458950245281.pdf. （Internet date March 4, 2016）

16.Gareth Evans, Tanya Ogilvie-White and Ramesh Thakur, Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play 2015, February 2015, p.203.

17.Douglas Birch, R. Jeffrey Smith, “Obama steps back from sweeping nuclear security goal”, http://www.publicintegrity.org/2015/06/15/17471/obama-steps-back-sweeping-nuclear-security-goal. （Internet date March 4, 2016）

18.Final Document: 16th Summit of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, August 31, 2012.http://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/nam-iransummitfinaldocument-083112.pdf. （Internet date March 4, 2016）